

THE CONCLUSION.

Defending the Soul's Immortality against the Somatists or Epicureans, and other Pseudo-philosophers.

THOUGH in this treatise I have not wilfully balked any regardable objections, which I thought might stick with an intelligent reader, about the truth of the things here delivered; yet, those which are proper to the somatistical, irreligious sect of philosophers, I thought more fit to put here as an appendix by themselves, that they might not stop the more sober in their way.

As to the subject and method of this discourse, it consisteth of these four parts: 1. The proof of the Deity, and what God is. 2. Of the certain obligations which lie upon man, to be holy and obedient to this God. 3. The proofs of a life of retribution hereafter, where the holy and obedient shall be blessed, and the unholy and disobedient punished. 4. The proofs of the verity of the christian faith.

For the first of these, that there is a God, though I have proved it beyond all rational contradiction, yet I have despatched it with haste and brevity; because it is to the mind as the sun is to the eye, and so evident in all that is evident in the world, that there needeth nothing to the proving of it, but to help the reader to a rational capacity and aptitude, to see that which all the world declareth. The common argument, from the effects to the cause, in all the entities and motions in the world, is undeniable. Whatsoever any being hath, and hath not originally from itself, or independently in itself, it must needs have from another; and that other cannot act beyond its power, nor give that which it hath not either formally or eminently; therefore, he that findeth in the world about him so much entity and motion, so much intellection, volition, and operation, and so much wisdom, goodness, and power, must needs know that all these have some cause, which, formally or eminently, or in a way of transcendency, hath more itself than it giveth to others.

I measured my endeavours about this subject, according as the occasions of my own soul had led me. Among all the temptations which have at any time assaulted me, I have found those so contemptible and inconsiderable, as to their strength, which would have made me doubt of the being of God, that I am apt to think that it is so with others; and, therefore, in the review of this discourse, I find no reason to stand to answer any man's objections against the being, or essential attributes or properties of God.^a

And for the second point, that we all owe to this God our absolute resignation, obedience and love, and so that holiness is naturally our duty, it doth so naturally result from the nature of God and man compared, that I can scarcely think of any thing worthy of a confutation which can be said against it, but that which denieth the nature of God or man; and, therefore, is either confuted under the first head, or is to be confuted under the third.

As for the fourth particular contained in the second tome,^b (the truth of the Gospel,) I find not any reason to defend it more particularly, nor to answer any more objections than I have done; for, in proving the truth, I have proved all the contradictory assertions to be false; and I have answered already the greatest objections: and after this, to answer every ignorant exception of unsatisfied persons, against the several passages of the Scripture, would be tedious, and not necessary to the end of my design. And, indeed, I perceive not that any considerable number are troubled with doubtings of the truth of the christian faith, in a prevalent degree, who are well convinced of those antecedent verities of the Deity, and of the natural obligation and necessity of holiness, and of the immortality of the soul, or of a future life of reward and punishment, and that live in any reasonable conformity to these natural principles which they profess. For when natural evidence hath sufficiently convinced a man that he is obliged to be holy, in absolute obedience and love to

^a Si vis Deorum speciem apprehendere, proprietates animæ rationalis ultimæ cogita, et oppositas in perfectione Diis attribue.—*Jamblic. de Myst. per Ficin.*

^b When Mahomet had taken Constantinople, and demanded of the patriarch an account of the christian faith, George Scholarius, alius Gennadius, then patriarch, wrote that brief summary which you may find in Mart. Crucius's 'Turco Graæ.' (l. 2;) 'Hist. Eccles.' (p. 10,) &c. which very well openeth the mystery of the Trinity, and of Christianity, with seven reasons of it.

his Creator, through the hopes and fears of another life, he is very much prepared to close with the design and doctrine of the Gospel, which is so far from contradicting this, that it doth but confirm it, and show us the way by which it may most certainly be brought to pass.

And, therefore, my observation and experiences constrain me to think, that there is no point which I have insisted on, which so much calleth for my vindication, as the third about the life to come.

I know there is a sort of overwise and overdoing divines, who will tell their followers in private, where there is none to contradict them, that the method of this treatise is perverse, as appealing too much to natural light, and overvaluing human reason ; and that I should have done no more but shortly tell men that all that which God speaketh in his word is true ; and that, *propria luce*, it is evident that the Scripture is the word of God ; and that to all God's elect he will give his Spirit to cause them to discern it ; and that this much alone had been better than all these disputes and reasons : but these overwise men, who need themselves no reason for their religion, and judge accordingly of others, and think that those men who rest not in the authority of Jesus Christ should rest in theirs, are many of them so well acquainted with me, as not to expect that I should trouble them in their way, or reason against them, who speak against reason, even in the greatest matters which our reason is given us for. As much as I am addicted to scribbling, I can quietly dismiss this sort of men, and love their zeal, without the labour of opening their ignorance.

My task, therefore, in this conclusion, shall be only to defend the doctrine delivered in this foregoing treatise, of the life to come, or the soul's immortality, against some who call themselves philosophers. For of men so called, it is but a small part who at all gainsay this weighty truth. The followers of Plato, the divine philosopher, with the Pythagoreans, the stoics, the cynics, and divers other sects, are so much for it, that, indeed, the most of them go too far, and make the soul to be eternal both *à parte ante*, and *à parte post* : and Cicero doth conclude, from its self-moving power, that it is certainly eternal and divine : insomuch that not only Arnobius, but many other ancient Christians, write so much against Plato for holding the soul to be naturally immortal, and assert themselves, that it is of a middle nature, between that which is naturally immortal,

and that which is merely mortal, that he that doth not well understand them, may be scandalized at their expressions, and think that he readeth the philosophers' defending the soul's immortality, and the Christians' opposing it. And though Aristotle's opinion be questioned by many, yet Cicero, who lived in time and places wherein he had better advantage than we to know his meaning, doth frequently affirm, that he was in the main of Plato's mind; and that the academics, peripatetics, and stoics, differed more in words than sense; chiding the stoics for their schism or separation, in setting up a school or sect as new, which had almost nothing new but words. Not only Fernelius, *de abditis rerum causis*, but many others have vindicated Aristotle, however his obscurity hath given men occasion to keep up that controversy. And if the book 'De Mundo,' be undoubtedly his, I see no reason to make any more question of his meaning; much less if that book be his which is entitled, 'Mystica Ægypt. et Chald. Philos.' which Aben Ama Arabs translated out of Greek into Arabic, which Franc. Roseus brought from Damascus, and Moses Rovas Medicus Hæb. translated into Italian, and Pet. Nicol. Castellinus into Latin, and Patricius thinketh Aristotle took from Plato's mouth.^c

It is only, then, the Epicureans, and some novel somatists, that I have now to answer, who think they have much to say against the separated subsistence and immortality of man's soul, which I may reduce to these objections following:

I. Matter and motion, without any more, may do all that which you ascribe to incorporeal substances of souls: therefore, you assert them without ground. II. To confirm this, the brutes have sense, imagination, thought, and reason, by matter and motion only, without immortal or incorporeal substances; therefore, by sense, imagination, thoughts, or reason, you cannot prove that man hath more. III. Forms are but accidents, that is, qualities or the mode of matter, and not substances different from matter: therefore, it is so with human souls. IV. The

^c That Plato and Aristotle were of one opinion about the soul, Mirandula and Mars. Ficinus, ('Upon Priscians Theophrastus de Anima,') have largely laboured to evince. Galen is known to speak many objections against Plato, and the soul's immortality, but in other places he speaketh doubtfully: and if really Nemesius had those words out of such a book of Galen, as he citeth, 'De Ani.' (c. ii. p. 481,) he would then seem to have thought better of the rational soul. Plotinus's last words were, as Porphyry saith in his 'Life,' "I am now returning that which is divine in us, to that which is divine in the universe."

soul dependeth upon matter in its operations, and acteth according to it, and not without it : therefore, it is material, and consequently mortal. V. No immaterial substance moveth that which is material, or is the principle of its operations ; but the soul moveth the body as the principle of its operations : *ergo*. VI. If in our dreams the thoughts do operate only according to the accidental irregular motion of the spirits, and sometimes be so inactive, that we do not so much as dream, then the soul is nothing but the said active spirits, or some material, corruptible thing : But, &c. *ergo*. VII. Sense is a more perfect apprehension than reason : therefore, brutes, which have sense, have as noble and perfect a kind of soul as man ; or, at least, reason is no proof of the immateriality of souls. VIII. Sensation and intellection are both but reception, and the soul is but a patient in them, *ergo* : it is not a self-moving, and so not an incorporeal substance. IX. Nothing is in the understanding but what is first in the sense : *ergo*, the understanding can reach no farther than to sensible things : *ergo*, it is itself of no higher a kind. X. Corporeal objects move the soul, *ergo*, it is corporeal. For things material cannot work upon that which is immaterial. XI. If the soul were incorporeal, it would know itself to be so ; but it is not only ignorant of that, but hath no true notion, but merely negative, of immaterial beings. XII. That which is generated, is corruptible ; but the soul is generated, as is proved by Senertus, and many others. XIII. *Quicquid oritur interit* ; that which is not eternal as to the past duration, is not eternal as to the future duration : but all Christians maintain, that the soul is either created or generated, and not of eternal duration, as to what is past : and all the philosophers, or most who took it to be eternal as to future duration, went on that ground, that it was so antecedently. XIV. You give us none but moral arguments for the soul's immortality. XV. Nay, you confess, that the soul's eternal duration cannot by you be proved by any natural evidence, though you think you so prove a life of retribution. XVI. The soul and body are like a candle, where oil, and wick, and fire, (which are all,) are in *fluxu continuo* ; and as there is not the same individual flame this hour as was the last, so neither have we the same individual souls ; *ergo*, they are incapable of a life of retribution hereafter. XVII. If the soul be a durable substance, (as we must confess no substance is annihilated,) it is most likely to come from the *anima mundi*, or some

universal soul of that orb or system of which it is a part, and so to return to it again, as the beams to the sun; and so to cease its individuation, and consequently to be incapable of a life of retribution. XVIII. The Platonists, who hold the soul's immortality, (and some Platonic divines too,) have so many fopperies about its vehicles, regions, and transmutations, as make their principal doctrine the less credible. XIX. If the soul should continue its individuation, yet its actings will be nothing like what they are in the body; nor can they exercise a memory of what they did in the body, as having not the material spirits and nerves by which memory is exercised; and, therefore, they can have no proper retribution, especially punishment, for any thing here done. XX. The belief of the immortality of the soul doth fill men with fears, and take up their lives in superstitious cares for a life to come, which might be spent in quietness, and in public works: and it fills the world with all those religious sects and controversies which have so long destroyed charity and peace.

These are the objections which I have here to answer.

Object. I. Matter and motion, without any more, may do all that which you ascribe to souls.^d

Answ. When nothing seemeth to us more false and absurd than the matter of your objection; you cannot expect that your naked assertion should satisfy us without proof; and a satisfactory proof must reach to all the noblest instances, and must have better evidence than the bold and confident affirmations of men, who expect that their conceptions should be taken for the flower of reason, whilst they are pleading against the reasoning nature itself. And to what authors will they send us for the proof of this assertion; is it to Mr. Hobbs? We have perused him, and weighed his reasons, and find them such as reflect no dishonour on the understandings of those who judge them to be

^d The Platonists' opinion, that the soul is all the man, and that *animus cūjusque* is *est quisque*, is incomparably more probable, and of more honest tendency, than theirs that think the body is all the man. *Qui putant hominem esse ex anima corporeque compositum, consequenter utile à justo se jungunt: qui vero hominem esse animam conjungunt.*—*Proclus de Anim. et Dæm. per Ficin.*

What then will they hold and do, that think man is *tantum corpus*. For as Proclus there saith, and Cicero often, most philosophers agree that *vivere secundum suam naturam*, is man's great duty and felicity: therefore, as men differ about man's nature, they will differ about his duty and felicity. They that think he is all body, will describe his work and his happiness accordingly: a truth of sad and desperate consequence.

void of probability as well as cogent evidence. But after so smart a castigation as he hath received from the learned Dr. Ward (now Bishop of Exeter), and from that clear-headed primate of Ireland, Dr. Bramhal, I hope it will not be expected that I trouble myself or my reader with him here. Is it to Gassendus? he writeth for the immaterial, created human soul himself; and charity obligeth me not to charge him with prevarication, whatsoever to Cartesius or anywhere else he writeth, which seemeth injurious to this doctrine: and if Sorberius number it with his honours, (in vita Gassendi,) that Mr. Hobbs could not sufficiently admire his work, "*Qui Heroem nostrum nunquam majorem apparere pronunciabat, quàm in retundendis larvis, tenues in auras tam facile diffugientibus, gladio imperviis, nec ictum clavæ excipientibus: ita enim sentiebat vir emunctæ naris de meditationibus Cartesii et de illa Gassendi disquisitione,*" &c. It was because he weighed not honour in an English balance, or judged not of an Englishman by an English judgment, nor himself well perceived what was indeed honourable or dishonourable in his friend. If you send us to Epicurus and Lucretius, they are so overwhelmed with the number of adversaries that have fallen upon them, that it is a dishonour to give them another blow. Besides all the crowd of peripatetics, Platonists, and stoics, even the moderate latitudinarian Cicero hath spit so often in the face of Epicurus, that when Gassendus had laboured hard in wiping it, he thought meet to let this spot alone. But because it is only this sort of men that are the adversaries with whom we do contend, I will this once be so troublesome to the reader, as to give him first some general countercharges and reasons against the authority of these men; and next, some particular reasons against the objected sufficiency of matter and motion, to do the offices which we ascribe to souls.

And, 1. When I find men dispute against man, and reason against the power of reason, I think human interest alloweth me to be distrustful of their sophistry, and to yield no further than I have cogent evidence. If man's soul be his form, he denieth man to be man, who denieth him that soul.

2. I find philosophers so little agreed among themselves, that it greatly diminisheth their authority, and requireth a man who is just to his reason, to make a very accurate trial before he fall in with any of their opinions. Their divisions are sufficiently opened and aggravated by Laertius, Cicero, and many more of themselves; and contemptuously displayed by Hermas, Arno-

bis, Athenagoras, Lactantius, Eusebius, and many other Christians. There are few things that one asserteth, but there are many to rise up against him and contradict it. They must better defend themselves against one another, before their authority be much revered by others.

3. I find the wisest of them so conscious of their ignorance, that they take most for uncertain which they say themselves, and confess they talk but in the dark, which made the Pyrrhonians and Arcesilaus have so many followers, and Cicero, with the academics, so over-modest in disclaiming certainty and confidence, and writing by dialogues, with so much indifference and wavering as they did. I need not send you to Zanchez's '*Nihil scitur*,' nor to our Mr. Glanvil's '*Vanity of Dogmatizing*,' for satisfaction. The learned Gassendus's modesty is sufficient, who, if he speak of occult qualities, will ask you what qualities are not occult; and if he speak of the magnitude and distances of the stars, will tell you how little possibility of assurance is left to mortals about those things which others, with over-much confidence, have asserted;^e and about the case in hand, he could no better defend Epicurus, against Cicero's "*Hoc est optare, et provincias dare atomis, non disputare*," than by confessing, "*Vere quidem id objici; sed eam tamen esse ingenii humani imbecilitatem, ut objici idem nemini non possit. De ipsis principiis dicere nil aliud licet, nisi quod hæc isto, illa illo modo se habeant, ex suæ naturæ necessitate; cum ignoremus germanam causam ob quam ita se habeant; imo cum ea frustra quæatur, nisi sit eundem in infinitum.*" (Sec. 1, l. iii. c. 7, p. 275.) And ingenuously he confesseth, (Sec. 2, l. ii. c. 3, p. 560,) "*Verum quicquid dicatur (scil. per Cartesium et Epicurum) hypothesis semper mera est, ac difficultas remanet, fierique nihil tutius potest, quàm profitendo ignorantiam, totum quem videmus rerum ordinem in arbitrium, summi opificis conferre. Dicere certe quod aliqui, solem v. g. idcirco hic potius quàm alibi esse, quia ejus natura ita exigat, id quidem vere dicitur; sed interim nil aliud est, quàm respondere ipsum quæsitum, et dissimulando ignorantiam, videri esse animi in causam optimam parum grati.*" Which is true, and applicable to many other cases. And it was ingenuously confessed lately by the

^e The truth is, as fire is, per essentiam, a moving, enlightening, heating substance, so the soul is, per essentiam, a life, or vital principle; and, therefore, as Porphyry argueth, for the soul to die, is for life itself to die, or that which is, per essentiam, life to cease to be what it is.

very ingenious Mr. Samuel Parker, "I am lately grown such a despairing sceptic in all physiological theories, that I cannot concern myself in the truth or falsehood of any hypotheses ; for, though I prefer the mechanical hypotheses before any other, yet methinks their contexture is too slight and brittle to have any stress laid upon them ; and I can resemble them to nothing better than your glass-drops, from which, if the least portion be broken, the whole compages immediately dissolves and shatters into dust and atoms : for their parts, which rather lie than hang together, being supported only by the thin film of a brittle conjecture, not annealed by experience and observation," &c. And upon the like reasons, it is rejected by that eminently learned and industrious man, Dr. Willis, 'De Ferment. (p. 3.)' "At quoniam principia sua supponit potius quam demonstrat, docetque qualis figuræ elementa ista corporum sint, non quæ ipsa fuerint, atque etiam notiones inducit valde subtiles et à sensu remotas, quæque naturæ phænomenis quando ad particularia descenditur, non satis quadrant, hac insuper habita," &c.^f

4. And I find that the philosophers who have rejected or vilified Epicurus and his way, have been very numerous ; multitudes to a few, and of the most venerable names in the ages and places where they lived ; and no one sect of them so vilified by the rest, as the Epicureans were by all.

5. I find, also, that the most who in this age adhere to the Epicurean or Cartesian hypotheses, are the younger sort of ingenious men, who have received prejudice against the peripatetics, Platonists, and stoics, before they did ever thoroughly study them ; but, reverencing more some person noted for much ingenuity, by his authority, have been drawn to defend what they scarcely understand themselves ; and that it is the mere novelty of some of these new-started notions, which maketh them so much followed ; as novelties in religion are with some young and wanton wits : and, accordingly, I expect that, ere long, they will grow out of fashion, and die again, before ever they come to have such supporters as the other philosophy hath had.

^f Quibusdam qui ne ignem calere putant, nisi eum manu contrectarint, nihil credendum esse placet, quod supra progredientem naturam videatur. Multorum quoque studia tardantur, quod id credere noluit quod minus sub eorum cognitionem cadit : quæ errorum pravitas ex ingeniorum imbecillitate defluxit : siquidem cum sensuum angustia ex quibus hominem agnitio eruitur, in externorum sensilium genere versentur, satis notem esse debet, his tanquam compedibus intelligentiæ cursum retardari, divinaque capessere nequire.—*Paul. Cartes. in 1 Sent. dis. 9. p. 22.*

6. *Respicere ad plurima*, to take in all that must be taken in, is the character of true wisdom. But I find that the Epicureans do *respicere ad pauca*; they look so much at things corporeal, that they quite overlook the noblest natures; and they reduce all to matter and motion, because nothing but matter and motion is thoroughly studied by them. And, like idle boys, who tear out all the hard leaves of their books, and say they have learned all when they have learned the rest; so do they cut off and deny the noblest parts of nature, and then sweep together the dust of agitated atoms, and tell us that they have resolved all the phenomena in nature.

7. And I find that they are very kind-natured to their own conceptions, and take those for demonstrations, which other men think are more like dreams.

8. I perceive that they are deluded by taking the *vestigia* and images of things, for the things themselves. The intellectual nature is the image of the divine, and the sensitive of the intellectual, and the vegetative of the sensitive, and the fiery of the incorporeal. And when they can prove no more in any of the lower, but such an image of the higher, they would on that advantage confound them all; and would hence conclude that brutes are intellectual, and deny the differencing forms of all things.

9. I find that as they look so much at the organ, as to overlook the agent; and look so much at the particles of matter, as to overlook the different natures of it; so do they observe the second cause with so narrow a mind, as much to overlook the first: or when they have acknowledged that there is a God, they think they have done fair, though afterwards they consider not that interest of his in all operations, which their own concessions necessarily infer.

10. Lastly, I perceive that they proceed not methodically in their collections, but confound all by mixing certainties with uncertainties: whereas the first, the great, the most discernible truths, should be first congested as certainties by themselves, and the uncertainties should not be pleaded against them, nor suffered to stand in contest with them.

Perceiving all these general reasons to distrust this sort of philosophers above others, though I resolve to be impartial, I cannot willingly be so foolish as to overlook their disadvantage in the present cause.

II. The particular reasons which dissuade me from believing

the Epicurean sufficiency of matter and motion, are these following :

1. They all, with whom I have now to do, are constrained to confess an incorporeal, intellectual substance, even that there is a God, and that God is such. Epicurus himself doth not deny it ; yea, seemeth to speak magnificently of God, and in honour to him would excuse his providence from the minding of inferior things. For, 1. They know that matter did not make itself, and motion is but its mode ; and, therefore, matter cannot be made by its own motion. Its being is in order of nature before its motion ; and matter is in itself so dull a thing, and by the adversaries stripped of all forms, which are not caused by motion, that if it were said to be from eternity in its duration, they will confess it could be but as an eternal effect of some nobler cause : so that at the first word they grant, that matter hath an incorporeal cause. 2. And motion, as it is found in matter, could not cause itself : though it be but the mode of matter, it is such a mode as must have a cause. And the passive matter yet unmoved, is supposed by themselves to be void of all antecedent, moving power ; so that they are all fain to say that God made the matter, and gave it the first push. And so all matter and motion is reduced to a first Efficient, who is incorporeal ; and, therefore, an incorporeal Being is acknowledged.^g

2. I meet with none of them who dare deny this God to be an intellectual, Free-agent ; so that though it be granted them, that *intelligere velle* be not in God the same thing formally as it is in man, yet it is something which eminently must be so called, man having no fitter expression of it, than from these acts of his own soul. Epicurus will not make God defectively ignorant, impotent, or bad. When themselves divide all things into such as have understanding, and such as have none, of which part do they suppose God to stand ? Things that are void of understanding, formally or eminently, are below the dignity of things that have understanding. So that they confess there is existent an incorporeal, intelligent, Free-agent.^h

^g Read the 'Mystic. Ægypt.' and Chald. Philos. to prove that souls are not corporeal ; and Nemesius and Mammertus.

^h If the soul be nothing but matter and motion, then no man is the same this year as he was the last. For matter is in fluxu continuo, as they object themselves anon : we have not the same flesh and blood to-day which we lately had ; and the motion of this instant is not the same with the motion which succeedeth in the next ; so that no man's soul, and consequently no man, is long the same. And so (as I have said after) kings will lose their titles to their crowns, and all men to their lands, as being not the same who

3. As they confess that this intellectual agent is the first cause both of matter and motion, so they cannot deny that he still causeth both, by his continued influx, or causing efficacy : for there can be no effect without a cause ; and therefore, when the cause ceaseth, the effect must cease. The material part of a moral cause may cease, and yet the effect continue : but that moral causation continueth which is proportioned to the effect. The parent may die while the child surviveth ; but there is a continued cause of the life of the child, proportioned to the effect. Matter is not an independent being. To say that God hath made it self-sufficient and independent, is to say that he hath made it a god. Suppose but a total cessation of the divine emanation, influx, and causation, and you must needs suppose also the cessation of all beings. If you say that when God hath once given it a being, it will continue of itself, till his power annihilate it : I answer, if it continue without a continuing causation, it must continue as an independent, self-sufficient being. But this is a contradiction, because it is a creature : God is no effect, and therefore needeth no cause of subsistence ; but the creature is an effect, and cannot subsist a moment without a continued cause. As the beams or communicated light cannot continue an instant, if there were a total cessation of the emanation of the luminary, because their being is merely dependent ; and they need no other positive annihilation, besides the cessation of the causation which did continue them. It was from one of your own poets that Paul cited : "In him we live, and move, and have our being, for we are his offspring." And nothing is more abhorrent to all common reason, than that this stone or dirt, which was nothing as yesterday, should be a god to itself, even one independent, self-sufficient being, as soon as it is created ; and so that God made as many demi-gods as atoms. We see, past doubt, that one creature cannot subsist or move without another, on which it is dependent ; how much less can any creature subsist without its continued reception

were born heirs to them ; and there must be no rewards or punishments, unless you will reward and punish one for another's faults, and they need no more to fear the pain or death which will befall them, than that which befalls their neighbour, because it is not the man that now is who must undergo it : nor should any man have a wife or child of his own one year together. If they like not these consequents, let them either prove that identifying matter and motion are permanent, or grant that some other permanent thing doth identify the person. See this as the argument of Ammonius and Numenius, pressed by Nemesius de Anim. c. 2. p. 477. Vid. et Cleanthis argumenta pro animæ corporeitate à Nemesio profligata, *ibid.* p. 479. &c.

of its Creator's influx? If you could suppose that for one moment there were no God, you must suppose there would be nothing. If I thought any would deny this, besides those inflated vertiginous brains, that are not to be disputed with, I would say more for the illustration of it.

Object. But though matter subsist not without a continued divine causation, or emanation, or efficacious volition, yet motion may continue when all divine causation of it ceaseth: because when God hath given it one push, that causeth a motion, which causeth another motion, and that another, and so, *in infinitum*, if there were no stop.

Answ. 1. If this were so, it must be on supposition of a *vis motiva communicata vel impressa*; for if there had been no such, the first motion would have not been, or all have presently ceased for want of a continued cause. As there is no motion *sine vi motiva*, so none can be communicated, but by the communication of that force. Action is not nothing, nor will be caused by nothing: as the *delapsus gravium* would presently cease, if we could cause the *pondus* or gravity to cease; so is it in all other motions. If there be no *vis*, or strength, communicated along with the motion, there would be nothing in that motion to cause another motion, nor in that to cause another. And if it were by way of traction, if the cause cease which is the *prima trahens*, all the motion ceaseth: and so, also, if it be by way of pulsion. So that in every motion there is something more than matter and motion.

2. All motion (of things below within our reach) hath many impediments, and therefore would cease, if the first Cause continued not his powerful efficacy. It is tedious and needless to enumerate instances.¹

3. The moving power of the noblest creatures, is not purely active, but partly passive, and partly active, and must receive the influx of the highest Cause, before it can act or communicate any thing. Therefore, as soon as the first Mover should

¹ If the doctrine of matter and motion only were true, there would never be any true miracles in the world, but all things go on from motion to motion, as the first touch did put them into a necessity; whereas, however the world hath been deluded by many fictions, yet many certain miracles there have been. Whether the removing of the mountain by faith, mentioned by M. Paulus Venetus (l. 1, cap. 18,) be true or not, and the non-dissolution of excommunicate bodies in Constantinople, mentioned in Mart. Crusius's '*Hist. Eccles. Turco-Græc.*' (l. 2,) with multitudes of the like, which most historians have, &c.; yet, certainly, that there have been some such, hath been fully proved unto many.

cease, the rest would be soon stopped, though some active power was communicated to them: as we see in a clock, when the poise is down, and in a watch, when the spring is down; the motion ceaseth first where it first began.

4. Can you constrain your reason to imagine that God is the sole, principal, active Cause, for the first touch, and, as it were, for one minute, or instant, (while he causeth the first motus,) and is an inactive being, or no cause ever after, save only reputative, because he caused the first. This is to say, that God was God till he made the world, and ever since he hath done nothing, but left every atom or creature to be god. Is God so mutable, to do all for one instant, and to do nothing ever after?

5. The infiniteness and perfection of God fully prove, that all continued motion is by the continuance of his efficiency. For it is undeniable, that he who made all things is everywhere, or present to all his creatures, in the most intimate proximity. And it is certain, that he cannot but know them all; and also that his benignity maintaineth all their beings and well-beings, and, therefore, that he is not an inactive Being; but that his power as well as his wisdom and goodness, is continually in act. How strangely do these Epicureans differ from Aristotle; who durst not deny the eternity of the world, lest he should make God an inactive Being *ad extra*, from eternity to the creation. When as these men feign him to have given but one instantaneous push, and to have been *cætera otiosus*, or inactive from eternity.

Seeing, then, it cannot by sober reason be denied, that God himself is by a continued causation, the Preserver and intimate first Mover of all things, it must needs thence follow, that matter and motion are still insufficient of themselves; and that this is to be none of the controversy between us: but only whether it be any created nature, power, or other cause, by which God causeth motion in any thing, or all things? Or whether he do it by his own immediate causation alone, without the use of any second cause, save mere motion itself? So that the insufficiency of matter and motion to continual alterations and productions, must be confessed by all that confess there is a God.

4. It is also manifest in the effect, that it is not a mere motion of the first cause, which appeareth in the being and motions of the creature. There is apparently a tendency in the creature's motion to a certain end, which is an attractive good; and there is a certain order in all motions to that end; and certain laws, or guidances, and over-rulings, to keep them in that order: so

that wisdom and goodness do eminently appear in them all, in their beings, natures, differences, excellences, order, and ends, as well as motion the effect of power. 1. It is certain that God who is unmoved himself, is the first Mover of all. 2. And if God were not unmoved, but by self-motion caused motion, yet he exerteth wisdom and goodness in his creation and providence, as well as motion. 1. He that is infinite, and, therefore, not properly in any place or space, or at least is limited in none, can himself, by locomotion, move himself in none; which, methinks, none should question: and they that make the world infinite, or at least indefinite, as they call it, methinks should not deny the infiniteness of God: and they acknowledge no motion themselves but locomotion, or *migratio à loco in locum*. But, saith Gassendus: (vol. 1. p. 337 :) “Et certe captum omnem fugit, ut quippiam quantumvis sit alteri præsens conjunctumque ipsum moveat, si in seipso immotum maneat, &c.—Itaque necesse omnino videtur, ut cum in serie moventium quorum moventur alia ab aliis procedi in infinitum non possit, perveniantur ad unum primum; non quod immotum moveat, sed quod ipsum per se moveatur.” Answ. You gather from hence, that it is the contexture of the most subtle atoms which is the form and first mover in physical beings. But you granted before, that God moved those atoms, and also put a moving inclination into them: and atoms are far from being *unum* or *primum*. You said before, “Sufficiat Deum quidem esse incorporeum, ac pervadere fovereque universam mundi machinam.” And if so, then *movere etiam* as well as *fovere*. Either you mean as you speak in confessing a God, or not; if not, it is unworthy a philosopher to dissemble for any worldly respects whatsoever: if you do, then it is beyond your capacity to conceive that God being unmoved moveth all things, or not: if not, why should it be beyond your capacity to conceive the same in a second order of a second spiritual being. The reason as to motion is of the same kind: if yea, then either you believe God is the first Mover, or not; if not, withdraw your former confession; if yea, what locomotion (for you deny all other) can you ascribe to God, who is unbounded and infinite; what place is he moved from, and what place is he moved into? And is his motion *rectus vel circulans*? is it one or multifarious? or, rather will you not renounce all these? 2. And as God moveth being unmoved, so he doth more than move, he moveth orderly, and giveth rules and guidances to motion; and moveth graciously to the felicity

of the creature, and to a desirable end. A horse can move more than a man ; for he hath more strength or moving power ; but he moveth not so regularly, nor to such intended ends, because he hath not wisdom and benignity or goodness as man hath. He that buildeth a house or ship, or writeth such volumes as Gassendus did, doth somewhat more than barely move, which a swallow or a hare could have done as swiftly. And he that looketh on the works of God, even to the heavens and earth, as Gassendus hath himself described them, and seeth not the effects of wisdom and goodness in the order, and tendency, and ends of motion, as well as power in motion itself, did take his survey but in his dream. Saith Balbus, in Cicero ‘De Nat. Deor.’ (l. 2, p. 62 :) “Hoc qui existimat fieri potuisse,” (that is, for the world to be made by mere fortuitous motion of atoms, &c.,) “non intelligo cur non idem putet, si innumerabiles unius et viginti formæ literarum, aliquo conjiciantur, posse ex his in terram excussis Annales Ennii, ut deinceps legi possint effici, quod nescio an in uno quidem versu possit tantum valere fortuna. Quod si mundum efficere potest concursus atomorum, cur porticum, cur templum, cur domum, cur navem non potest, quæ sunt minus operosa, et multo quidem faciliora ? Certè ita temere de mundo effutiunt, ut mihi quidem nunquam hunc admirabilem cœli ornatum, qui locus est proximus, suspexisse videantur.” Where he brings in this passage, as from Aristotle, that if we should imagine men to have lived in some dungeon or cavern in the earth, and never to have seen the sun, or light, or world, as we do, and if there should be a doubt or dispute among them whether there be a God ; and if you should presently bring up these men into our places, where they might look above them and about them, to the sun and stars, and heaven and earth ; they will quickly, by such a sight, be convinced that there is a God. But as he truly addeth, “Assiduitate, quotidiana, et consuetudine oculorum assuescunt animi neque admirantur neque requirunt rationes earum rerum quas semper vident : perinde quasi novitas nos magis quam magnitudo rerum debeat adquirendas causas excitare.”

But I suppose it will be granted me, that the first Mover doth more than merely move, the effects of wisdom and goodness being so legible on all the world ; but you will say, that to do it wisely and to attain good ends by it, &c. is but the *modus* of action with the effect ; and, therefore, matter and motion rightly ordered may be nevertheless sufficient to all effects. To which

I answer, that the creatures' motion requireth not only that the Creator move them, but that he place and order them, and move them rightly; and that he remove and overcome impediments, &c. Therefore, there is necessary in the first Mover, both wisdom and love as well as power: and neither his power, wisdom, or love, is locomotion in himself. And this much being proved, that in every motion there is divine power, wisdom, and love, which is more than matter and motion itself; I proceed next to inquire:

5. Do you think there is any thing existent in the world, besides matter and motion, or not? As to mere site and figure, and other such order or modes of matter, I know you will not deny them to have now a being as well as motion. But is there no different tendency to motion in the parts of matter? Is there not in many creatures a power, an inclination, or aptitude to motion, besides motion itself? Is there not a reason, *à priori*, to be given, why one creature is more agile and active than another, and why they act in their various ways? Why is fire more active than earth, and a swallow than a snail? If you say, that the different *ratio motus* is in some extrinsical agent only which moveth them, you will hardly show any possibility of that, when the same sun, by the same virtue, or motion, as you will say, is it that moveth all: and if it were so, you must go up to the first cause, to ask for the different motions of those movers; when our inquiry now is *de natura moventium et motorum Creatorum*? If you say that it is the *ratio recipiendi* in the different magnitudes or positions of the parts of matter, which is the cause of different motions, I would know, 1. Whether this difference of magnitude, and figure, and site, being now antecedently necessary to different motions, was not so heretofore as well as now? If you say 'No,' you feign, without proof, a state of things, and order of causes, contrary to that which all men's sense perceiveth to be now existent. And who is the wiser philosopher; he that judgeth the course and nature of things to be, and have been, what he now findeth it, till the contrary be proved; or he that findeth it one thing, and feigneth it some time to have been another, without any proof? That which is now antecedently necessary to diversity of motion, it is likely was so heretofore. 2. And then how could one simple, equal act of God, setting the first matter into motion, cause such an inequality in motions to this day, if it be true that you hold, that only that which is moved, or in motion itself, can move; and that motion

is all that is necessary to the diversity? 3. Either the first matter was made solid in larger parcels, or all conjunct, or in atoms. If it was made first in atoms, then motion caused not division: if it was made conjunct and solid, then motion caused not conjunction and solidity: and if the first division, or conjunction, site, and figure, of matter, was all antecedent to motion, and without it, we have no reason to think that it is the sole cause of all things now.

But, surely, quantity, figure, and site, are not all that now is antecedent to motion. Doth not a man feel in himself a certain power to sudden and voluntary motion? He that sat still, can suddenly rise and go: and if you say, that he performeth that sudden motion by some antecedent motion, I answer, that I grant that; but the question is, whether by that alone, or whether a power distinct from motion itself, be not as evidently the cause? For otherwise the antecedent motion would proceed but according to its own proportion; it would not in a minute make so sudden and great an alteration. I can restrain also that motion which some antecedent motion (*e. g.* passion) urgeth me to. Surely this power of doing or not doing, is somewhat differing from doing itself. A power of not moving is not motion.

And what is the *pondus* which Gassendus doth add to magnitude and figure, as a third pre-requisite in atoms? I perceive he knoweth not what to make of it himself. But, in conclusion, it must be no natural gravity by which the parts are inclined to the whole in themselves, but the mere effect of pulsion or traction, or both. At the first, he was for both conjunct, pulsion of the air, and traction of the atoms from the earth: but of this he repented, as seeing *impulsionem aëris nullum esse*, and was for the traction of atoms alone; than which, his friend's conceit of the pulsive motion of the sun in its diastole, or whatever other motion is the cause, doth seem less absurd. But that man that would have me believe that if a rock were in the air, or if Paul's steeple should fall, the descent would be only by the traction of the *hamuli* of invisible atoms, or by the pulsion of air and sun conjunct, must come nearer first, and tell me how the *hamuli* of atoms can fasten upon a marble rock; and how they come to have so much strength as to move that rock, (which no man can move in its proper place,) if there be no such thing as strength or power, besides actual motion; and why it is that those drawing atoms

do move so powerfully earthwards, when at the same time it is supposed, that as many or more atoms are moving upwards by the sun's attraction, and more are moved circularly with the earth; why do not these stop or hinder one another; and why doth not the rock as well go upwards with the ascending atoms; and when the rock descendeth, doth it carry down none of the ascendants with it? As likely as for the descendants to carry down it. Are those atoms that carry down the rock more powerful than a hundred thousand men, who could not lift it up at all, much less so swiftly? And why do not the same partial atoms bear down a feather, or the birds that fly quietly in the air; and why feel we not the power of their motion upon us? How easily can some men believe any thing, while they think that their increase of wisdom lieth in believing no more than evidence constraineth them to. If Gassendus's instance of the loadstone put under the balance to increase the *pondus* of the iron, prove any thing, it will prove something more than a traction of the hooked atoms, even the traction of nature that needeth no hooks.

And mark, I pray you, what Gassendus granteth, when he saith, "Unum omnino supponere par est, viz., quantacunque fuit atomis mobilitas ingenita tanta constanter perseverare: so that," saith he, "they may be hindered from moving, but not from endeavouring to move and free themselves from their restraint."^k What need we more than this, or what more do we plead for? It is granted us, then, that when a moveable, or active being is stopped from motion, it doth not thereby lose its mobile, or active nature, or disposition; and so, that it is not only motion that causeth motion, but that there is *in atomis mobilitas ingenita*, which continueth when the motion ceaseth. You will say, perhaps, that he meaneth only a passive recepti-

^k Those that fly to this "*ingenita dispositio vel pondus*," will, in other words, grant that nature, form, or quality, which they deny: and those that grant nothing to move but former motion, must needs make some degrees of motion daily to diminish in the world, one thing or other still ceasing its motion; and all motion within our knowledge, having such constant impediti-
 on, that before this time, we may think all things would have stood still, if their opinion were true. If they say, that the sun, or some superior movers, renew the motion of things inferior, I grant it; but, that is, because it hath a moving nature: for if they say, that the sun itself hath not the least impediti-
 on to diminish the degrees of its motion, they speak, not only without any proof, but contrary to our observation of all things known, and to their own opinion, who make the air impediti-
 on to other motions, and the effluvia of other globes to be impediti-
 on to the sun.

vity, by which one thing is easier moved by an exterior cause than another. But you mistake him; for he taketh not *mobilitas ingenita* only passively, but also actively; and therefore saith that "it endeavoureth to move and free itself." And (lib. iv. c. 2) he saith, "Non motus sed impetus, ab initio perseverat; vel nisus perpetuus:" which is as much as I desire now: for then there is somewhat besides matter and motion, even an *impetus et nisus*, which must also come from a power which, *per nisum et impetum*, doth show itself.

And, indeed, it doth not only overpass our reason, but contradict it, that mere subtlety of matter, or smallness of particles, should be all the cause of motion that is found in the matter itself. Must we believe that an *alcohol impalpabile* of marble or gold, if it could but be atomised more, would be as moveable as fire; or would thereby turn to fire itself; or as active as the vital and intellectual creatures; yea, turned to such a thing itself. If all matter was atoms at first, then all was fire, and all was of one kind, and equally moveable: and what hath made the difference since? And if you will feign that God made some parts atoms, and some parts more gross; or that he distinguished matter *ab initio*, into Cartesius's *materia subtilis, globuli ætheri*, and grosser matter, why may not we better say, that the same Creator hath distinguished matter by different natures and powers, which we find them possessed of? And by what proof do you distinguish matter into those three degrees or sorts, any more than into two, or four, or six, or ten, or ten hundred? Who can choose but shake the head to see wise philosophers thus impose upon the world, and at the same time say it is the first duty of a man that would be wise, to believe no more than by evidence he is forced to? Yea, and at the same time to say, these are but our hypotheses, which, saith one, I acknowledge to be false; and, saith another, I cannot say is true, and yet they are our foundation; and from these our philosophical verities result, which must make you wise, who must believe nothing without proof. Alas! what is man!

And I would know whether they can prove against Gassendus, that *impetus et nisus vel conatus*, is *ipse motus*, when the heaviest poise is at a clock that standeth still, the poise doth not move, but it doth *niti vel conari*. Hold but a weight of an hundred pounds of lead in your hand, as immoveable as possible, I am of opinion you will feel that it doth incline to motion, though it move not. Is not this inclination, then, somewhat

different from motion? If you tell me again of nothing but the invisible, tractive, hooked atoms, I advise you to involve a thousand pounds of lead in a sufficient case of feathers, which, it seems, are charmed from the power or touch of atoms, and try then whether it be no heavier than the feathers are. The same, I may say, of a spring of steel, which is wound up in a standing watch or other engine; there is no proof of any motion, and yet there is a *conatus* different from motion. You will say, perhaps, that the particles in the steel are all in motion among themselves; but when will you prove it? and prove also that they are so in the lead or rock that, by gravity, inclineth to descent? and prove also that the particles are moved by an extrinsic mover only, and have no principle of motion in themselves?

Moreover, what think you is the nature of all our habits? Is there nothing in a habit but actual motion? Suppose that you sleep without a dream; or that a lethargy intercept your intellectual motion; or that other business alienate your thoughts, do you think that all your learning is thereby obliterated? Or that you are afterwards as unapt for your arts and trades, as if you had never learned them? Let a musician, an astronomer, a physician, try whether they will not return more expert than an idiot? What, then, is this habit? It is not actual motion itself, else it would be totally extinct, when the motion is but for an hour intercepted. If you say that there is other motion in us still to renew it, I answer why should that other (*e. g.* the motion of the lungs or heart, or the circulation of the blood) make you an artist the next morning, any more than your neighbour, if that were all? You will grant, I suppose, that a habit is somewhat distinct from motion, but it is the effect of it only, and one of the phenomena, which we say that matter and motion are sufficient for. To which I answer, do you deny that a habit doth itself conduce to future motion, or not? If not, it is no habit: if yea, then, as to future actions, there is more than matter and motion needful, and the principles are more. And then, what reason have you to contradict us, who, finding some principles in nature which conduce to motion as much and more than habits do, do assert such principles? And how know you that former motion proceedeth not from such natures or principles, when you confess that later motions do so? If you say that habits are nothing but a *cursus motuum*, as of water, that by running in a certain channel is inclined to run that way again,

I answer, they are certainly something that remain when the action ceaseth ; and, therefore, are an *inclination ad agendum*, as well as a *cursus actionum* : and they are something that are active principles, and not only so many channels which the spirits have made themselves in the brains and nerves, otherwise the numberless variety of objects would so furrow and channel the brain, that they would consume it, (as *gutta cavat lapidem*, &c.)

6. And do you know what you oblige yourselves to, when you undertake to solve all phenomena by matter and motion only ? And how have you satisfied the studious and impartial world herein ? I hope you will not put off all questions that are put to you, with these same two general words only. When we ask you what causeth the *descensus gravium*, do not tell us, It is matter and motion ; but tell us the differences in the motion or matter, which cause this effect as different from others. What is the reason in motion that fire ascendeth ? What is the reason that the *motus projectorum* doth continue ? Why doth the ant take one course, and the bee another, and the fly another, &c. ; what different motions are they that are the cause ? What motion is it that causeth the hen to sit on her eggs in fasting and patience, and to know her chickens, and to cherish them till they are mature, and then beat them away ; and so almost of all other birds and beasts ? What is the difference in motion that causeth one creature to love this food, and another that ; that one eateth grass, and another flesh ; that every seed doth bring forth only its proper species ? What are the differences in motion which cause the difference in odour, and taste, and virtue, and shape of leaves, and flowers, and fruits, &c., between all the plants that cover the earth ? That all that come of one seed have an agreement in leaf, and flower, and fruit, and odour, and taste, and virtue : *e. g.*, germander, betony, peony, &c. ; what are the different motions that cause all these differences, even in the very seeds themselves ? To tell us only, in general, that the difference is all made by motion, is to put an end to learning and studies, and to give one answer to all the questions in the world, and one description of all beings in the world. You may as well tell us that you solve all the phenomena, to tell us that all things are entities, and made and moved by God. It is a fair advancement of knowledge, indeed, to cast away and deny all the noblest parts of the world, and to tell us, that all the rest is matter of various magnitude and figure,

variously moved and placed. This is short philosophy; and the particular specifying differences you do not, you cannot, tell us according to your principles.

Gassendus (sec. 1, l. iii. c. 2) denieth the transmutation of elements. Others of the atomists tell us that every hour changeth the elements, and that continual motion is continually turning one into another; and that fire *e. g.* is but that part of matter which falleth under such or such a motion; and that the same matter which is fire this moment while it moveth, is something else the next when that motion ceaseth; and that whatever matter falleth under the same motion, be it stone or earth, or any thing, it is presently by that motion turned to fire, as fire may be into stone or earth. But that which we expect from them is, to tell us what motion it is that maketh the different elements; and what doth constitute them; and what transmutes them: and not to put us off with two general words, when they boast of solving all the phenomena.

We expect, also, to hear from them, how density and solidity come to be the effects of motion; and how the cohesion of the particles of gold, or marble, or glue, is caused by the mere magnitude and figure of matter, or by the motion of it, without any other material properties.

And they must give us a better account than they have yet done, of the true cause of sense in matter and motion. They know our argument; but I could never yet understand how they answer it. We say that *Nihil dat quod non habet, vel formaliter vel eminenter*: all the objections against this maxim, they may find answered, besides others, in Campanella, ‘*De sensu rerum.*’ Atoms, as matter, have no sense; they smart not, they see not, they feel no delight, &c. *Formaliter*, you will not imagine that they have sense; and they cannot have it *eminenter*, being not above it, but below it; and showing us nothing that doth transcend it, or is like it. And motion is no substance, but a mode of matter; and therefore hath itself no sense.

Object. Doth not Campanella, Telesius, &c., argue that all things have sense?

Answ. 1. Their fanaticisms are no part of our physical creed. 2. They mean, when all is done, but this much: that there is some image or participation of life in inanimates, of sense in vegetatives, of reason in sensitives, and of angelical intellection in rationals. 3. As it is said in the ‘*Mystic. Ægypt. et Chald. Philos.*,’ ascribed to Aristotle, “*Et si quibusdam videtur quod*

elementa habent animam, illa est aliena adventitiaque eis. Cumque sint viva, vita illis est accidentaria, non naturalis : alioquin forent inalterabilia." (l. xii. c. 11.) So the stoics deified the fire, and made it intellectual ; but it was not as it is matter, but as they supposed it animated with an intellectual form. So many of the ancients thought that the angels were compounded of an intellectual form or soul, and of a fiery or ethereal body : but it is only the body that we are now inquiring of. Have atoms sense ? Doth matter feel or see as such ?

Object. We say not that all matter or atoms have sense, but only some part of it, which by motion is subtilized.

Answ. Still *nihil dat quod non habet* ; you grant then that matter, as such, hath no sense at all, else the argument would hold *ad omnem* : and if it have none as matter, motion can give it none as mere motion, for motion hath not sense to give. Let motion attenuate the matter, and subtilize it, it is but matter still, and it can be no less than atoms ; therefore show us how *materia subtilis*, or atoms, should feel or see, because of the subtlety or parvity, and by its magnitude or grossness lose that sense : tell us how and why the change of mere magnitude and figure should make a thing feel that felt not before. If you difference not matter by some natural difference of forms, or properties and virtues, you will never speak sense in proving sense to be in matter, by mere atomizing it, or moving it. The alcohol of marble feeleth no more than the solid stone ; nor the air than the earth ; for any proof that we have of it. The boys that whip their tops, and the women that turn their wheels, so swiftly, that the motion shall not be discerned, yet put no feeling into either, though the motion be swifter than that of the heart, or lungs, or blood.^k What the learned Dr. Ward hath said of this, against Mr. Hobbs, I refer you to peruse, and excuse me from transcribing it. Scaliger, Sennertus, and many others, have heretofore challenged these philosophers to show the world how atoms by motion, or elements by mixture, can get that sense which neither matter, motion, nor mixture have ; but we can meet with no account of it yet worth the reading ; not by Cartesius, not by Regius or Berigardus, not by Gassendus, nor any other that we can get and read. How unsatisfac-

^k Sane ignis, aer, aqua, terra, suapte natura carent anima : et cuicunque horum adest anima, hoc vita utitur peregrina : alia vero præter hæc nulla sunt corpora.—*Plotin, Enead.* 4, l. 7. c. 2. p. 457.

tory is it to tell us that “*Facultas sentiendi et movendi, quæ anima sensitiva vulgo dicitur, est partium animalis in spiritus, nervos et alia sensoria, &c., talis attemperatio et conformatio, qua animal ab objectis variis motibus affici potest;*” as Regius (l. v. c. 3, p. 267). This is an easy solving of the phenomena indeed. But “*Qualis est illa contemperatio? et quomodo potest contemperatio insensibilium, sensibile constituere? Nonne dat ista contemperatio quod non habet?*”

Object. Perhaps you will say, with him, in Cicer. ‘*De Nat. Deor.*,’ that by this argument God must be a fiddler, because he maketh men that are such.

Answ. By this argument no fiddler, nor any other man, hath more wisdom than God, or can do that which God cannot do; but because God is above him in his skill, doth it follow that the names which signify human imperfections, must be put on God? Can God enable a man to do that which he is not able to do himself, and can he give that which he hath not to give?

Object. None of the parts of a clock can tell the hour of the day, and yet all set together can; and none of the letters of a book are philosophy, and yet the whole may be a learned system; and no atoms in a lute can make melody as the whole can do.

Answ. This is but to play with words. In all these instances the whole hath nothing of a higher kind in nature than the several parts, but only a composition, by the contribution of each part. The clock telleth you nothing but *per modum signi*; and that *signum* is only in the sound, or order of motion. And sound and motion belong to the whole, by virtue or contribution of the parts, and is not another thing above them. And that the motion is so ordered, and that man can by it collect the time of the day, is from the power of our understandings, and not from the matter of the engine at all. So the book is no otherwise philosophy at all, but *per modum signi*: which *signum* is related to man’s understanding, both as the cause and orderer, and as the receiver and apprehender. So that the letters do nothing at all, but passively serve the mind of man; and so it is in the other instance. The strings do but move the air, and cause the sound which is in the ear: that this is melody, is caused only by the mind of man, who first frameth, and then orderly moveth them, and then *suo modo* receiveth the sound, and maketh melody by the aptitude of his apprehension. If you had proved that clock, or book, or lute, do make themselves, and order and use themselves, and know the time, or understand and

delight in themselves, you had done something ; but by the deceitful names of philosophy and melody, to confound the bare natural sound and sign, with that ordering, and that reception, which is the privilege of a mind, is unfit for a philosopher.

Moreover, I expect, from matter and motion, an account of motion's great concomitants, that is, of light and heat.¹ Mistake me not, I am not undervaluing the effects of motion ; I take it for a most noble and observable cause of most that is done or existent in the corporeal world : but must it, therefore, be the solitary cause ? I have long observed, amongst wranglers, and erroneous zealots in divinity, that most of their error and misdoing lie in setting the necessary, co-ordinate causes or parts of things as inconsistent, in opposition to one another. It would make one ashamed to hear one plead, that Scripture must be proved by itself ; and another, that it must be proved by reason ; and another, that it must be by miracles ; and another, by the church ; and another, by general history and tradition, &c. As if every one of these were not necessary concurrent parts in the proof. Such work have we among poor, deluded women, and ignorant men, while the Romanists say, that they are the true church ; and the Greeks say, it is they ; and the Lutherans say, it is they ; and the anabaptists say, it is they : as if my neighbours and I should contend, which of our houses it is that is the town. And so do these philosophers, about the principles and elements. The intellectual nature, which is the image of God, hath notoriously three faculties, understanding, will, and executive power ; and men think that they cannot understand the one, without denying the other two : and the fiery nature which constituteth the sun and other luminaries (and is the image of the vital nature) hath three notorious powers or properties ; light, heat, and motion ; and they cannot understand motion, without making nothing of light and heat, or greatly obscuring and abusing them. Cull out into one, and set together but what Patricius hath said of light, and what Telesius hath said of heat, and Campanella after him, and what Gassendus and Cartesius have said of motion, and cut off

¹ Vid. Priscian. in Thophrast. Proving that light is neither a body nor a quality, (c. 19.) But I find no satisfaction when he cometh to tell us what it is : nor will I subscribe to Ficinus, who, with other Platonists, saith ; *Cœleste corpus primum luminis susceptaculum incorporea vita et intelligentia regi à qua et lumen habeat ; cæterisque tradat*——*Si Lumen esse dicamus, radios visuales cœlestium oculorum in se viventium, perque ejusmodi radios cuncta videntium agentiumque videndo*——*non errabimus.*

all their superfluities, and you will have a better entrance into sound philosophy, than any one book that I know doth afford you.^m I confess, that as wisdom must lead the will, and determine its acts, *quoad specificationem*, and the will must set a-work the same intellect, and determine its acts, *quoad exercitiam*; and the active power doth partly work *ad intra* in the operations of both these, and *ad extra* is excited by the *imperium* of the will; so that these three faculties (as Sekeibler, Alsted, and many others, truly number them) are marvellously conjunct and co-operative: even so it is in the motion, light, and heat of the active element, or fiery, or ethereal nature.ⁿ I know that motion contributeth to light and heat, but it is as true that light and heat have their proper, co-equal and co-ordinate properties and effects, and that heat contributeth as much to motion, at least, as motion doth to heat: indeed, in one essence they are three co-equal virtues or faculties, the *vis motiva*, *illuminativa*, *et calefactiva*.^o And so vain is their labour, who only from matter and motion give us an account of light and heat, that I find no need or willingness to be at the labour of confuting them. Call but for their proofs, and you have confuted them all at once.

And if no better solution be given us of the nature of light and heat, what shall we expect from them about intellection

^m Leg. le Grand. Dissert. in Epicur. Philos. ad Gassend. et de communium vivendi ratione ad Campanel. et de nominibus Dei soli attributis; in which he taketh atoms, or indivisible particles, for the first real, passive matter, antecedent to the distinction of elements; but fire, called also spiritus æthereus et natura, to be of a higher elevation, the active informer, disposer, and moderator, of all matter; and animated fire, that is, the sun and its emanations, to be the life and ruler of the material world: and that this was the sense of almost all the old philosophers, and that by their numerous names of God, they meant the same thing, as diversely operating; that is, the sun, fire, or ether, (which they took to be animated intellectuals,) as considered in its various respects to mortals. Ut docet Hermes, Mens generalis habet pro corpore ignem, et quasi igne stipatur et circumvestitur νοῦς ἀθέριος ἔχει σῶμα τὸ πῦρ; semper enim et necessario ignis æthereus et mens universalis sibi invicem comites assident; amboque ita affines nihil constituent aliud quàm spiritum igneum, ætherem, lucidum, cœlestem, et divinum, tenebrosam hanc et informem immanis materiei abyssum complementem, illustrantem et animantem.—Idem ad Campanel. p. 80. Vide quæ ex Mercur. Pimand. citat. p. 79.

ⁿ Saith a novel philosopher himself, Ex speculis ustoriis certum est calorem a sole creari intensissimum, non acceleratione motus, sed coalitione radiorum.

^o Lumen species est inter omnes species sensibiles præ cæteris intellectua-lem speciem representans: et in intellectu est per causam; in cœlo per formæ plenitudinem; in igne per plenitudinem participationis; hinc derivatur in portiones.—Ficin. in Theophrast. de Anim. c. 44.

and volition : do atoms understand or will ; or doth motion understand or will ? If not, (as sure they do not as such,) then tell us how that which hath no participation of understanding or will should constitute an agent that doth understand and will ? Set to this work as philosophers, and make it intelligible to us, if you are in good earnest.

7. But to proceed a little further with you ; I take it for granted, that you confess that an intellectual, incorporeal being there is, while we confess a God : and that this sort of being is more excellent than that which is corporeal, sensible, and gross. I would next ask you, do you take it for possible or impossible that God should make any secondary beings, which are incorporeal and intellectual also ? If you say, it is impossible, give us your proof. If possible, I next ask you, whether it be not most probable also ? You acknowledge what a spot or punctum in the world this earthly globe is : you see here that man, whose flesh must rot and turn to dust, hath the power of intellection and volition : you look up to the more vast and glorious regions and globes, and I am confident you think not that only this spot of earth is inhabited : and surely you think that the glory of the inhabitants is likely to be answerable to the glory of their habitations. You make your atoms to be invisible, and so you do the air and winds ; when yet our earth and dirt are visible. Therefore, you take not crassitude, or visibility, or sensibility, to have the pre-eminence in excellency. Judge, then, yourselves, whether it be not likely that God hath innumerable more noble and excellent creatures than we silly men are ? And will you reduce all their unknown perfections, or their known intelligence, to matter and motion only ?

Moreover, when you observe the wonderful variety of things, in which God is pleased to take his delight, what ground have we to imagine that he hath no greater variety of substances, but corporeal only ? Nor any other way of causation but by motion ? When no man can deny, but he could otherwise cause the variety which we see, and fix in the creatures, *ab origine*, their different natures, properties, and virtues ; what reason, then, have you to say, that he did not do so ?

And can you believe that the goodness of that God, who hath

¶ Non ergo levitas et gravitas causæ primi motus sunt, sed qualitates sunt elementorum ; sed tamen ut etiam hoc detur, quomodo ratiocinari, opinari, judicare, gravitatis et levitatis opera esse possunt ; si non sunt gravitatis et levitatis opera, neque elementorum sunt : si non elementorum, neque certe corporum.—*Nemesius de An. c. 2. p. 484.*

made this wonderful frame which we see, would not appear in making some creatures liker and nearer to himself, than matter and motion are ?

But to talk no more of probabilities to you, we have certain proof that man is an intellectual free-agent, whose soul you can never prove to be corporeal, and whose power of intellection and volition is distinct from corporal motion. And we have proof that there are superior intelligences more noble than we, by the operations which they have exercised upon things below.

And what should move you (who seem not to be overmuch divine, and who seem to observe the order and harmony of the creatures) to imagine, that God doth himself, alone, without any instrument or second cause, move all the corporeal matter of the world ? If you are serious in believing that God himself doth move and govern all, why do you question whether he make use of any nobler natures next him, to move things corporeal. And why do you, against your own inclinations, make every action to be done by God alone ? I doubt not but he doth all : but you see that he chooseth to communicate honour and agency to his creatures. He useth the sun to move things on earth. Therefore, if you believe that corporeal beings stand at so infinite a distance from his perfection, you may easily judge that he hath some more noble, and that the noblest are the most potent and active, and rule the more ignoble : as you see the nobler bodies (as the sun) to have power upon the more ignoble. Therefore, to violate the harmony of God's works, and to deny all the steps of the ladder, save the lowest, is but an unhappy solving of phenomena.

Nay, mark what you grant us : you confess God to have power, wisdom, and will, and that he is incorporeal, and moveth all : And you confess that man hath, in his kind, power, understanding, and will ; and is there any thing below that is liker God ? If not, do you not allow us to take these faculties for incorporeal ? and that those are so that are higher than we ?

8. And you seem to us by your philosophy to write of nature, as the atheist writeth of God ; instead of explaining it, you deny it. What is nature but the *principium motus et quietis*, &c. ?^a

^a So Lipstoriup, in his 'Specim. Philos. Cartes.' Deus in principio mundi materiam simul cum motu et quiete creavit—Unde communissima naturæ lex, &c. (vide p. 37, 38.) So that nature, with the Cartesians, is nothing at all, but God's first moving act at the creation, as if he caused motion without any created principle, and as if spirits and fire had no more moving nature, or principle, than clay, but only that their matter was either in the creation more

And you deny all such *principia*, and substitute only former motion; so that you leave no other nature but what a stone receiveth from the hand that casteth it, or the children's tops from the scourge that driveth them: or, rather, every turn is a nature to the next turn; and so the nature of things is mostly out of themselves in the extrinsic mover.

And so you level all things in the world; you deny all specific forms, or natural faculties and virtues. The sun and a clod have no natural difference, but only magnitude, and figure, and motion: as if so noble a creature had no differencing, peculiar nature of its own, nor any natural power or principle of its own motion, and so it moved but as a stone is moved.

Yea, you make all motions so violent, and deny all proper natural motion at all; for that which hath no active principle of motion in its nature hath no proper natural motion as distinct from violent.

Hereby, also, you deny all vital powers; you make a living creature and a dead to differ but in the manner of motion; which, whether you can at all explain, we know not. Why may not the arrow which I shoot, or the watch which I wind up, be said to live as well as you? It hath matter and motion; and some inanimates (the air and fire) perhaps have as subtle matter, and as speedy motion, as is in you. Why doth not the wind make the air alive, and the bellows the fire? In a word, you deny all intelligencies, all souls, all lives, all natures, all active qualities and forms; all powers, faculties, inclinations, habits, and dispositions, that are any principles of motion: and so all the natural excellency and difference of any creature above the rest. A short way of solving the phenomena.

Lastly, with nature you deny the being of morality. For if there be no difference of beings, but in quantity, figure, motion,

moved by God, or since by a knock from some other mover put into motion, by which accidental motion clay or water may be made fire. Leg. Petr. Monnerii. lib. de Impetu, et lib. 2. de moto naturali; where the nature of motion is more exactly handled than by the Epicureans or Cartesians, though too little is said, de vi moventis, in comparison of what is said, de impetu mobilis. Leg. l. 2. pp. 76, 77, &c., 'De causa intrinseca motus localis naturalis;' et p. 78, his 'Seven Reasons against Gassendus,' his 'Doctrine of Gravitation by the traction of Atoms,' and his 'Confutation of all the Extrinsic Causes,' viz., Causa prima sola, ær, terræ vis magnetica (vel per qualitatem diffusam, vel per vim sympathicam, vel tractionem filamentorum) virtus cæli pellens, detrusio per lucem, et generans: and as easily may the Cartesian reason be confuted, which Lipstorpious so magnifieth: and the impetus innatus is the reason which he assigneth, (pp. 80, 81.) &c. Vid. exceptiones Jo. Bap. du Hamel. contra Cartes. in conciliat. pp. 148, 151, 170, 209, 210.

and site, and all motion is locomotion, which moveth by natural necessitating force, then a man moveth as a stone, because it is irresistibly moved, and hath no power to forbear any act which it performeth, or to do it otherwise than it doth. For if there be no power, habits, or dispositions, antecedent to motion, but motion itself is all, then there is one and the same account to be given of all actions, good and bad ; I did it because I was irresistibly moved to it, and could no more do otherwise, than my pen can choose to write. There is, then, no virtue or vice, no place for laws and moral government, further than they may be tacklings in the engine which necessitateth : whatsoever is done amiss, is as much imputable to God, the first Mover, as that which is done well. If you shoot an arrow which killeth your friend, the arrow could not hinder it ; if you make or set your watch amiss, though one motion causeth another, yet the error of all is resolved into the defect of the first cause. They that killed Henry III., and Henry IV., kings of France, may say, that as the knife could not resist the motion of their hand, so neither could they the motion of the superior cause that moved them, and so on to the first. No traitors or rebels can resist the power which acteth them therein, any more than the dust can resist the wind which stirreth it up. And so you see what cometh of all the government of God and man, and of all laws and judgments, justice and injustice, right and wrong : and how little cause you have to be angry with the thief that robbeth you, or the man that cudgelleth you, any more than with the staff. But of this I refer you to the aforesaid writing of Bishop Bramhal against Mr. Hobbs, allowing you to make the most you can of his reply.

We are certain, by the operation of things, that there is a difference in their natural powers and virtues, and not only in their quantity, figure, and motion. God hath not made only homogeneal, indifferenced matter ; there are plainly now exceeding diversities of natural excellencies, virtues, and qualities, in the things we see : and he that will say, that by motion only God made this difference at first, doth but presumptuously speak without book, without all proof to make it credible, and taketh on him to know that which he knoweth that he knoweth not. Is not the virtue and goodness of things as laudable as their quantity and motion ? Why, then, should we imagine so vast a disproportion in the image of God upon his works, as to acknowledge the magnitude and motion incomprehensible, and to

think that in virtue and goodness of nature they are all alike, and none is more noble or more like himself than a clod of earth? We see that the natures of all things are suited to their several uses. *Operari sequitur esse*; things act as they are. There is somewhat in the nature of a bird, or beast, or plant, which is their fitness to their various motions. If only motion made that fire to day, which yesterday was but a stone, why doth not the strongest wind so much as warm us? Or why doth it so much cool us? Why doth not the snow make us as warm as a fleece of wool? The wool doth move no more than the snow, and the matter of it appeareth to be no more subtle. Indeed, man can give to none of his works a nature, a life, or virtue, for the operation which he desireth. He can but alter the magnitude, and figure, and motion of things, and compound and mix them, and conjoin them: and these Epicureans seem to judge of the works of God by man's. But he who is Being, Life, and Intelligence, doth accordingly animate his noble engines, and give them natures and virtues for their operations; and not only make use of matter and weight where he findeth it, as our mechanics themselves can do. Debasing all the noblest of God's works, is unbecoming a true philosopher, who should search out the virtues and goodness, as well as the greatness of them.

But I have been longer in answering this first objection than I can afford to be about the rest, unless I would make a book of this, which I call but the conclusion. I will add but this one thing more; that in case it were granted the Epicureans, that the soul is material, it will be no disproving of its immortality, nor invalidate any of my former arguments for a life of retribution after this. To which purpose, consider these things.

1. That where matter is simple, and not compounded, it hath no tendency to corruption. Object. Matter is divisible, and therefore corruptible, how simple soever. Answ. It is such as may be divided, if God please, and so the soul is such as God can destroy. But we see that all parts of matter have a wonderful tendency to unity, and have a tendency to a *motus aggregativus* if you separate them. Earth inclineth to earth, and water to water, and air to air, and fire to fire. 2. All philosophers agree to what I say, who hold that matter is eternal, either *à parte ante*, or *à parte post*: for if matter be eternal, the soul's materiality may consist with its eternity. 3. Yea, all without exception do agree, that there is

no annihilation of matter when there is a dissolution. Therefore, if the soul be a simple, uncompounded being, though material, it will remain the same. This, therefore, is to be set down as granted us, by all the infidels and atheists in the world, ‘That man’s soul, whatever it is, is not annihilated when he dieth, if it be any kind of substance, material or immaterial.’ And they that call his temperament his soul, do all acknowledge that there is in the composition some one predominant principle, more active or noble than the rest; and of the duration of this it is that we inquire, which no man doth deny, though some deny it to be immaterial. But this will be further opened under the rest of the objections. The reasons of my many words in answering this objection, I give you in the words of a late learned conciliator, “*Philosophiæ Platoniciæ explicationi diutius immorati sumus, quod res maximas et cognitione dignissimas complectatur. Habet id quoque præ cæteris, quod ad æternas et primitivas rationes mentem erigat, eamque à fluxis et perituris rebus avocatum, ad eas quæ sola intelligentia percipiuntur convertat. Qua quidem in re infinitum prope momentum est: num obruimur turba philosophorum, qui nimis fidunt sensibus, et nihil præter corpora intelligi posse contendunt. Atque ut mihi videtur, nulla perniciosior pestis in vitam humanam potest invadere, nihil quod magis religioni adversetur.*” (Joh. Bap. ‘Du Hamel. in Consens. veteris. and novæ Philos. Præfat.’)

Object. II. By sense, imagination, cogitation, reason, you cannot prove the soul to be incorporeal, because the brutes partake of these; whose souls are material and mortal.

Answ. I. It is easy for men, that set themselves to say all they can, either with Mr. Chambre, to extol the brutes as rational; or with Gassendus, to talk of the whispers and consultations of the ants; or with Telesius and Campanella, to say that every thing hath sense; or, on the other hand, with Cartesius, to deny all to a brute which belongeth not to an engine. But our converse with them doth teach all men to judge of their natures, as between both these extremes, unless by study and learning they learn to know less than they did before, and do but study to corrupt their understandings, and obliterate things that are commonly known. I doubt not but the minerals have something like life, and the vegetatives have something like to sense, and the sensitives have something like to reason; but it doth not follow that therefore it is the same. But this is so copiously written of by very many, that I supersede my further labour about it.

2. If it were so, that the apprehensions of a brute might be called reason or intellection, yet the difference betwixt it and human intellection is so great, as may easily prove to those that have their reason in free use, that they are several species of creatures, made for several uses and ends, and none of the twenty arguments which I used are at all debilitated by this. If a bird have reason to build her nest, and to feed her young, yet she hath none to build cities and castles, or to use navigation, or any of the arts; much less to set up government by laws, and to write systems of philosophy and other sciences; and least of all to inquire after God, the Cause of all things, or to hope for blessedness in another life, or to escape a future misery, or to be ruled in this life by the interest of another. Beasts think not of God, nor of loving him, seeking him, pleasing him, or enjoying him, or of being judged by him. I know the perverse wrangler will ask me how I know this, and I can answer him no better than thus: as I know that a stone doth not see or feel, or that my paper doth not talk, because they manifest no such thing; and these are all operations which they that exercise are apt to manifest, and things that in their nature are unapt to be long hid. Campanella, who hath written, *de sensu rerum*, to prove brutes rational, and plants sensible, hath yet in his 'Atheismus Triumphatus' written more for the excellency of human nature, and the soul's immortality, than any infidel can soundly answer.

3. And how prove you that the souls of brutes exist not after death? Of their individuation we shall say more anon. But there is no part of their substance annihilated, as you will confess; nor any part of it abased below the same nature which it had in the composition: only the constituting parts are separated, retaining their several natures still. All men that confess that brutes are sensible, do confess that there is some one predominant part in their composition, which is the principal cause of sense; whether it be the finest atoms, or the *materia subtilis*, or *globuli caelestes*, or elementary fire, or Aristotle's quintessence analogous to the celestial, starry substance, or yet an incorporeal soul: whatever it is, it is not annihilated, nor the nature of the simple essence destroyed.^r

4. And here let me venture to tell you once for all, that I

^r See Sir W. Raleigh 'Hist. (l. 1.)' of fire, making it certainly a thing unknown, and probably quiddam medium between things corporeal and incorporeal.

never found cause to believe that any mortal man ^s is so well acquainted with the true difference between a corporeal and an incorporeal substance, as to tell us certainly wherein it doth consist ; and to lay the stress of this controversy upon that difference. I know what is said of *moles et extensio, et partes extra partes* ; of divisibility and impenetrability ; and so on the contrary side. But how much of this is spoken in the dark. Are you certain that no true matter is penetrable ? If you say, that which is so we call not matter, and so make the controversy, *de nomine*, only intelligible, I must pass it by. And are you sure that no matter is indivisible ; and that no spiritual, incorporeal substance is quantitative, extended, or divisible ? It now goeth for current, that light is a body ; and Patricius, that so judgeth, doth take it to be indivisible, *in longitudine radiorum*, and to be penetrable ; and that it cannot penetrate other bodies ; and it is hard to be sure that diaphanous bodies are not penetrated by light. I know, Gassendus and others think that it passeth but through the pores of the glass or chrystal ; but I have heard of no engyscope that hath perceived pores in glass. In cloth they are certainly discernible, and large, and numerous, when yet the light doth not penetrate it as it doth the glass : Gassendus saith, the reason is, because the pores of the glass, and other diaphanous bodies, are all one way, so that the light is not intercepted by their irregularity ; and he giveth us a proof of his opinion, because that if you set white papers on each side

^s Hence it is that the wisest philosophers differ in this point, whether any proper matter be found in the soul of man. Micrælius Ethnoph. (l. 1. c. 13. pp. 23, 24,) hath instanced in many that are for some materiality. Eam sententiam inter veteres probavit apud Macrobiū, Heraclitū Physicū, cui anima est essentiae stellaris scintilla : et Hipparchus apud Plinium cui est cæli pars : et Africanus apud Ciceronem, qui detrahit animum ex illis sempiternis ignibus, quæ sidera vocamus ; quæque globosæ et rotundæ divinis animatæ mentibus circulos suos orbesque conficiunt celeritate mirabili : et Seneca, qui descendisse eam ex illo cælesti spiritu ait, et Plato ipse, qui alicubi animam vocat *αὐγοειδὲς ὄχημα*, radius et splendidum vehiculum : et Epictetus qui astra vocat nobis *φίλα καὶ συγγενῇ σοικεῖα*, amica et cognata elementa : Ipseque cum peripateticis Aristoteles, qui eam quinta essentia constare et *ἀνάλογον τῷ πέμπτῳ σώματι* in animabus inesse dicit. Inter nostrates Scaliger quoque vocat animam naturam cælestem, et quintam essentiam alia quidem a quatuor elementis natura præditum, sed non sine omni materia. Eadem opinio arridet Roberto de Fluctibus, &c. Lege rationes Carpentarii in Dec. 1. Exerc. 7, contra porositatem diaphanorum. Dicit Plato universæ naturæ animam porrectam esse a centro orbis terræ usque ad extremas oras cæli : non ut locum ista notet porrectio, sed extensiois quendam modum, quem mens et ratio assequatur.—*Nemes. de Anim.* c. 2, p. 487.

the glass, there will be umbles on one side, and light reflected on the other: I have often tried, and seen indeed abundance of such umbles; but I as plainly see that they all answer the squilts or sanded faults that are in the glass (the bigger sort of which are all as visible as the shades). And surely all the rest of the glass is not pores, or nothing. And if the pores lie all one way, how cometh it to pass, that a glass of water, or a ball of chrystal, is equally perspicuous every way: look which way you will, it is all alike: therefore it must be every way equally porous. But I would know whether we have any atoms smaller than the body of light which thus penetrateth the glass and chrystal. I think they all make it the most subtle matter; and yet Gassendus thinketh that they are bodies, and such as have their *hamuli* too, which flow from the loadstone to the iron: and if so, then those bodies must be more penetrating than light, for they will pass through a brick wall, and operate by their attraction on the other side, where no light can pass. And whether the air be penetrable by light, is scarcely well cleared or understood. They that think there is no vacuum, I think, with Gassendus, can never prove that there can be any motion, unless the air or some bodies are penetrable. Let them talk of a circulation, with Cartesius, as long as they will, somebody must *cedere* before the next can move; and no one can give way till the motion, or cession, begin at the utmost part of the corporeal world. My understanding is past doubt that there must be an *inane*, or a penetration; and yet, on the other side, I am satisfied that entity is the first excellency, and that something is better than nothing. And therefore if rarity be only by the multitude and greatness of interspersed vacuities, and the rarity and subtlety of matter be but the scantiness or smallness of its quantity in that space, then it would be but next kin to annihilation, and the rarest and most subtle matter would be, *ceteris paribus*, the basest, as being next to nothing. For instance, Sir Kenelm Digby telleth Gassendus, from two accurate computers, that gold, in the same space, is seven thousand six hundred times heavier than air: so that air is, in the same space, seven thousand six hundred times nearer to nothing than gold is; and the whole air betwixt us and the heavens hath interspaces that are vacuous, to the same proportion of seven thousand six hundred to one: and then we may well say that *datur inane*: nay, *quære*, whether it be more proper to say, that all between us and heaven is a vacuum, or not, when it is

to be denominated from the space which so far exceedeth all the rest as seven thousand six hundred to one? And, then, if the ether be something more subtle, it must be still nearer to nothing, and consequently be most vile. But I am satisfied that dung is not so much more excellent than light, as it is more gross. And that these terrestrial bodies are not the most noble, nor have most of entity or substance, because they are more gross.^t Therefore, though Gassendus put off Sir K. Digby, by saying only that the said disproportion is no inconvenience, I see not how these inconveniences will be answered. I am satisfied that nothing is not so good as entity, and yet that the most subtle and invisible substances are the life of the world, and of the greatest excellency and force. But what will hence follow about penetrability I know not; but I know that it is little about these things, which men understand, of what they say. The fiery nature seemeth, as Patricius saith, to be some middle thing between corporeal and incorporeal. And I much doubt whether *materia* be a *summum genus*, and whether the lowest degree of things incorporeal, and the highest degree of things corporeal, suppose fire, or that which is the matter of the sun, do differ so much more than gradually, as that mortals can say, that one of them is penetrable and indivisible, and the other not. There have been some philosophers that have thought that sensibility was as fit an attribute to characterise matter or bodies by, as any other; but then they meant not, by sensible, that which man can perceive by sense, but that which is a fit object for senses of the same kind as man's, supposing them elevated to the greatest perfection that they are capable of in their kind. And so air and atoms, being of the same kind as other matter, may be visible to a sight of the same kind as ours, if it received but the addition of enough degrees. And, for aught I know, this is as wise philosophy as that which is more common. I am sure it is more intelligible.

And for divisibility, they have demonstrations on both sides that a punctum is divisible, and that it is not. One thinketh, that if three be set together, it is possible, at least, for God to divide just in the midst. Another, with Gassendus, thinketh, that it is unlikely to be true, that every part should be as much or more than the whole, and a point as much as all the universe: and that if a point may be divided into infinite parts, it is infi-

^t I hope we shall not have philosophiam staticum, and judge of essences and excellences by the balance.

nite in magnitude, and therefore larger than the world. And is it any marvel, if indivisibility, then, be an unfit property to know a spirit by, when they are not agreed about it as to bodies? Certain it is, that there is a true individuation of souls, and so a numeral division of them. That which is your soul is not your neighbour's. And it is certain, that created spirits are not infinite as to extent. And what division God can make upon them, is more than I can tell.

Scotus thinketh, that the subject of physics is not *corpus naturale*, but *substantia naturalis*; and so that angels are moved *motu physico*. Scaliger, Scheibler, &c., say, that angels have extension and figure; that is, extension *entitativè*, distinct from extension *quantitativè*. Vid. Scalig. (Exercit. 359. s. 4.) The *termini essendi*, saith Scheibler, being no other than are signified *per inceptionem, seu dependentiam ab alio et desitionem*: and that no creature is immense, but hath *finitas adessendi* according to which it is determinate to a certain space. He saith, that angels are finite; 1. *Essentiâ*: 2. *Numero*: 3. *Potestate*: 4. *Quantitate*, h. e. *non esse immensos*. And that they are *in spatio intelligibili*. He saith also (Exerc. 307), “Unam primum est: alia dependent igitur. Ergo sua natura omnia prætur unum sunt corruptibilia. Tametsi sunt entia absoluta à subjecto et termino, non sunt absoluta à causa.”

Damascene saith, (‘De Orthod. fid.’ l. ii.) “That God only is a spirit by nature, but other things may be spirits by indulgence and grace.”

The doctrine of Psellus is too gross, and largely delivered by himself.^a

Eugubinus, Niphus, and Vorstius, were of the same mind, that angels were corporeal.

Augustin himself saith, that “Anima respectu incorporei Dei corporea est.” (De Spir. et Anim. c. 2.)

Cæsarius, (in Dialog. i. p. 573, B. P.,) saith, “Ἀσώματοι μὲν οἱ ἄγγελοι καθ’ ἡμῶς σωμα δὲ καθ’ ἐαυτῶς, ὡς ἄνεμος, ἢ πῦρ, ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ, ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ, ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ. σώματα γὰρ ὑπάρχουσι λεπτὰ καὶ ἀνυλὰ ἐξὼ τῆς ἡμέτερας παχύτητος.” And he applieth to them the apostle’s words, “There are bodies celestial and bodies terrestrial.”

Arnobius is a little too gross herein, and almost all the ancients, especially the Greeks, that speak of that subject, take angels for more subtle, purer bodies.

^a In Ficinus’s ‘Collections, (lib. de dæmonib.)’

I know not what Athenagoras meaneth to call the devil, *ὁ τοῦ ὕλης καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ εἰδῶν ἀρχῶν*——*Materiæ ejusque formarum princeps, et alii ex illis qui circa primum mundi fundamentum erant peccarunt, &c.* (p. 71.) And hence he and others talk of their falling in love with virgins, &c.

And when Faustus Rhegiensis wrote a book, to prove that angels and souls were but a purer, subtle sort of bodies or matter, Claudianus Mammiertus largely and learnedly confuteth him, who pretended that all the ancients were on his side: yet doth the same Mammertus think, that though angels, *quoad formam*, be incorporeal, they had bodies also which were fire, or of the nature of the stars. Which Cæsarius also seemeth to mean, when he saith, that “Not only that which is here with us below is fire, but also those higher powers seem to be fire, and kin to that which is with us, as our souls are kin to angels.” (Dialog. 1. q. 58, 59. p. 584. And (qu. 60) he saith, “That the shepherds, when they will boil flesh, (in the fields where they have no fire,) do use to fill a glass vessel with water, and hold it directly opposite to the sun, and then touch dried dung with it, and it will kindle fire.” And having thus proved the sun to be fire, he saith, (Dial. 2. q. 195,) that “*Omnibus creatis levior est ignis naturâ: ideoque angeli etiam hanc sortiti sunt: qui facit angelos suos spiritus, et ministros suos ignis flammam.*” And (q. 107.) he saith, that “the star which led the magi to Christ was an angel.” It would be tedious to cite all out of Tertullian, Lactantius, and all the ancients, that was written to assert that angels were *corpora tenuiora*; and out of those that came after them, and confuted them, who yet wrote that they were the souls of fiery bodies.

And abundance of our writers of physics, metaphysics, and logic, do tell us, that angels have *materiam metaphysicam*, and in a certain sense may be called corporeal. And the sum of all is, when they determine the questions about their locality, extension, or quantity, that they have their *ubi*, their quantity and extension, which are the properties of bodies, *suo modo, vel modo metaphysico*, as bodies have them *modo tuo physico*; being not immense or infinite any more than bodies. How far the name of nature belongeth to them, see Fortunius Licetus ‘*De natura primomovante.*’ And Scheibler, with others, maketh the difference of extension to be this, that angels can contract their whole substance into one part of space; and therefore have not *partes*

extra partes. Whereupon it is, that the schoolmen have questioned how many angels may sit upon the point of needle?

For my part, I profess, that as my understanding is fully satisfied by the operations and effects, that there are such invisible, potent substances, which we call angels and spirits; so it is utterly unsatisfied in the common properties of penetrability, and impenetrability, extension, or discernibility, and indiscernibility, or indivisibility, as the characters to know them by. And as I think that *materia* had been as fit a name as another, for that part or notion of spiritual substances which is distinguished from their form, if custom had so pleased to use it; so I think that such substances as we call spirits or immaterial, may be well said to be compounded of metaphysical or spiritual matter and form; and this in consistency with such simplicity as belongeth to a creature. And I remember not what apt word we have instead of matter, to supply its place in Latin, which taketh not in the notion of the form: for the word matter signifieth no real being, but only a partial, inadequate conception of real beings, *quoad hoc*, which have all something more which is essential to them. There is no such thing existent, as matter without form or peculiar nature. And the matter and form are such *partes intelligibiles* as can neither of them exist alone: therefore, as it is not fit to make too eager a controversy, *de nomine materiæ, vel materialis*; so, I think, that it is little that we know of any substances at all, but what their accidents and effects reveal. Matter we know by the quantity, figure, colour, heat or cold, density or rarity, hardness or softness, levity or weight, &c. And forms or differing natures we know by their operations: but that either matter or form is known to us immediately by itself, and is the *objectum sensus per se et immediate*, I cannot say by any observed experience of mine own.

Would you have me to go further yet? I shall then adventure to say, that as I feel no satisfying notion to difference the highest simple being, called material, from the lowest next it, called immaterial, but what is in and from the forms; so I think that it is too slippery a ground for any man to satisfy himself or others by, to say only that one is material, and the other immaterial. Matter, as I said, being but a *pars intelligibilis*, or inadequate conception of a thing, is not to be a genus in any predicament. And if substance express the adequate conception,

it must comprehend something answerable to matter, with that differencing nature called the form; and what name besides matter to give to that part of the conception of a substance, which is contradistinct from the form, philosophers are yet but little agreed in: some name there must be when we speak of any created substances: for the name of substance must not confound these distinct conceptions. Therefore, *materia metaphysica vel spiritualis* is the term, that hitherto men are fain to use.

Moreover, it is the form that doth difference and denominate. How then can you sufficiently difference corporeal and incorporeal from the material cause, by calling one physical and the other hyperphysical, or metaphysical? Doth any man's understanding perceive the true, positive difference by these words? Is matter as opposed to *nihil reale*, and is *ens creatum* (or as it expresseth our half-conception both of corporeal and incorporeal substances) differenced so discernibly, or *toto genere, vel tota specie*, without a form to make the difference. Doth *mole immunis et mole prædita* speak a formal difference, or not? If not, what place hath it in *arbore Porphyrii vel Gassendi*? And if it do not, you make the matter of substances *ab origine* differenced *in se* without any forms to difference them; that is, the physical and the metaphysical matter. But if those words do express a formal difference, you should find some other to expound them by: for surely *mole prædita* expresseth no form intelligibly; and *mole immunis* is but a mere negation of quantity.

Differences, therefore, that are fetched from matter here, or the material part of substance, are hardly made intelligible: and we have so little acquaintance with spiritual substances in their naked matter (for unless you will take *εἶδος* which is better than substance I know not how else to call it); that we speak but by rote when we talk of indivisibility, and unextensiveness, and impenetrability as the notifying differences; because they are things beyond our understandings.

Is there a difference between intellectual and spiritual beings among themselves or not? Doubtless, there is, as the case of angels, devils, and the souls of men declare: is this difference among any of them specific and formal? It is commonly so concluded, as between angels and men. Is there any agreement in substance, or in another essential part, where there is a formal difference? I know none that notify the other essential differ-

ence of the substance of men's souls and angels; but they commonly confess that both are spirits, not differenced materially otherwise than in degrees of purity and dignity, which how far it belongeth to the form I pretermitt. But there can be no specific difference in the matter considered without that form which specifieth. At least, some agreement there is; and of spirits, which are of different forms or species, there must be some one name for that in which they still agree. If you say that it is in substance, you must then take substance as we do matter for an inadequate conception, or only the *pars intelligibilis* of a being as without the form; but that is not the common acceptation of it; nor is it then fit for the place assigned it *in ordine prædicamentali*.

From all this, I am not about to injure any man's understanding, by building my conclusions upon any questionable grounds: I do but right your understandings so far, as to remove all uncertain foundations, though they be such as seem to be most for the advantage of my cause, and are by most made the great reasons of the soul's immortality. And it is not my purpose to deny, that as angels are compounded *ex genere et differentiâ*, so the generical nature of angels greatly differeth from the nature of corporeal things: as God can make multitudes of corporeal creatures, formally or specifically different, of the matter of one simple element only (as air, or fire), without material mixture; so he can either make an element of souls, either existent of itself, of which he will make individuals, yea, species formally diverse, or else existent only in the species and individuals, as he please. But then we must say, that as fire, and air, and water, differ formally, as several elements, so the spiritual element, or general nature hath a formal difference from the corporeal, called the material.* But hence it will follow, 1. That angels and human souls have a double form, as some use to call it, that is, generical as spirits, which is pre-supposed as the aptitude of their metaphysical matter, by which they differ from bodies; and specific, by which they are constituted what they are, and differ among themselves: unless you deny all such formal difference among them, and difference them only by individuation and accidents; as several drops or bottles of water taken out of the same sea. 2. And

* Porphyry 'De Occasion. per Ficin.' holds that Anima quidem medium quiddam est inter essentiam individuum, atque essentiam vera corpora divisibilem. Intellectus autem essentia est individua solum: sed qualitates materialesque formæ secundum corpora sunt divisibiles.

it will seem plain, that our differencing characters, or properties, between spirits and bodies, must be sought for in their different forms, which must be found in the noble operations which flow from the forms, and not from uncertain accidents. Therefore, my design in all this is but to intimate to you, how lubricous and uncertain, and beyond the reach of man's understanding, the ordinary characters from such accidents are, and that it is better to fetch the difference from the operations.

Saith Georg. Ritschel, 'Contempl. Metap. (c. 6. pp. 40, 43.)' "Difficile est rebus materialibus immersis substantiam immaterialem concipere——Et licet pro certo non constet an menti angelicæ omnis simpliciter materialitas repugnet; certum tamen est elementarem nostram ab illis abesse; atque divinam essentiam ab omni esse materia secretam æterna ejus et immutabilis habitudo convincit, nisi per materialitatem forte substantiam intelligas. (Sect. 15.) Dubium quidem nullum est immaterialem mundum essentiarum varietate intelligibilium æque admirabilem et augustum esse, atque mundum corporeum videmus: sed in quo illa consistat diversitas, nobis indicio certo non percipitur. Nimirum si præter te et lumbricum atque scarabæum animal aliud nullum vidisses, audires autem esse alia innumera genera, diversitate naturæ et forma penitus discrepantia, tum vagas quidem confusasque de diversitate volvere cogitationes posses; non posses autem illas tot bestiarum, piscium, reptilium, avium, species suo vultu et coloribus signare: ita quid spiritus sit immaterialis ex te capere, qui mentem immaterialem habes, qualemcunque notitiâ potes, non potes autem in te perspicere in quo precise illa varietas consistat."

To come nearer to the application of what is said, to the present objection, 1. The souls of men and brutes, we see, do not differ *in genere entis*, nor *in genere substantiæ*, nor *in genere principii vitalis*, nor *in genere sentientis*. 2. The matter of both, whether it differ as a metaphysical and physical, or how, is much beyond our knowledge. 3. The great diversity of operations doth show the great diversity of their powers, and forms, and inclinations. 4. This sheweth the diversity of their uses and ends, for which they were created. 5. It is certain that no substantial principle in either of them is annihilated at death. The souls of brutes have the same nature after death as they had before, and the souls of men have the same nature as before: they are not transformed into other things. 6. Therefore, about both of them, there is nothing left of doubt or controversy, but

only, 1. About the perpetual individuation; 2. The future operations; and so the habits, viz.: 1. Whether the souls of men or brutes, or both, do lose their individuation, and fall into some universal element of their kind? 2. Whether they operate after death, as now? There is nothing else about their immortality that common reason can make a question of. And for the souls of brutes, whether they remain individuate, or return to a common element of their kind, is a thing unknown to us, because unrevealed; and unrevealed, because it is of no use and concernment to us. Our own case concerneth us more, and therefore is more made known to us by God, as will further appear in that which followeth.

Object. III. Human souls are but forms; and forms are but the qualities or modes of substances, and therefore accidents; and therefore perish when separated from the bodies.

Ans. The world of learned men do find themselves too much work, and trouble others with controversies about names and words, and especially by confounding words and things, and not discerning when a controversy is only *de nomine*, and when it is *de re*; ^y and they have done so about forms as much as any thing. The word 'form' is usually liable to this ambiguity: in compounded beings, it is sometimes taken for the active, predominant part or principle, and sometimes for the state, which resulteth from the contemperation of all the parts. Which is the fit test to be called the form, is but a question *de nomine*. Gassendus himself confesseth this ambiguity of the word, and having pleaded that all forms, except man's intellectual soul, are but modes or qualities of bodies, and accidents, he addeth, (sec. 1. l. vi. c. 1,) "Si formæ nomine spiritum quendam et quasi florem materiæ intellexeris, cujusmodi fere concipimus animam in equo, tum forma dici potest substantia, immo et corpus tenuissimum, quod crassius pervadat, perficiat et regat. At si formæ nomine intelligitur dispositio ac modus quo tam substantia illa spirituosior quam crassior reliqua se habet, et ad quam facultates actionesque naturales consequentur tum posse qualitatem conseri ac dici." Whether the souls of brutes be only the spirits, or the *flos materiæ*, or not, it is granted by him, and by almost all men, that in mixed bodies there is one part more subtle than the rest, which is the most active, powerful, predominant part, and which doth *corpus pervadere, perficere, regere*.

^y Lege Plotinum de Anim. En. 4. l. 3. c. 391. sect. 26.

He thinketh that this is but that subtle matter which others call fire ; but others think, upon the reasons before given, that it is a superior nature, and that the spirits, or fiery nature, is but its nearest instrument, because no subtlety will make atoms sensible or appetitive, which, in their proper nature, have no such thing. But whatever becomes of the controversy, whether the animal principle in brutes be material or immaterial, it is granted us, and is certain, that in all mixed beings, there is a difference of the constitutive parts. As the fiery nature, such as the sun is of, is active in comparison with the other three elements, which to it are passive ; so the vital principle in brutes is active, powerful, and regent, as to the rest of the compounding parts. And it is certain, that the name of a form is, by contenders, taken sometimes for that regent, active principle or substance, (be it what it will,) and sometimes for the temperament resulting from all the parts. In engines, where there is no principle or part which is notably predominant, the name of the form is given to the ordered conjunction of all the parts ; so in a watch, the spring, though the beginning of motion is not so fitly called the form of the watch, as the order of the whole frame : but in living things, there is more room for a competition between the regent part and the temperament, which of them should be called the form. Now it is undeniable with all men, that both in men and brutes that regent principle is a substance, and that the contemperation, or order of the parts, is but their mode, and maketh no other kind of being than *ordo civitatis vel reipublicæ* is, which ceaseth upon the dissolution. And the form of simple beings, corporeal or incorporeal, elements or spirits, is neither another substance, distinct from the physical and metaphysical matter, nor yet an accident or mode ; but that peculiar nature, consisting in certain powers or virtues, by which, as essential to it, that being is specifically differenced from others ; which some call an essential quality, and some a substantial quality, and some a substantial form, because it is the perfection and essential nature of the substance *in specie*, and not another substance besides it.

Thus, Burgersdicius (however in his ‘Physics’ he saith as others), in his ‘Metaphysics,’ (l. i. c. 25, s. 6—9,) saith that, “*Forma substantialis est quæ materiam complet eamque informat, atque ita constituit substantiam corpoream : forma accidentalis est additamentum completæ substantiæ inhærens, et cum illa constituens. Ens concretum atque unum per accidens.*”

And he addeth that “*Forma substantialis non per se est substantia : substantia enim per se subsistit, &c. Quid ergo erit substantialis forma? Nihil aliud quam substantialis modus. Quia formis debetur, quod res corporales tales res sint, iis etiam ex parte debetur quod sint : quia esse non potest concipi absque tali aut tali esse, et tale esse est ipsius esse complementum.*” And yet the same man saith, (*ibid.* l. ii. c. 17, s. 13, p. 304,) “*Resp. Animas vegetativas et sensitivas unitas quidem esse corpori ex elementis confecto, sed mediante spiritu vitali et animali. Ideoque facultates earum animarum non esse temperationes primarum qualitatum, sed ipsam substantiam animarum, quatenus spirituum ope elementari corpori alligantur.*”

If, then, you take the word ‘form’ for the order of the parts, I say that man’s soul is not his form in that sense, nor is his form a substance ; but if the regent, predominant, active, vital, intelligent principle be called the form, so the form is a substance, and the soul is that form.

Here we must not confound *formam corporis, formam animæ, et formam hominis*. 1. The form of Adam’s body, before it had received a soul, was but the contemperation or order of all the parts by which it was apt to receive a soul, and to be actuated by it, as *corpus physicum organicum*. 2. The form of the soul itself (*e. g.* in its separated state) is that *vis naturalis intelligendi, volendi, et exequendi*, by which it is essentially differenced from all other kinds of being (commonly comprehended under the name of reason alone). 3. The *forma hominis*, taken for the state of the parts contemperate and ordered, is that said state or order, and not the soul : but taken for the vital, intelligent, regent part, or principle, it is the soul itself. So that the soul is not the *forma corporis*, nor the *forma hominis* in the one sense ; but it is the *forma hominis* in the other ; and its own differencing nature is its own form.

The like ambiguity there is in the word ‘quality,’ used in the objection. As I was never satisfied with the order or number of Aristotle’s ten predicaments, so especially I never understood him in the predicament of quality itself. As it is a very hard thing to know what those are that are by him, and commonly called qualities ; so I think that name too general and defective, to signify the nature of them aright. And I supposed ever that his *forma et figura* differ much more from the other species of quality, than most of the predicaments do from one another, (of which see Burgersdicius ‘Metaph.’ (l. ii. c. ult.) et Gassendus

(in Loc.) Judicious Mr. Pemble, *de origine formam*, pleadeth hard that "Principia constitutiva," are "materia (vel subjectum) et accidentia; et principium transmutationis" is "contrariarum qualitatum pugna:" that, "forma, exceptâ humanâ, non est substantia, nec materialis, nec immaterialis, sed accidens vel accidentium mixtura dictum temperamentum, et quod accidentia per se et immediate agunt, et non in virtute formæ substantialis." That is, "quod qualitates immediate hærent in materia, et à qualitatibus immediate profluunt operatione set operandi vires. Quod qualitates omnes primæ, (which he maketh five; lux, calor, frigus, humiditas, siccitas,) et aliquæ secundæ, tenuitas, crassities, gravitas, levitas, fluor, consistentia, creationis die primo existerunt: quod qualitates omnes activæ generant sibi simile, et ita sui diffusivæ et similium generativæ sunt, ut necessario materiam sibi proportionatam efficiunt. Quod animæ vegetativæ in plantis et sensitivæ in brutis sunt tantum temperamenta nobiliora qualitaturn actuosiorum in materia subtili, pura, spirituosiore."

Telesius maketh the same principles (*materia, calor, et frigus*) as to the chief; but he maketh *calor et frigus* to be substances, *vel formæ substantiales, et non tantum accidentia*. So that they that agree that it is qualities that are the active forms, are never the more agreed what they are, nor what the word 'qualities' doth signify. And what if, by the word 'quality,' Pemble do mean the very same thing as many others do that call them forms, when they speak of vegetatives. And what if, by substance, Telesius mean the same that Pemble doth by accidents? Is not the world, then, troubled with ambiguity of words? He that will consider them well, may suspect that they mean as I conjecture. An active power, or principle, being the chief cause of operations, alterations, or discrimination, is the thing that they all mean by these names. And the followers of Democritus, especially Gassendus and Cartesius, do not improbably argue that it is some substantial being which maketh that change or effect upon our senses, which as there received, is a quality. So that unless Mr. Pemble can better tell us what *lux et calor* are, than by calling them qualities, he hath given the understanding no satisfaction at all: much less when he nakedly asserteth, without any proof, that sensation doth not *superare naturam primarum qualitaturn*, that are none of them sensible themselves. And when he hath no other answer to this argument, but that *non minus miranda sunt in inanimatis*, which he giveth not one instance or

word to prove. When Aristotle, &c., Scaliger, Sennertus, and abundance more, have said much to the contrary.

I conclude, that for all that is here said, and whether you call them our forms or not, (as you may or may not, in several senses,) human souls are those parts of man which are simple, pure, invisible, active, powerful substances; and, therefore, being not annihilated, must needs subsist in their separated state.

Object. IV. The soul is material, and consequently mortal, because it dependeth upon matter in its operations, and consequently in its essence.^a

Answ. 1. I have proved already, that if you did prove the soul material, you had not thereby at all proved it mortal: unless you mean only that it hath a *posse mori vel annihilari*; which may be said of every creature: for simple matter, which hath no repugnant parts or principles, hath not only a *posse non mori*, but an aptitude in its nature, *ad non moriendum*. Remember your friends that make the world, or matter, at least, to be eternal. They thought not that materiality was a proof of either annihilation or corruption.

Object. If it be material, it must be compounded of matter and form, and, therefore, is corruptible.

Answ. True, if that matter and form were two several substances, and were one repugnant to the other. The soul and body are different substances; but the metaphysical matter and form of the soul, being but the *genus et differentia*, are not two substances, much less repugnant; and, therefore, have never the more a tendency to corruption.

2. The soul useth matter, and dependeth no otherwise on it than its instrument. It doth not follow that a man is a horse, because he dependeth on his horse in the manner of his riding, and his pace; nor that I am inanimate, because in writing I depend on my pen, which is inanimate. If you put spirits of wine into water or whey, as its vehicle to temper it for a medicine, it doth not follow that the spirits are mere water, because they operate not without the water, but conjunct, and as tempered by it. If the fire in your lamp do not shine or burn with-

^a Against the soul's dependence upon matter, the Platonists write excellently; Plato himself, and Plotinus, and Jamblicus, Proclus, &c. Anima per essentiam est mobilis ex seipsa; sed conjuncta corpori quodammodo evasit etiam mobilis aliunde; sicut enim ipsa sua præsentia dedit corpori ultimum ex se movendi vestigium, sic et ipsa propter corporeum contubernium conditionis notam subiit mobilis aliunde.—*Proclus de Anim. et Dæmon.*

out the oil, but in manner and duration dependeth on it, it doth not follow that fire is annihilated when the candle is out, or that it was but oil before ; no, nor that it ceaseth to be fire afterwards, as Gassendus must needs confess, who holdeth that the elements are not turned into one another. (S. 1. 1. iii. c. 2.) Fire ceaseth not to be fire, when it goeth out of our observation.

The noblest natures use and rule the inferior ; God himself moveth and useth things material, and yet is not, therefore, material himself. Yea, if *motus* be in *patiente et recipitur ad modum recipientis*, you may conjecture how far God's own operations upon the creatures may be called dependent as to the effect, as being *ad captum et modum creature*. And the sun doth move and quicken all passive matter here below, *ad modum recipientis*, with great variety through the variety of the matter ; and yet it followeth not that the sun is itself such passive matter.

3. The soul hath operations which are not upon matter at all, though matter may possibly be an antecedent occasion, or pre-requisite. Such is the apprehension of its own intellection and volitions, and all that it thence gathereth of God, and other intellectual natures and operations, of which I must say more anon.

Object. V. No immaterial substance moveth that which is material, as a principle of its operations ; but the soul moveth the body as the principle of its operations : *ergo* :

Ans. 1. I have already said, that if you proved the soul material, it would not prove it mortal.

2. As the body hath various operations, so it is moved by various principles or powers. As to locomotion, and perhaps vegetation, the *materia subtilis*, or finest atoms, as you will call it, or the fiery matter in the spirits, as I would call it, is an active being, which hath a natural power to move itself and the rest. But whether that motion do suffice to sensation, is undecided. But, certainly, there is another inward principle of motion, which guideth much of the locomotive, and overruleth some of the natural motion by a peculiar action of its own, which is called intellection and volition, as I have proved before. When I go to the church, when I write, or talk, the spirits are the nearest sufficient principle of the motion as motion ; but, as it is done in this manner, to this end, at this time, with these reasons, it is from the intellectual principle.

3. And thus I deny the major proposition, and I prove the

contrary. 1. God is the first Principle of all motion in the world, and the first Cause of material motion, and yet is not material. 2. What the lower and baser nature can do, that the higher and nobler hath power to do (*suppositis supponendis*): therefore, if a body can move a body, a soul can do it much more.

But, saith Gassendus, "*Causis secundis primum agendi principium est atomorum varia mobilitas ingenita, non incorporea aliqua substantia.*" Answ. Angels are *causæ secundæ*; souls are *causæ secundæ*; animated bodies of men are *causæ secundæ*; prove it now of any of these in your exclusion, if you can. But he saith, "*Capere non licet quomodo si incorporeum sit, ita applicari corpori valeat, ut illi impulsus imprimat; quando neque ipsum contingere, carens ipsa tactu seu mole qua tangat, non potest. Physicæ actiones corporeæ cum sint, nisi à principio physico corporeoque elici non possint. Quod anima autem humana incorporea cum sit, et in ipsum tamen corpus suum agat, motumque ipsi imprimat, dicimus animam humanam quæ est intellectus seu mens, atque adeo incorporea, non elicere actiones nisi intellectuales, seu mentales et incorporeas. Et quum est sentiens, vegetans, præditaque vi corporum motrice atque adeo corporea est, elicere actiones corporeas,*" &c. And of angels and devils he saith, "That it is known by faith only that they are incorporeal, and perhaps God gave them extraordinary bodies, when he would have them move or act on bodies."

To this I answer, 1. Who gave those atoms their ingenite mobility, and how? You say that "*Captum omnem fugit ut quippiam aliud moveat, si in seipso immotum maneat.*" If so, then it seemeth that either God was moved when he moved atoms, or that he never moved them. How, then, came they to be moved first? But you confess that God put into them their mobility. You say, "*De Deo alia ratio est, quoniam infinitæ virtutis cum sit, et ubique præsens, non ullo sui motu, sed nutu solo agere et movere quidlibet potest.*" If you think not as you speak, it is unworthy of a philosopher; if you do, then it is strange that you should overthrow your own reasoning, and excuse it no better than thus. If the reason why incorporeal spirits cannot move bodies be that which you allege, because only a body can be applied to a body to make impression on it, then God can less move a body than man's soul can; because his purest essence is more distant from corporeal grossness than

our souls are, at least the reason would be the same. And to say that God is everywhere, and of infinite virtues, maketh him nevertheless a spirit: and created spirits (if that be enough) may have power or virtue enough for such an effect. Doubtless, if God move bodies, the spirituality of an agent hindereth not the motion.

2. But why should it, *captum omnem superare*, that a nobler and more potent nature can do that, which a more ignoble can do? Because I cannot know how a spirit by contact can apply itself to matter, shall I dream that therefore it is incapable of moving bodies? Clean contrary, I see that matter of itself is an inactive thing, and were it not that the noble, active element of fire, which, as a lower soul to the passive matter, and a thing almost middle between a spirit and a body, did move things here below, I could discern no motion in the world but that which spirits cause, except only that of the parts to the whole, the aggregative motion which tendeth to rest. The difference of understandings is very strange: it is much easier to me to apprehend that almost all motion should come from the purest, powerful, active, vital natures, than that they should be all unable to stir a straw, or move the air, or any body.

Object. VI. The soul is, in our sleep, either inactive, as when we do not so much as dream, or acteth irregularly and irrationally, according to the fortuitous motion of the spirits. *Ergo*: it is no incorporeal, immortal substance.ⁿ

Answ. 1. I suppose the soul is never totally inactive. I never awaked since I had the use of memory, but I found myself coming out of a dream; and I suppose they that think they dream not, think so because they forget their dreams.

2. Many a time my reason hath acted for a time as regularly, and much more forcibly than it doth when I am awake: which showeth what it can do, though it be not ordinary.

3. This reason is no better than that before answered; where I told you, that it argueth not that I am a horse, or no wiser than my horse, because I ride but according to his pace, when he halteth, or is tired. Nor doth it prove that when I alight, I cannot go on foot. He is hard of understanding that believeth that all the glorious parts of the world above us have no nobler, intellectual natures than man. Suppose there be angels; and suppose one of them should be united to a body, as

ⁿ a See in Aristæus' *Histor.* de 70. p. 879, the King's Quest. 19, about dreams; with the answer, how far dreams are in our power.

our souls are, we cannot imagine but he would actuate it, and operate in it according to its nature ; as I write amiss when my pen is bad. The same I say of persons lethargic, apoplectic, delirant, &c.

Object. VII. Reason is no proof of the soul's immateriality, because sense is a clearer and more excellent way of apprehension than reason is ; and the brutes have sense.

Ans. 1. I have said enough to the case of brutes before.

2. The soul understandeth bodily things, by the inlet of the bodily senses : things incorporeal (as I shall show more anon) it otherwise understandeth. When it understandeth by the help of sense, it is not the sense that understandeth any thing. If brutes themselves had not an imagination which is an image of reason, their sense would be of little use to them. We see, when, by business or other thoughts, the mind is diverted and alienated, how little sense itself doth for us ; when we can hear as if we never heard, and see, and not observe what we see, yet it is true that the more sense helpeth us in the apprehending of things sensible, which are their objects, the better and more surely we perceive them by the understanding. As the second and third concoction will not be well made, if there be a failing in the first ; so the second and third perception, in the fantasy and intellect, will be ill made, if the first deceive or fail them. But this proveth not either that the first concoction, or perception, is more noble than the third ; or that sensitives without reason have any true understanding at all ; or that sense, fantasy, and reason, are not better than sense alone. But these things need not much disputing. If sense be nobler than reason, let the horse ride the man, and let the woman give her milk to the cow, and let brutes labour men, and feed upon them, and let beasts be your tutors, and kings, and judges, commit to them the noblest works, and give them the pre-eminence, if you think they have the noblest faculties.

Object. VIII. Sensation and intellection are both but reception ; the passiveness, therefore, of the soul doth show its materiality.^b

Ans. A short answer may satisfy to this objection.

1. All created powers are partly passive, how active soever they be. For being, *in esse et operari*, dependent on, and subordinate to, the first Cause, they must needs receive his influ-

^b Read Priscian's 'Thophrast. de Anim.' with Facinus's Notes, which show how far the sense is active.

ence, as well as exercise their own powers. As the second wheel in the clock must receive the moving force of the first, before it can move the third.

2. It is an enormous error about the operations of the soul, to think that intellection, yea, or sensation either, is mere reception, and that the sensitive and intellective power are but passive. The active soul of man, yea, of brutes, receiveth not its object as the mark or butt receiveth the arrow that is shot at it. It receiveth it by a similitude of nature, and by an active attendance, and embracement, yea, by an active appetite, *sicut fœmina mare, vel potius sicut esuriens cibum*: yea, it moveth towards its object, and meeteth it. It actively welcometh it, and improveth it: as I said even now, a scholar that in his studies so far diverteth his thoughts, that he knoweth not that the clock hath struck at his ears, and knoweth not what those say that talk by him, doth show that some active attendance is necessary to almost all perception. He that feeleth not that his understanding doth *agere* as well as *pati*, when he is studying, reading, or writing, is a stranger to himself. How often have I read over many lines when I have thought of something else, and not known one word that I have read? Is inventing, compounding, dividing, defining, &c., no action? I never felt cause, from any experience of my own, to believe that I was a mere patient in any thought that was ever in my mind. Nay, the Epicurean that supposeth thoughts to be but a dance of atoms, called spirits, doth think that those atoms or spirits are notably active. Cartesius's *materia subtilis* is eminent in activity. Do you think that every dead object which I think on, with my eyes shut, in the night, is so much more alive than I; and so much more active than my mind, that it must be accounted the sole agent, and my mind the patient. They know little of a mind that talk in this strain.^c

I know Cartesius telleth us, that the eye hath no fire or light in it, except, perhaps, the eye of a cat or owl. But if the

^c Sensus principium mediaque et finem sentiendæ rei individuæ comprehendit, et actio est, judiciumque perfectum, et in præsentî momento simul totus existit, etsi non absque passione aliqua instrumenti sensus efficitur non tamen est hæc passio sensus; quo fit ut patiamur et vigilantes et dormientes nec tamen persentiamus.—*Theophrast. de Anim. ut supr.* Lege Mars. Ficinum 'De Volupt. (c. 1—3.)' &c. Platonis dogma defendentem, scil.—*Voluptatem esse Actum vel Motum.*

Priscian in Theophrast. 'De Anim. (c. 3.)' saith, Anima videtur cum sit forma vivens et sensualis, agit circa illa quæ sibi offeruntur. Vitaliter atque sensualiter: et quia est in corpore, usque ad certum spatium operatur.

study of matter and motion had left him any room for the consideration of other things which he passed over, he would, by a little search, have found that the eye doth close with its primary object, light, by mere connaturality, because it participeth of light itself, in its own constitution. It is fire in the eye, even in the visive spirits, which meeteth the fire or light without, and by union causeth that which we call sight. And seeing that experience forced him to confess it of cats and owls, how could he think that all other eyes or sights were quite of another kind? Some men have been able to see in the dark, and had sparkling eyes, almost like cats. The degree here differenceth not the species. If this *materia subtilis*, or *globuli ætheri*, be fire, he might have allowed some of that to the visive spirits in man, as well as in owls. Saith Ficinus, in ‘Theophrast. de Anim. (c. 14.)’ “Primum luminosum est cœleste : secundum est igneum : tertium inter composita quod quasi fulget ut ignis. Primum luminale est oculus præcipue radiosus, in animalibus, quæ nocte vident ; sed alii quoque oculi quamvis minus, sunt tamen luminales.”

Nemesius,^d ‘I. pro Immort. Anim. in Bibl. Pat.’ (p. 505,) approveth Plato’s judgment : “Plato inquit per confusionem splendorum res aspicere existimat, ut id lumen quod ex oculis proficiscitur aliquo usque in aerem, qui ejusdem est secum genus effluat. Quod vero à corporibus manat contraferatur, et quod in aere est, qui interponitur, facileque, diffunditur et vertitur, simul cum oculorum igne extendatur. Et Galenus (inquit) de visione cum Platone consentit in 70 de consens.” And he saith himself, “That the sun sendeth its light by the air, and the light in the eye streameth also into it ; which is to seeing, as the nerves are to the brain for feeling. Porphyry saith, “That sight is the soul itself discerning itself in all things.” But if there were any doubt in the point of sight, which is performed both by active spirits, and an active object light, yet, methinks, that when I feel a stone, much more when I meditate on a mountain, all should confess that my sense and intellection is like to have more action than that stone and mountain. And if you say only, that spirits first moved move others, and so touch the intellectual organs, or spirits, I have partly answered that before, and shall answer it more anon. We have great reason to ascribe the most of action to that part which is most subtle, vigorous, and active.

^d See Alcinous ‘De doct. Plat. (cap. xviii.)’ to the same purpose.

Object. 9. There is nothing in the intellect which was not first in the sense, from which it receiveth all its knowledge by the ideas of the fantasy ; therefore, the soul can reach no higher than to corporeal, sensible things ; therefore, it is but such itself.

Answ. The antecedent is false, and both the consequents. Had he limited his assertions to corporeal objects, I should easily acknowledge to Gassendus, that “ *Omnis quæ in mente habetur idea ortum ducit à sensibus. Et omnis idea aut per sensum transit, aut ex iis quæ transeunt per sensum formatur. Et quæ idea propriis acquiritur sensibus perfectior est eâ quæ ex facta ab alio descriptione formatur. Qualis idea rei, talis definitio.*” But that these things will not hold true as he delivereth them, universally, I think I shall make plain, and confute this objection, to the satisfaction of any one that knoweth himself.

Ortum ducere à sensu is an ambiguous phrase : the sense may be the occasion, *sine qua non*, of that whereof it never had the least participation in itself. I desire you but to distinguish between the intellect’s object and its act, and those objects which it knoweth by the mediation of other extrinsic objects, and those which it knoweth by the mediation of its own act. These differences are past all doubt. When the eye seeth these lines and this paper, the light, and lines, and paper, are each one thing, and the sight of them is another. I see the light, and thereby the paper, but I see not my sight ; my sight is not the object of my sight ; it may be said, that the object is in my sight, but not that my sight is in my sight ; yet, by seeing, I perceive not only what I see, but that I see ; and I perceive much more plainly that I see, than what I see. I may doubt of a thousand objects which I see, what matter, shape, or colour, they are of ; but I doubt not at all of the act of seeing ; that right or wrong some sight I have, or that I see the light ; so is it with the intellect. This book is one thing, and the understanding of it is another thing. The book is the object of my understanding ; but, at least, *in primo instanti*, my understanding is not the object of my understanding ; but by understanding, I have an immediate perception that I understand. And, as Cartesius truly saith, the act of intellection is more perceived than the object : I am more certain that I think and understand, than I am of the nature of that which I think of and understand. If any say, that the act of intellection is the object of another

intellection, because *intelligo me intelligere*, and so that *intellectio non est tantum actus intellectus, sed etiam est in intellectu*, and that the intellect doth understand its own act, *intuitivè*, as some speak, or by reflection, as others, though doubtless the first perception that I understand is not by reflection, but by that same act of understanding something else, as sight doth not reflect upon itself to get a perception that I see. I will enter no controversy about any of these notions of the manner of our understanding our own act of intellection, which doth not concern the present business. But it is most certain that *actus intelligendi nunquam fuit in sensu*: when the object of intellection did pass through the sense, the act of intellection did not; nor the intellection or perception of that act of intellection did not: nor the intellection of the common nature of an intelligence, which from hence I gather; nor the intellection of particular intelligences, as angels; nor my intellection of any man's intellect or intellectual act, whose nature I gather from mine own; nor the conception I have of a Deity, as the most perfect intellect; nor the perception which I have of my own volition of my own felicity, or of the means thereto as such, nor of the pleasing of God, nor of another man's good; nor my perception of the nature of the will hence gathered; nor my conception of the volitive power in other persons; nor my conceptions of the volitions of God, of angels, &c.; nor my conception of intellectual or moral habits, nor of the will's natural inclinations: none of all these were ever in the sense, nor passed through the sense; some of them (which Gassendus 'De Ideis' doth overlook) are, without any idea at all, properly so called, as the first perception of the act of my own understanding and will, by understanding and willing other things, as we perceive that we see *non videndo ipsum visum, sed alia videndo*; and that idea which we have of all the rest is fetched from this perception of our own acts, and not from any thing which ever was in the sense; the soul, by knowing itself, doth gather the knowledge of all higher intellectual beings, which is its most considerable, worthy knowledge. I hope I have given you instances enough, and plain enough; and you see now what truth there is of *nihil est in intellectu quod non fuit prius in sensu*.

D'Orbellis distinguisheth knowledge, largely, taken into *sensitivè et intellectivè*; and both of them into *abstractivè et intuitivè*. Knowledge intuitive is of an object as itself present,

when a thing in its present existence is the moving object of knowledge. Knowledge abstractive is when the species of the thing doth move us to know the thing itself; and that whether the thing itself be present or absent, and have existence or not. The example of intuitive sensitive knowledge or perception, which he giveth, is the eye-seeing colours. The instance of abstractive sensitive knowledge is, as the fantasy doth imagine colours: the instance of intuitive, intellective knowledge is, the saints seeing the glory of God in heaven; and he might have instanced in many other things. The instance of abstractive, intellective knowledge, is the understanding's knowledge of the quiddity of colours by means of the species: to which may be added, that abstractive knowledge is either *per speciem propriam* or *per speciem alienam*: in this life the soul knoweth its own acts, either intuitively, or by an act, if possible, yet nearer to its essential power, that hath no usual, distinguishing name. It knoweth its own powers, inclinations, and habits, neither by a knowledge, in proper and strict sense, intuitive or abstractive; for it is not by a proper species, but it is its natural, innate power of discerning this principle, that *quicquid agit potest agere quod agit*; by arguing *ab actu ad potentiam et naturam*. But in the large sense, as Cartesius useth the word, this may be called an idea. The mind knoweth God, and angels, and other men's souls, in this large sense, also, by an idea, but not *per speciem propriam*, *sed alienam*, that is, not by a species of God and angels, but by an idea borrowed from our own intellections and volitions. But this is not an idea that ever passed through the senses; and Gassendus might have thought on it, whether it be not an idea in the intellect, if not without the fantasy, at least over and above the idea in the imagination, when he denieth that there are any such intellective ideas.

2. But what, if there had been nothing in the intellect but what passed through the sense? It would no more thence follow, that the intellect is no more noble, spiritual, or immortal than the sense, than it will follow that the king is no better than his porter, because none cometh to him till he let them in, or that the animal spirits are no more noble than the teeth, or than the natural heat; or the third concoction is no more excellent than the first, because nothing cometh to the third concoction but what was masticated, swallowed, and passed the first and second concoction: of which before.

3. And even, by the help of things sensible, Epicurus can

reach the knowledge of insensible atoms ; and Cartesius, of his subtle matter, and *globuli cœlestes* ; why, then, by things sensible, may we not reach the knowledge of spiritual substances and powers ?

Yet, after all this, I am much of their mind who think that it is not actual knowledge that is born with us ; nor is there any true idea or picture of any thing innate in our understandings ; and I think that if, *per possibile vel impossibile*, you suppose a man born without any one sense, that he would have had no actual knowledge at all, though that is uncertain. Because, as if I had not seen any thing objective, I should not have perceived that I could see ; so if I had never known any other object, I could not have known what it is to know : and other objects have no way, that I know of, to the intellect, but through the sense (though what the active spirits would have done upon the fantasy, I cannot possibly understand). But all this only concludeth, that the senses' reception is the way to the intellection of things sensible ; and that it was a necessary occasion, *sine qua non*, to the perception of our own intellectual act, because thus necessary to the act itself : but not that any idea of our own intellection, or any of all the things fore-instanced, was received through the senses.

Object. X. That which things corporeal work upon, is corporeal : for it cannot be conceived how bodies can work upon that which hath no body. But things corporeal work upon the soul : *ergo*, it is itself corporeal.

Answ. 1. I largely before showed, that our uncertainty of the just consistence of metaphysical matter, or incorporeal substance, doth make all such arguings to sound like dreams.

2. I have showed that spiritual powers receive not impressions as dull matter doth, by a mere passive power, but by an activity and outgoing ; it worketh indeed upon that which it receiveth, much more than any such matter can be said to work upon it : nay, matter doth not properly work upon it at all, but only affordeth it matter to work upon, and occasion to exercise its active power. As the stone, or tree, doth not work upon the sight, but the sight by the help of light doth work upon it. As the eye can see a dunghill, and yet be of a nobler kind ; and God and angels can know beasts and worms, and yet be incorporeal. So man can know things inanimate, and yet be animate ; and things insensible, and yet be sensible ; and things irrational, and yet be rational ; and things corporeal, and yet be

incorporeal. And this by the activity and extent of its power, and not by any passive, debasing defectiveness at all.

Object. XI. That is not incorporeal which neither knoweth itself to be incorporeal, nor hath any notion but negative of an incorporeal being: but such is man's soul.^e

Answ. 1. If the soul know not itself to be an immortal spirit, what maketh almost all the world to judge so of themselves? Insomuch, that those men that under pretence of philosophy deny it, are fain to study very hard, and take many years' pains to blot out this light of nature from their minds, because they cannot be ignorant of it at easy rates. The understanding will not lose its natural light, nor suffer such verities to be obliterated, but by a great deal of industry, and by the engines of abundance of false notions, which are sought after to that use. As Cicero saith of the Epicureans, they learn those things; "*quæ cum præclare didicerunt nihil sciunt.*" ('Piso. de Fin. 5. p. 204.) They learn diligently to unlearn the truth, that when they have learned much, they may know little.

2. Hath man no notion but negative of an incorporeal being? I showed you before why the notion of materiality should not be here used for a cheat or blind. But look back on what I said, even now, and you will see that, as Cartes truly saith, "We have not only positive conceptions of a mind, but the first, the clearest, and the surest conceptions of it, in the measure that is fit for our present state."

Quest. 1. Have you not a positive conception of intellection and volition? If not, you are unfit for any controversies about them, and cannot own your own humanity.

Quest. 2. Have you not a clearer perception that you think, and know, or reason, either right or wrong, than you have what that thing is that you think or reason about?

Quest. 3. Have you not a sure and positive conception that *omnis actus est alicujus actus, et quod nihil, nihil agit*, and therefore that you are an intelligent, volitive being?

Quest. 4. Have you not a positive, sure conception, that *quicquid agit agere potest*, and that nothing doth that which it cannot do; and therefore that your souls are beings potentiated for intellection, volition, and execution?

Quest. 5. Have you not a positive, sure conception that you have a natural inclination to these acts, and a pleasure in them,

^e Vid. Paul. Cortesium, in Sent. 1, Dis. 1, p. 7, et Dis. 2, p. 8. That spiritual things are better known than corporeal, and of the knowledge of God.

and that they are natural and perfective to you, and, consequently, that your souls are beings that have not only a power, but a *vis et inclinatio naturalis*, or a power that is natural, and active, and inclined to these particular things.^f

Quest. 6. Have you not a positive, sure conception that the end and highest object of these acts and inclinations, are things above sense, viz., yourselves or minds in the first place, and then the things above you, the first Being, Cause, and Mover of all; the infinite Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, who is your Maker and your End? If you find no such thing, the Lord have mercy on you; for every honest man may find it.

Quest. 7. Have you not a positive, sure conception that such as the operations are, which flow from the essential powers or faculties, such in nobility, and excellency, and nature, is the substance thus potentiated and acting?

All these are clear, undeniable, positive conceptions of the soul, which, set together, are thus much: that the mind or soul of man is a noble essence, above the reach and nature of sense, naturally potentiated and inclined, as an active being, to intellection, volition, and seeking after things celestial and everlasting, especially God himself, his ultimate End. All this is positive, clear, and sure; and you would think this enough, 1. If you would consider what Lud. Vives saith: that God hath given man a soul to use, rather than accurately to know; or to know so far as is necessary to use. As your child may have the use of his knife, or clock, or watch, or clothes, without knowing what metal they are made of, or how to compose and make the like, as long as he can but do that with them which is necessary to their use. Often, saith Seneca, "*Necessaria ignoramus, quia superflua didicimus.*" 2. If your minds were not by sense deluded and captivated to such fixed ideas of things corporeal and gross, as to overlook all other beings, and measure all substance by such gross ideas. 3. If you well considered that you know in any respect little more of things corporeal, and in some respect much less. Let us see wherein it is that you know more; either as to the sensible or insensible parts of such beings. As for the substances, as such, you confess they are but *per accidentis*, the objects of sense, and that, as stripped of their accidents, you have no positive, true conception of them; and as for the accidents, you are no whit agreed either what they are, or how

^f Porphy. de occas. inq. Anima est essentia inextensa, immaterialis, immortalis, in vita habente à seipsa vivere atque esse simpliciter possidente.

many. Of all things, you are most unanimous in that of quantity, *moles*, or extension; but what a poor kind of knowledge is it, to know that this or that is *quantum*, and not to know what it is that is *quantum*. What light, colour, sapor, odor are, and what all the senses that perceive them, you are as much disagreed as if this age had been the first that had debated it. The same I may say both of qualities in general, and of all other in particular, except figure, which properly belongeth not to that predicament. Of all the rest there is the like disagreement; even time and place, which, truly, are nothing but *entia rationis*, are disposed by you in the first place, and are two of Gassendus's four predicaments. About the number either of principles or elements, there is no agreement; no, nor what any one of the elements are: who hath told us what is the form of earth, or water, or air; or described them otherwise than by their qualities? And then differ you as much about those qualities! Who hath told us any thing about the naked matter or form of fire, such as the sun and luminaries are, any otherwise than by its acts and powers, or virtues of motion, light, and heat, as we describe to you the soul of man? And if you go to the invisible part of matter, it would make a man rather sick than wise, to read men *provincias dare atomis*, as Cicero speaketh; and to think with what bold, unreasonable fiction they number them, as shaped and figured; and figure and shape them to the uses which they have feigned for them; and then use them and conduct them, and vary their motions, as confidently and seriously as if they had given us any proof of this, and indeed expected to be believed: nay, we must know how the corners of atoms (pardon the contradiction) came to be filed or worn off by motion, and so reduced to greater subtlety. And Gassendus, after all the fabric which he buildeth upon atoms, saith, "That atoms have not of themselves a moving force, but from God's first motion." (S. I. c. viii. p. 280.) "Non quod Deo necesse fuerit creare seorsim atomos, quas deinceps in partes grandiores, grandioresque ex his, mundus constaret, compingerit; sed quod creans materiæ massam, in corpuscula exolubilem, atque adeo ex corpusculis tanquam minimis extremisque particulis compositam, concreasse illi ipsa corpuscula consentur." (*Ibid.*) So that they know not indeed whether God created matter first in atoms disjunct, or in more large and bulky parts; and so whether motion did divide grosser and greater parts into atoms, or whether it coagulated atoms into greater

bodies. But the sum is, that they only affirm, that whatever bodies God made, they are divisible into atoms; that is, into parts by man indivisible. A great mystery surely, that the whole is divisible into smaller parts! And what the nearer is any man by this, for the discerning of any of their wild hypotheses? In a word, God hath given man knowledge for his benefit and use, to the ends of his being and life; and so far as we have use for it, we may know all things about us; but to humour our wanton fancies he is not obliged. And because we have more use for the faculties of our souls than for fire and water, or any outward thing, he hath given us the first and surest knowledge of them; whatsoever self-contradicting somatists say to depress this knowledge, and advance that knowledge of bodies which their own disagreements do confute. Sure I am, if that be a probable opinion which hath divers learned men for it, almost all things are probable in philosophy; and if that be improbable which hath multitudes of learned men against it, almost all things are improbable.

Object. XII. That which is generated is corruptible; but the soul is generated: *ergo*, &c.

Answ. 1. If, by corruptible, you mean that which hath a *posse perire*, or a certainty of perishing, if God uphold it not, I grant it of the whole creation; but if you mean that which in its nature is so fitted to dissolution, perishing, or decay, as that God seemeth to intend it to such an end, or must miraculously preserve it, or else it will perish, or that which eventually will perish, then we must not so easily dismiss you.

2. The word 'generated' is of so great ambiguity, and generation itself a thing so little understood by mortals, that this reason doth but carry the controversy into the dark, and argue *ab obscuriore et minus noto*; which is the way of a wrangler, and not of one that would reveal the truth. Either generation is the production of some new substance, not existent before, so much as in its matter; or it is only the composition of pre-existent substances. If it be the latter, then you may prove the possibility and probability of the dissolution of the frame, and separation of those several substances. But you will confess yourselves, that each part retaineth its proper nature still; and that if one were a more noble and active element than the rest, it is not annihilated, but remaineth so still without debasement. Therefore, if their opinion were true, who hold the pre-existence of that purest part of man, which we call his soul, either in a common element, or individuate, no reason can think that the

dissolution doth any more than separate the parts of man, and return that soul to its pre-existent state ; where, still, it will be as noble a creature as it was here.

But if generation do produce a substance *de novo*, which did no way pre-exist, then it is either a corporeal substance, or a spiritual or incorporeal : whichsoever it be, can you give a reason why this should perish at the dissolution, any more than if it had pre-existed ? If the nature of it be the same, why should not the duration be the same ? One of the two you will confess it, either a corporeal substance or an incorporeal, if it be at all a substance ; and you confess that no substance is annihilated, or perisheth, otherwise than by dissolution of parts. If the reason of your *major* be because the thing generated hath a beginning, and did *oriri de novo*, so did all matter and substances that be created ; or, if you suppose them all from eternity, yet do but suppose them to be created, and have had a beginning, and yet to be the same as if they had been eternal, and you will see that there will be the same reason to prove their continuance, as long as their nature and their dependence on God are both the same.

But, it may be, you will form your objection better, and say, that generation produceth no new substance, but only a composition, order, and temperament of pre-existent substances ; but souls are generated : *ergo*, they are no substances, but the order and temperament of pre-existent substances.

Ans. I never saw any thing like a cogent proof of the *major* ; and most Christians think you can never prove the *minor*.

A substance may be called new, either because it is made of nothing, as in creation, or because it ariseth to its natural state of perfection *ex semine vel natura fœcunda*, where it was only virtually and seminally before.

Before you can prove your *major*, even in the first sense, you must be better acquainted with the nature of God, and of spirits, and of generation, than you are ; I cannot imagine what show of proof you can bring to prove that, universally, no generation causeth a substance totally new, unless you will go to Scripture, (which you believe not,) and plead from Gen. i. that "God then ended all his works, and, therefore, doth create no more." But, 1. He may cause them totally *de novo*, without such a creation as is there spoken of ; for he may, by an established law of nature, adjoin his producing influx to the act of the creature, ordinarily, and so difference it from that proper creation.

2. No man can prove that God hath there said one word to assure us, that he will never create any thing hereafter. Cannot a workman look on his house, and see that it is well done, and say, 'I have finished it,' without obliging him never to build another, nor to make any reparations of that as there is cause? May not God create a new heaven and earth? May he not create a new star, or a new plant, or animal, if he please, without the breaking of any word that he hath spoken? For my part, I never saw a word which I could discern to have any such signification or importance. The argument from Gen. i. is no better than theirs, who, from Christ's *consummatum est*, do gather, that his death and burial which followed that word, were no part of his satisfactory, meritorious humiliation.

On the contrary, there have been both philosophers and divines, who have thought, that God doth, *in omni instanti*, properly create all things which he is said to conserve: of whom the one part do mean only, that the being of the creatures is as dependent on his continual causation, as the life of the branches is on the tree, but that the same substance is continued, and not another daily made. But there are others who think that all creatures are *in fluxu continuo*, not *per locomotum*, but *ab entitate ad nihilum*, and that they are all but a continual emanation from God, which, as it passeth from him, tendeth to nothing, and new emanations do still make such a supply, as that the things may be called the same; as a river, whose waters pass in the same channel; as they think the beams or light of the sun do *in omni instanti oriri et festinare ad nihilum*: the stream being still supplied with new emanations. Were it not for the overthrow of individuation, personality, rewards and punishments, that hence seemeth to follow, this opinion would seem more plausible than theirs, who groundlessly prohibit God from causing any more new beings.

But though, no doubt, there is unto all beings a continual emanation or influx from God, which is a continued causation, it may be either conservative of the being first caused, or else restorative of a being continually in decay, as he please: for both ways are possible to him, as implying no contradiction; though both cannot be about one and the same being, in the same respect, and at the same time. And our sense and reason tell us, that the conservative influx is his usual way.

2. But it is commonly, and not without reason, supposed, that generation produceth things *de novo* in another sense; not

absolutely, as creation doth, but *secundum quid*, by exalting the seminal virtue into act, and into perfection. New individuals are not made of new matter now created; but the corporeal part is only pre-existent matter, ordered, compounded, and con-tempered; and the incorporeal part is, both *quoad materiam suam metaphysicam, et formam vel naturam specificam*, the exaltation and exurgency of that into full and perfect existence, which did before exist *in semine virtuoso*.

When God had newly created the first man and woman, he created in them a propagating virtue and fecundity: this was, as it were, *semen seminis*: by this they do first *generare semen separabile*, which *suppositis supponendis*, hath a fecundity fit to produce a new *suppositum vel personam*; and may be called a person seminally or virtually, but not actually, formally, and properly; and so this person hath power to produce another, and that other in the same way. And note, that the same creating word, which said, "Let there be light;" and, "Let us make man;" did say also to man, as well as to other creatures, "Increase and multiply:" not, 'Create new souls or bodies,' but by generation, "Increase and multiply," which is the bringing of many persons out of two, and so on, as out of a seminal pre-existence, or virtual, into actual, formal existence.

He knoweth not the mysteriousness of this wonderful work of God, nor the ignorance of mankind, who knoweth not that all generation of man, brutes, or plants, hath much that is to us unsearchable. And they that think it a dishonour to a philosopher, not to undertake or pretend to render the just causes of this and all other the phenomena in nature, do but say, 'I will hide the dishonour of my ignorance by denying it;' that is, by telling men that I am ignorant of my ignorance, and by aggravating it by this increase, and the addition of pride, presumption, and falsity.

This much is certain, 1. That whatsoever distinct parts do constitute individuals, which are themselves of several natures, so many several natures in the world we may confidently assert, though we understand not whether they all exist separately, or are found only in conjunction with others.

2. We certainly find in the world,^g 1. An intelligent nature.

^g The Platonists' method of progression is thus summed up in Plotinus Ennead. 4. l. 3. p. 384., and out of him by Ficinus: sicut æris Summum primum omnium ignitur, ab infimo ignis, sic cælum summum corpus primo animatur ab anima quæ est ultimum divinorum: ipsum Lunum est quasi

2. A sensitive nature. 3. A fiery, active, vegetative nature. 4. A passive matter, which receiveth the influx of active natures, which is distributed into air, and water, and earth.

3. The most active nature is most communicative of itself, in the way of its proper operations.

4. We certainly perceive that the sun and fiery nature are active upon the air, water, and earth, which are the passive elements. And by this activity, in a threefold influx, motion, light, and heat, do cause the sensible alterations which are made below; and so that it is a kind of life, or general form, or soul to the passive matter.

5. We also find that motion, light, and heat, as such, are all different *totâ specie* from sensation; and therefore, as such, are not the adequate causes of it. And also that there is a sensitive nature in every animal, besides the vegetative.

6. Whether the vegetative nature be any other than the fiery or solar, is to man uncertain. But it is most probable that it is the same nature, though it always work not to actual vegetation, for want of prepared matter. But that the sun and fiery nature is, *eminenter*, vegetative; and, therefore, that vegetation is not above the nature of fire, or the sun, and so may be an effect of it.

7. In the production of vegetatives by generation, it is evident that, as the fiery active nature is the nearest cause efficient, and the passive is the matter and recipient, so that this igneous nature generateth as in three distinguished subjects, three several ways. 1. As in *parentibus et semine*, into which God, *ab origine*, in the creation, hath put not only a spark of the active, virtuous, fiery nature in general, but also a certain special nature, differencing one creature from another. 2. The sun and superior globes of the fiery nature, which cast a paternal, though but universal influx, upon the foresaid *semen*. 3. The *calor naturalis telluris*, which may be called, as Dr. Gilbert and others do, its soul or form; which is to the seed as the *anima matris* is to the infant. And all these three, the fiery nature of the *semen*, of the sun, and of the *calor naturalis telluris*, are

centrum: mens, lumen inde emicans; et permanens: anima, lumen de lumine se movens: corpus, per se opacum illuminatur ab anima; sed animæ in cælo, securæ illuminant; sub cælo non sine curâ. Est utique aliquid velut centrum; penes hoc autem circulus ab ipso micans: præter hæc et alius circulus, lumen de lumine: ultra hæc insuper non amplius luminis circulus, sed jam luminis indigus alieni, propriæ lucis inopia.—*Inqui. Plot. ibid.*

generally the same ; and, by their agreeableness, do meet in co-operation for generation.

8. Herein all three, as conjunct, are the cause of life, as life, the sun, the seed, and the *calor telluris*, communicating conjunctly what in their natures they all contain ; that is, an active nature, having a power, by motion, light, and heat, to cause vegetation and its conjunct effects. But the *calor et motus solis*, and the *calor telluris*, are but universal causes of life as life ; but the *virtus seminalis* is both a cause of life *in genere*, and a specifying cause of this or that sort of plants *in specie*. The reason why, *e. g.*, an oak, an elm, a rose-tree, and every plant is what it is, *in specie*, being to be fetched from the seed alone, and the Creator's will.

9. Though the seed be the chief, or only specifying cause, (why this is *adiantum*, and that *betonica*, and that *calendula*, &c.,) yet the sun and earth, the universal causes, do contribute much more to the life as life, than the seed itself.

10. This fiery, or solar, active nature is so pure, and above the full knowledge of mortals, that we have no certainty at all, whether, in all this generative influx, it communicate to vegetatives from itself a pre-existent matter, and so draw it back to itself again by circulation ; or whether it do only by the substantial contact of its active streams, cherish, and actuate, and perfect the substance which it findeth *in semine et materia passiva* ; or whether, *per influxum virtutis*, it operate only by that which is commonly called quality, without any communication or contact of substance.

11. In all this operation of the solar or fiery nature in generation, it is, *quid medium*, between the passive matter and the animal nature ; and is plainly an image of the animal nature and its operations ; so like it, that it hath tempted many to ascribe all animal operations only to the solar or fiery nature, and hath caused wise men to doubt whether this nature be to be numbered with things corporeal or incorporeal ; and to place it between both, as participating in several respects of both.

12. If the sensitive nature be really above, or specifically different from the fiery, we may, in what is said, conjecture much at the order of the generation of things sensitive, viz., by a threefold cause co-operating, one specifying, and two universal and cherishing. The specifying is the *virtus seminalis maris et feminae* conjunct, and of neither alone ; the same God which blessed the single seed of a plant with the gift of multiplication,

blessed only the conjunct seeds of male and female animals with that gift; the superior, universal cause, is either some *anima universalis ejusdem nature*, or God immediately. By an *anima universalis*, I mean not an *anima totius mundi*, but of that superior vortex, or part, which this earth belongs to. Either this is the sun, or some invisible soul. If it be the sun, it is not by its simple, fiery nature before mentioned; because sensation seemeth to be somewhat, *tota specie*, different from motion, light, and heat; and then it must prove that the sun is compound, and hath a superior form and nature, which either *formaliter*, or *eminenter*, is sensitive; and that by this it is that it animateth inferior sensitives. But of this we mortals have no certainty. It seemeth very improbable, that a worm, or fly, should have a nature superior to any that the sun hath; but probabilities are not certainties: there are things highest and things lowest, in their several kinds. But remember, that if it should be the sun, it is by that nature superior to fire, by which it doth it: the maternal universal cause of the sensitive life is the mother. Whether the spirits of a sensitive creature have more in them than the spirits of a plant; and do more by nutrition than cause vegetation; whether they nourish sensitive life as such is doubtful, but if they do so, they be but an universal, and not a specifying cause, that is, the cause of life as life, but not of the *vita bovis, equi, canis, felis, aquila, quatalis*. And, therefore, if the late-discovered trick of passing all the blood of one animal into another, be prosecuted to the utmost trial, possibly it may do much to the advantage of life and sense as such; but never to the alteration of the species, to turn a dog into a swine, or any other sort of animal.

13. Whether the sensitive nature be most refined corporeal, or totally incorporeal, is past the reach of man to be assured of.

14. The foresaid difficulty is greater here than in the vegetative generation, viz., Whether, in the multiplication of sensitive souls, there be an addition of substance communicated from the universal causes, or a greater quantity or degree of matter, physical or metaphysical, propagated and produced into existence by generation, than there was before? It seemeth hard to say, that a pair of animals in Noah's ark had as much matter or substance in their souls, as the millions since proceeding from them; but whether such souls have quantitative degrees; or by what terms of gradation the souls of millions are distinct from one, besides the number; or whether God, in the blessing of

multiplication, hath enabled them to increase the quantity of matter which shall serve for so many more forms, are things which we cannot fully understand.

15. In the like manner, we may rise up, and conceive of the generation of mankind. We are sure that he hath an intelligent nature, much nobler than the sensitive. And we know that *homo general hominem*: and we know that in his generation there is an universal cause, and a specifying cause: for though there be one species of men, yet there are more of intelligences; and that one may have an universal cause, producing that and other effects, and an univocal, special cause. We know that because he is generated, the specifying cause is the fecundity, or propagating power of the parent, generating a separable seed, which seed, in conjunction, as aforesaid, *et suppositis supponendis*, is *semen hominis*, and is man seminally and virtually, but not actually: that is, hath both passive and active power, and virtue, by reception of the influx of the universal cause, to become a man. The universal inferior or feminine cause, is the mother's body and soul, or the whole mother, in whom the infant is generated and cherished. I call it universal: for it is only the semen that specifieth: and, therefore, by a false or brutish semen a woman may produce a monster. The universal, paternal cause is certainly God, *ut prima*, and it is probable, also, *ut sola*: for he made man's soul at first by that immediate communication, which is called breathing it into him; and the intellectual nature, though specified into angels and men, is the nearest to God that we have any knowledge of: and therefore reason will not teach us to look to any intermediate, universal, or superior cause, because there is no created, superior nature to the intellectual; and it is absurd to go to the inferior to be the cause of the superior. If any will needs think, that under God, there is some universal intellect (not of the whole universe, for that is plainly improbable, but of our system or vortex) they must take it to be some angelical intelligence, as Aristotle, or the sun: no man can prove either of these to have any such office. And for the sun, it is certain that it is not possible, unless itself be an intelligence: and though to human reason it seem very likely, that so glorious a corporeal nature as the sun should not be destitute of as noble a form, as a lump of clay, as a human body doth possess, that so there may be a proportion in God's works between the nobility of matter and

form; yet all this to man is utterly uncertain; nor doth any man know whether the luminaries are animated with either sentient or intelligent souls, or not. He that most confidently asserteth either, and scorneth the contradictor, doth but tell you that he is ignorant of his ignorance. But if it should prove true, as many of the fathers thought, and Maminertus, *ubi supra*, asserteth, that angels have fiery bodies which they animate, and so that the sun is animated with an intelligence, it would not follow, that, as fiery or as sensitive, but only as intellectual, it were a subordinate universal cause of complete human generation, and that *sol et homo generant hominem*; save, only, *quoad corpus*, which is but *secundum quid*. But that God is the universal Cause is unquestionable, whether there be any subordinate or not.

16. And here it is no wonder if the doubts arise which were in the cases of the forementioned generations; whether God as the universal Cause produce new metaphysical matter for new forms: whether millions of souls since generated have not more such metaphysical matter than the souls of Adam and Eve alone: how souls may be said to have more or less such matter or substance: whether he educe all souls, *è virtute et fecunditate primarum*, by giving them a power without any division or diminution of themselves, to bring forth others by multiplication; and so cause his creature to participate of his own fecundity, or power of causing entities, &c. But such difficulties as these, which arise not from uncertainties in theology, but are the mere consequents of the imperfection of human intellects, and the remoteness, depth, and unrevealedness of these mysterious works of God, should turn no man from the holding of other plain revealed truths. As that man generateth man; that God is the chief specifying Cause by his first making of man, and giving him the power and blessing of propagation, which he still maintaineth, and with which he doth concur: that man is the second specifying cause in the exercise of that power of generation which God gave him. That God is the chief universal Cause; and to the production of an intellectual nature, as such, doth unspeakably more than man. That the mother, as cherishing the *semen utriusque parentis*, is the maternal universal cause, &c. We know not fully how it is that one light causeth a thousand, without division or diminution of itself; and what it is that is caused *de novo*. It is easy to say, that it is but the motion of one part of the atoms, or *materia subtilis*,

moving another, which was all pre-existent : but few men that can see through a smoke or dust of atoms, will believe that the sun, and other fiery bodies, which show themselves so wonderfully to us by motion, light, and heat, have no peculiar nature, power, or virtues to cause all this, but mere magnitude and figure : and that those corpuscles which have so many hundred degrees of magnitude, and figures, should not fall into as many hundred such bodies as we call elements, rather than into two or four.

Suppose, which we may, *ad verum exquirendum*, that there were no more fire in the universe than one candle : it having the same nature as now it hath, that candle would turn cities and all combustible matter into fire. But of the generation of man, *quoud animam*, I refer the reader to Sennertus's 'Hypomnemata,' to omit all others.

And now I would know what there is in generation that should be against the immortality of the soul ? Will you say, it is because the soul hath a beginning ? I have answered before, that so have all creatures. It is because it proveth the soul material ? 1. If it did, I have showed that you yourselves hold a perpetuity of matter. 2. But it doth not so. If you say, that incorporeal spirits generate not ; I answer, That is but a naked, unproved assertion. If you say, that angels do not : I answer, that 1. That is not because they are unable or unapt, if God thought it fittest for them : nor, 2. Can any man prove *de facto* whether they do or not. Christ saith, "They marry not," but he saith not whether they at all propagate their species or not. I know the negative is taken for certain ; and I say not that it is not true, but that it is not certain or at all known, and, therefore, an unfit supposition to argue from, against the immortality of the soul. And I must confess, that, for my part, as I have often read, *formæ se multiplicant*, and that the fire can more multiply or increase itself than earth ; and as I know that the more noble any nature is, the more like it is to God, and, therefore, more potent, more active, more fecund, and productive ; so I should far rather think that the angelical nature can propagate itself than the human, if God had not told me the latter, and said nothing *pro* or *contra* of the former. And, therefore, make no doubt : but if it do not, which no man knoweth, it is not because things material are more able, but for other reasons unknown to us. Whether, because God will have this lower world to be the *nidus vel matrix cælorum*, and

and the seminary of heaven, and a multiplication to be here, or what it is, we know not.^b

But if it be, on the other side, concluded, that the whole substance of a soul doth proceed directly and immediately from God, it doth make no great alteration in this case, or any of the coincident cases about human propagation ; if you consider, 1. That it is impossible that there should be any substance which is not totally from God, either immediately or mediately ; and that which is said to be mediately from him, hath in it as much of his causation as if there were no medium : for God is not a partial Cause, but a total *in suo genere* ; and he is as near to the effect, as if there were no second cause. 2. That the somatists themselves say, that in the generation of plants and animals, which they suppose to be totally corporeal, there is not the least degree of substance produced *de novo*, and, therefore, there is none but what was totally of God, and the parents do but cause instrumentally the uniting of matter pre-existent. Therefore, if, in the generating of man, the parents do but instrumentally cause the uniting of substance which is totally from God, though not pre-existent, it little differenceth the case as to the consequents. 3. Especially considering that what God doeth, he doeth by an established law of nature : as in his making of the world, he made the sun a *causa universalis* constantly to send forth the emanation of light, heat, and moving force upon passive matter, and thereby to produce effects diversified by the preparations and reception of that matter ; as to soften wax, to harden clay, to make a dunghill stink, and a rose smell sweet ; to produce a poisonous and a wholesome plant, a nightingale and a toad, &c. ; and this without any dishonour to the sun. So, if God the Father of spirits, the central Efficient of souls, have made it the original law of nature, that he will accordingly afford his communicative influx, and that in human generations, such and such preparations of matter shall be as receptive of his emanations for such and such forms, or spiritual substances, and that he will be herein but an universal Cause of souls as souls, and not of souls as clean or unclean ; and that this shall depend upon the prepara-

^b Nemesius de Anima, (which goeth under the name of Greg. Nyssen.) while he endeavoureth to prove the pre-existence of souls, doth thus peremptorily conclude : Si animæ ex ortu fiunt mutuo, ratione providentiæ fiunt, et caducæ sunt ut cætera quæ ex propagatione generis oriuntur : si sunt ex nihilo, Creatio hæc est, neque verum est, cessavit Deus ab omnibus operibus suis : non ergo nunc animæ fiunt." But there is no appearance of a just proof in any thing that he saith against either of the opinions which he opposeth.

tion of the recipient, whether it be the body, or a sensitive foregoing principle, still keeping at his pleasure, as a voluntary agent, the suspension or dispose of the effect, this would make no great alteration, neither as to the point of original sin, nor any other weighty consequent.

Object. XIII. *Omne quod oritur interit*: That which is not eternal as to past duration, is not eternal as to future duration: but the soul is not eternal as to past duration: *Ergo*.

Answ. I confess this argument will prove that the soul is not immortal *ex necessitate suæ naturæ*, without dependence on a voluntary preserver. And, therefore, Cicero, after most other philosophers who use the major for a contrary conclusion, mistook in this, that he thought the soul was as natural an emanation from God, as the beams or light is from the sun; and, therefore, that it was naturally eternal both *à parte ante et à parte post*: which made Arnobius, and other ancients, argue as much against the Platonists' immortality of the soul, as against the Epicureans' mortality; so that, as I said before, one would think that they were heretical in this point that doth not mark them well. But it is only this natural eternity which they confute: and when the philosophers say, that *omne quod oritur interit*, they can mean, or at least prove, no more than this, that it is not everlasting *ex necessitate naturæ*. But yet, 1. It may be in its nature fitted to be perpetual. 2. And by the will of the Creator made perpetual. Every creature did *oriri de novo*; and yet every one doth not *interire*.

Object. XIV. Among all your arguments for the soul's immortality, there are none but moral ones.

Answ. Morality is grown so contemptible a thing with some debauched persons, that a very argument is invalidated by them, or contemned, if they can but call it moral. But what is morality, but the modality of naturals? and the same argument may be natural and moral. Indeed, we call that a *causa moralis* oftentimes which doth not necessitate the effect; and, yet, sometimes even moral causes do infallibly and certainly produce the effect: but causation and argumentation are different things, and so is an effect and a logical consequence. Will you call the consequents of God's own wisdom, justice, veracity, goodness, &c., uncertain, as coming from a moral cause? The soul is an intellectual, free-agent, and adapted to moral operations; and this is its excellency and perfection, and no disparagement to it at all. And if you will better read them over, you will find that

my arguments are both physical and moral ; for I argue from the acts or operations of the soul to its powers and nature, and from its acts and nature to its ends, with many such like, which are as truly physical *media*, as if I argued from the nature of fire and earth, that one, if not hindered, will ascend, and the other descend : and other men have given you other arguments in their physics and metaphysics.¹

Object. XV. You seem to confess that you cannot prove the endless duration of the soul by an argument from nature alone ; but only that it shall live another life, which you call a life of retribution.

Ans. I told you that a great probability of it I thus prove : God hath made the soul of a nature not corruptible, but apt to perpetual duration ; *ergo*, he thereby declareth his will, that he intendeth it for perpetual duration ; because he maketh nothing in vain, either for substance or quality. It may be, some other will think, that this argument will infer not only a probability, but a certainty.

And if you go back to your objection of materiality, I now only add, that Aristotle and his followers, who think that the heavens are corporeal, yet think that they are a *quinta essentia*, and simple and incorruptible ; and, therefore, that they shall certainly be everlasting. And he taketh the souls of brutes to be analogous to the matter of the stars ; and so to be of that everlasting *quintessence* : and can you, in reason, say less of rational souls.

2. It is sufficient that I prove, by natural evidence, a life of retribution after this ; which shall fully make the miserable, ungodly ones repent tormentingly of their sin, and fill the righteous with such joys as shall fully recompense all their labour and suffering in a holy life ; and that I moreover prove that duration of this life, and all the rest, by supernatural evidence.

Object. XVI. Both soul and body are like a candle *in fluxu continuo* ; and we have not the same substance this week or year as we had the last, there being a continual consumption, or transition and accretion : *ergo*, being not the same, we are incapable of a life of future retribution. Will you reward and punish the man that is, or the man that was ?

¹ Would you see physical arguments for the soul's incorporeity and immortality ? Among a multitude that have done it, I desire you to read Plotinus, (En. 4. l. 7.) 'Of the Immort. of the Soul,' whose arguments I pretermit, because I would not be tedious in transcribing that which is already so well written, abating their peculiar conceits. Vid. et Savonarol. l. 1. c. ult.

Ans. It is a foolish thing to carry great and certain truths into the dark, and to argue against them, *a minus notis*, from mere uncertainties. As to your simile, I confess that the oil of your candle is still wasting, so is the wick ; but not, that new is added to make it another thing, unless it be a lamp. I confess that the lucidfume, which we call the flame, is still passing away ; but whether the fiery principle (in its essence not visible, but only in its light) be not still the same, till all the passive matter be consumed, is more than you know. So, also, if you argue from the vegetative life of a tree : whether the same principle of vegetation, enlarging itself, continue not to the end to invaduate the tree, though all the passive elements, earth, water, and air, may be in *fluxu* and a transient state ? It is certain, that some fixed principle of individuation there is, from whence it must be denominated the same. The water of the hasty river would not be called the same river, if the channel that it runs in were not the same ; nor your candle be called the same candle, if some of the first wick or oil, at least, did not remain, or the same fire continue it, or the same candlestick hold it. And what is it in the tree which is still the same ; or what in the bird that flieth about, which is still the same ? When you have searched all, you will find nothing so likely as the vital principle, and yet that something there must be.

2. But doth not the light of nature, and the concurrent sense and practice of all the world, confute you ; and tell you that, if you cannot understand what the individuating principle is, yet that certainly some such there is, and doth continue. Why, else, will you love and provide for your own children, if they be not at all the same that you begat, or the same this year as you had the last ? Why will you be revenged on the man that did beat you, or hang the thief that robbed you, or do justice on any murderer or malefactor, seeing that it is not the same man that did the deed ? If he transpire as much as Sanctorious saith, and his substance diminish as much in a day as Opicius saith, certainly a few days leave him not the same as those transitory parts. Surely, therefore, there is something which is still the same : else you would deny the king his title, and disoblige yourselves from your subjection, by saying that he is not at all the same man that you swore allegiance to, or that was born heir to the crown : and you would, by the same reason, forfeit your own inheritance. Why should uncertain, philosophical whimsies befool men into those speculations, which the light

and practice of all the world do condemn as madness; but arguing, *ab ignotis*, will have no better success. Of the individuation of bodies in the resurrection I spake before.^k

Object. XVII. If the soul be a substance, we must confess it not annihilated: but it is most likely to proceed from some element of souls, or universal soul, either the *anima mundi*, or rather the *anima solis, vel hujus systematis*; and so to be reduced to it again, and lose its individuation, and consequently to be incapable of retribution.^l

Answ. 1. That the soul which we speak of is a substance, is past all controversy: for though, as I have shewed, there is truly an order or temperament of the parts, which he that listeth may call the form, the life, the soul, or what he please, yet no man denieth but that there is also some one part which is more subtle, pure, active, potent, and regnant than the rest; and this is it, whatever it is, which I call the soul. We are agreed of the thing; let them wrangle *de nomine*, who have nothing else to do.

2. That this substance, nor any substance else, is not annihilated, as I have said, is past dispute.

3. Therefore, there is nothing indeed in all this business, which is liable to controversy, but this point of individuation, which this objection mentioneth, and that of action and operation following. And I must confess that this is the only particular in which hereabouts I have found the temptation to error to be much considerable. They that see how all waters come from the sea, and how earth, water, air, and fire, have a potent inclination to union, and when the parts are separated, have a *motus aggregativus*, may be tempted to think it a probable thing that all souls come from and return unto an universal soul or element, of which they are but particles. But concerning this, I recommend to the sober reader these following considerations:

1. There is in nature more than a probability that the universe hath no universal soul, whatever particular systems or globes may have.^m For we find that perfection lieth so much in

^k The sum of their reasons, who think that bodies at the resurrection are identified only by the soul's identity, you may see in Thom. White's 'Theolog. Institut.' To. 2, li. 3. Lect. 4. pp. 239, 340.

^l Read Plotinus in Ennead. 4. p. 374, Ed. Basil. 'De Individuatione Animarum,' as also the following pages, proving that our souls are not parts of the Anima Mundi; et Sect. 8. p. 377. *Quomodo animæ differant: et quomodo sint immortales in formâ propriâ restantes?*

^m Read the note in the foregoing page. (p. 486.)

unity, and as all things are from one, so as they go out from one, they go into multiplicity, that we have great cause to think that it is the divine prerogative to be *unicus universalis*. He is the *unicus universalis* in entity, life, intelligence, &c. As he hath made no one monarch of all the universe, no, nor of all the earth; nor any one head of all the church that is not God, whatever the Roman vice-god said; nor hath given any one a sufficiency hereto, whatever a self-idoliser may imagine of himself, so he hath not given away or communicated that prerogative which seemeth proper to the Deity, to be an universal mind, and consequently an universal parent, and king, yea, more, to be *omnia in uno*. Having no sort of proof that there is any such thing, finding it so high and divine a prerogative, we have little reason to believe that there is any such thing at all in being.

2. If you mean, therefore, no more than an universal soul to a particular system, or vortex in the world, that universal will be itself a particular soul, individuated, and distinct from other individuals. And, indeed, those very elements that tempt you, might do much to undeceive you. There is of fire a specifical unity, by which it differeth from other elements; but there is no universal aggregation of all the parts of fire. The sun, which seemeth most likely to contend for it, will yet acknowledge individual stars, and other parts of fire, which show that it is not the whole. The water is not all in the sea: we know that there is much in the clouds, whatever there is elsewhere above the clouds. We have no great cause to think that this earth is *terra universalis*. I confess, since I have looked upon the moon through a tube, and since I have read what Galileus saith of it, and of Venus, and other planets, I find little reason to think that other globes are not some of them like our earth. And if you can believe an individuation of greater souls, why not of lesser? The same reasons that tempt you to think that the individuation of our souls will cease, by returning into the *anima systematis vel solis*, may tempt you to think that the *animæ systematum* may all cease their individuation, by returning into God; and their existence, too.

3. If this were left as an unrevealed thing, you might take some liberty for your conjectures. But when all the twenty arguments which I have given do prove a continued individuation and retribution, it is deceitful and absurd to come in with an unproved dream against it, and to argue, *ab ignoto*, against so many cogent arguments.

4. And we have proved supernatural revelation to second this, which is evidence more than sufficient to bear down your unproved conjectures.

5. If it had been doubtful whether the soul's individuation cease, and nothing of all the rest is doubtful, yet this would not make so great a difference in the case as some imagine; for it would confess the perpetuity of souls, and it would not overthrow the proof of a retribution, if you consider these four things:

1. That the parts are the same in union with the whole, as when they are all separated. Their nature is the same, and, as Epicurus and Democritus say of their atoms, they are still distinguishable, and are truly parts, and may be intellectually separated: the same individual water which you cast out of your bottle into the sea, is somewhere in the sea still, and though contiguous to other parts, is discernible from them all by God. The *hæcceity*, as they say, remaineth.

2. That the love of individuation, and the fear of the ceasing of our individuation, is partly but put into the creature from God, *pro tempore*, for the preservation of individuals in this present life. And partly it is inordinate, and is in man the fruit of his fall, which consisteth in turning to selfishness from God. And we know not how much of our recovery consisteth in the cure of this selfishness; and how much of our perfection in the cessation of our individuate affections, cares, and labours. Nature teacheth many men, by societies, to unite as much as possible, as the means of their common safety, benefit, and comfort; and earth, water, air, and all things, would be aggregate. Birds of a feather will flock together: and love, which is the uniting affection, especially to a friend who is fit for union with us in other respects, is the delight of life. And if our souls were swallowed up of one common soul, as water cast into the sea is still moist and cold, and hath all its former properties, so we should be still the same; and no man can give a just reason why our sorrows or joys should be altered ever the more by this.

3. And God can either keep the ungodly from this union for a punishment, or let them unite with the infernal spirits, which they have contracted a connaturality with, or let them, wherever they are, retain the venom of their sin and misery.

4. And he can make the resurrection to be a return of all these souls, from the ocean of the universal nature, into a more

separated individuation again. I only say, that if it had been true, that departing souls had fallen into a common element, yet on all these reasons, it would not have overthrown our arguments for a life of full retribution. God, that can say at any time, 'This drop of water in the ocean is the same that was once in such a bottle,' can say, 'This particle of the universal soul was once in such a body, and thither I can again return it.' But the truth is, no man can show any proof of a future aggregation.

And to conclude, the Scripture here cleareth up all the matter to us, and assureth us of a continued individuation yet more than nature doth, though the natural evidences before produced are unanswerable.

And as for the similitude of light returning to the sun, it is still an arguing, *a minus noto*; we know not well what it is; we know not how it returneth; and we know not how the particles are distinguishable there. They that confess souls to be indivisible, though the individuals are all numerically distinct, must on the same ground think that two or many cannot by union be turned into one, as they hold that one cannot be turned into two, or into several parts of that one divided.

Object. XVIII. The Platonists, and some platonick divines, have so many dreams and fopperies about the soul's future state, in ærial and ethereal vehicles, and their durations, as make that doctrine the more to be suspected.

Ans. 1. Whether all souls hereafter be incorporate, in some kind of bodies which they call vehicles, is a point which is not without difficulty. A sober Christian may possibly doubt whether there be any incorporeal, simple essence in a separated existence, besides God alone. Those that doubt of it, do it on these grounds: 1. They think that absolute simplicity is a divine, incommunicable perfection. 2. They think that Christ is the noblest of all creatures; and that seeing he shall be compound of a human soul and body, though glorified and spiritual, to eternity; therefore, no angel shall excel him in natural simplicity and perfection. 4. Because it is said, that we shall be equal with the angels; and yet we shall, at the resurrection, be compounded of a soul and body. 4. Because, it is said, that he made his angels spirits, and his ministers a flame of fire. 5. Because the ancient fathers, who first thought angels to be subtle bodies, were confuted by those, as Mammertus forementioned, who asserted them to be fiery bodies, animated with

incorporal souls. 6. Because they read of the devil's dwelling in the air, as one cast down; therefore they think that he hath an airy body, instead of an ethereal or fiery. 7. Because they see the sun so glorious a creature, in comparison with a body of flesh; therefore they think that the symmetry and proportion among God's works require, that bodies and forms, or souls, be suitable. 8. Because they know not what else becometh of the sensitive soul of man, when he dieth, which they take to be but a subtle body; and therefore think it goeth, as a body or vehicle, with the rational soul. 9. Because they mistake that difficult text, (2 Cor. v. 1, 2, 8,) think, by the seventh and eighth verses, that it speaketh of the instant after death; and thinking, by the first and second verses, that (as Beza and most think) it speaketh of a celestial body as our clothing, and not of a mere state of glory to the soul.ⁿ

I name their reasons, that you may be charitable in your censures; but the truth is, they talk of unrevealed or uncertain things, which do but trouble the heads of Christians to no purpose, who may live better, and speed better, by following the naked precepts of Christianity, and hoping for such a glory as Christ hath plainly described, without prying into that which doth less concern them to be acquainted with.

And Satan knoweth that over-doing is one way of undoing. Thus men on all extremes do harden one another. As in these times among us it is notorious, that the men of one extreme in church affairs do harden the other, and the other harden them. And as fanaticism riseth from the disliking of sensuality and profaneness, incautelous, and sensual, and profane men run into hell to avoid fanaticism; even so the brutish grossness of the somatists driveth some philosophers into platonic dreams; and the platonic fictions harden the Epicureans in a far worse way. Lactantius 'De Ira Dei' (c. 13) thinks, that Epicurus was moved to his opinion against Providence, by seeing the hurt that good and religious men endure from the worse sort here in this world. But why should you run out on one side the way, because other men run out on the other? Why do you not rather argue from the doctrine in the sober mean, that it is true, than from the extremes that the truth is falsehood, when reason will allow you to conclude no more than that those extremes are falsehood? But, surely, I had rather hold Plato's *anima mundi*, or Aristotle's

ⁿ Plotinus' 'Ennead. 4. de Anima,' hath a great deal of doctrine in it, much wiser, and more wholesome than that of Epicurus and the atomists.

intellectus agens, and his moving intelligences, than Epicurus's atoms and motion only. And I had rather think, with Alexander Arphrod. that *omnis actio corporis est ab incorporeo principio*, yea, or the stoics' doctrine of intellectual fire doing all, than Gassendus's doctrine, that no incorporeal thing can move a corporeal, or that atoms and their motion only do all that we find done in nature.

When I look over and about me, I find it a thing quite past my power, to think that the glorious parts above us are not replenished with much nobler creatures than we. And therefore if the Platonists, and the ancient platonick fathers of the church, did all think that they lived in communion with angels, and had much to do with them, and that the superior intelligences were a nobler part of their studies than mere bodies, they shall have the full approbation of my reason in this, though I would not run with them into any of their presumptions, and uncertain or unsound conceits.

Saith Æneas Gazæus, (p. 778,) when he had told us that Plato, Pythagoras, Plotinus, and Numenius, were for the passing of men's souls into brutes; but Porphyry and Jamblicus were against it, and thought that they passed only into men: "*Ego quidem hac ipsa de causa filium aut famulum ob id quod commiserint peccatum puniens, antequam de ipsis supplicium sumam, præmoneo, ut meminerint ne posthac unquam in eadem mala recurrant. Deus autem quando ultima supplicia decernit, non edocet eos qui pœnarum causas, sed scelerum memoriam omnem tollet?*" (Vide p. 382.) For this reason, and many others, we assume not their conceit of the soul's pre-existence, and think all such unproved fancies to be but snares to trouble the world with. We think not that God punisheth men for sin in another world, while he totally obliterated the memory of the other world, and of their sin; when he hath told us, that in Adam all die; and by one man's disobedience many are made sinners, and so condemnation passed upon all. (Rom. v.) Nor will we, with Origen, thus tempt men to look for more such changes hereafter, which we can give them no proof of. Nor will we distribute the angelical hierarchy into all the degrees which the pseudo Dionysius doth; nor with the gnostics, Basilidians, Saturninians, Valentinians, and abundance of those ancient heretics, corrupt Christianity with the mixture of fanatic dreams, about the unrevealed powers and worlds above us, either worshipping angels, or prying into those things which he

hath not seen, (and are not revealed) vainly puffed up by his fleshly mind (or without cause puffed up by the imagination of his own flesh, as Dr. Hammond translateth it). (Col. ii. 18.) Nor will we make a religion with Paracelsus, Behmen, the Rosicrucians, or the rest, described by Christ. Beckman, (Exercit.) of the philosophical whimsies of an over-stretched imagination: and yet we will not reject the saying of Athenagoras, ‘Apol. (p. 57,)’ “Magnum numerum angelorum et ministrorum Dei esse fatemur; quos opifex et architectus mundi Deus verbo suo tanquam in classes ordinavit centuriavitque, ut elementa, cœlos, mundum, et quæ in mundo sunt, visesque, et ordinem omnium moderarent.” Though we may add, with Junilius Africanus, that “whether the angels meddle with the government of the world of stablished creatures, is a difficult question.”

Object. XIX. If the soul do continue individuate, yet its actings will not be such as they are now in the body, because they have not spirits to act by: and, as Gassendus thinketh, that the reason of oblivion in old men is the wearing-out of the *vestigia* of the former spirits, by the continual flux or transition of matter, so we may conceive that all memory will cease to separated souls on the same account; and therefore they will be unfit for rewards or punishments, as not remembering the cause.*

Answ. 1. If Gassendus’s opinion were true, men should forget all things once a-year, if not once a-month, considering how many pounds of matter are spent every twenty-four hours. And why, then, do we better, when we are old, remember the things which we did between nine or ten years old, and twenty, than most of the later passages of our lives, as I do, for my part, very sensibly.

2. What is man’s memory, (for with brutes we meddle not,) but *scientia præteritorum*? Is not remembering a knowing of things past? Surely, we may perceive that it is; and that it is of the same kind of action with the knowing of things present; and therefore we make not memory a third faculty, because it is the same with the understanding.

3. We have little reason to think, that the surviving soul will

* See Plotin. (Enead. 4. l. 3. p. 186,) showing, that in separated souls, reason is so powerful, that it, ex tempore, conceiveth all things propounded by the intellect; and that souls in heaven converse without voice, but demons and souls that are in the air converse by voice. Vid. Porphy. de Occasion. de Passionibus Animæ et Corp.

lose any of its essential powers, and grow by its change not only impotent, but another thing. Therefore, it will be still an intelligent power. And though remote actions and effects, such as writing, fighting, &c., are done by instruments, which being removed, we cannot do them without; yet essential acts are nothing so, which flow immediately from the essence of the agent, as light, heat, and motion of the fire: if there be but due objects, these will be performed without such instruments: nor will the Creator, who continueth it an active, intelligent power, continue it so in vain, by denying it necessities for its operations. There is likely to be much difference, in many respects, between the soul's actings here and hereafter: but the acts flowing from its essence immediately, as knowledge, volition, complacency, called love, and displacency, &c., will be the same. How far the soul here doth act, without any idea or instrument, I have spoken before. And the manner of our acting hereafter no man doth now fully understand: but that which is essentially an intellectual, volitive power, will not be idle in its active essence, for want of a body to be its instrument. If we may so far ascribe to God himself such affections or passions, as the ingenious Mr. Samuel Parker, in his 'Tentam. Phil. (l. ii. c. 8. p. 333, &c.)' hath notably opened, we have no reason to think that *scientia præteritorum* is not to be ascribed to a soul, when it is separated from the corporeal spirits.^p

Or, if the soul out of the body were as liable, as it is by diseases of the body while it is in it, to the loss of memory, yet all those arguments which prove the life of retribution hereafter, do fully prove that God will provide it a way of exercise, and prevent all those hinderances of memory which may make his judgment and retribution void. Again, therefore, I say, to argue from things unknown, against clear evidence, in matters that our own everlasting joy or sorrow is concerned in so deeply, is a folly that no tongue can express with its due aggravations.

Object. XX. The belief of the immortality of souls doth fill men with fears, and draw them to superstition, and trouble the peace of kingdoms by unavoidable sects, in the prosecution of these things which are of such transcendent weight; when other-

^p Plotin. (ubi supr. p. 398, sec. 26,) sheweth that memory is more pertinent to the soul than the body, and often without the body; (et sec. 29, &c., et c. 31, 32,) the difference between the sensitive and rational memory: (et l. 2,) he sheweth that the soul in heaven forgetteth these trifles, not through ignorance but contempt.

wise men might live in quietness to themselves and others, and in promoting of the public good.^a

Ans. This is the maddest objection of all the rest; but in our days there are men found that are no wiser than to make it. I have answered it fully in divers popular treatises, as that called 'A Saint, or a Brute,' &c.

1. The greatest and best things are liable to the worst abuses. Thus you may argue against reason, that it doth but fill men's brains with knavish craft, and enable them to do mischief, and to trouble the world, and to live themselves in cares and fears, &c. Upon many such reasons, Cotta, in Cic. 'De Nat. Deor.' doth chide God for making man a rational creature; and saith, he had been happier without it. And were it not for this wit and reason, we should have none of these evils which you have here now mentioned. Why, then, is not reason, as well as religion, on that account to be rejected?

On the same reason, philosophy and learning may be accused, as it is with the Turks and Muscovites. What abundance of sects, and voluminous contentions, and tiresome, consuming studies have they caused? Witness all the volumes of philosophers and schoolmen.

On the same account you may cry down kings, and civil government, and riches, and all that is valued in the world: for what wars and bloodshed have there been in the world for crowns and kingdoms! What hatred and contention for honour and wealth! If you could make all men swine, they would not stir for gold or pearls; or if they were dogs, they would not fight for kingdoms; and if they be blind and impious worldlings, they will not be zealous about religion, unless to dispirit it, and to reduce it to the service of their fleshly interest, which is the hypocrite's zeal. No man will contend for that which he valueth not.

But, 2. Consider that though dogs will not fight for crowns, they will fight for bones, and sometimes need men of reason to stave them off. And though swine fight not for gold, they will fight for draff, and burst their bellies if they be not governed. And though unbelievers and atheists trouble not the world to promote religion, they set families, towns and countries, and kingdoms to

^a Sic ille (Strato) Deum opere magno liberat, et me timore: quis enim potest cum existimet à Deo se curari, non et dies et noctes divinum numen horrere? et si quid adversi acciderit, (quod cui non accidit,) extimescere ne id jure evenerit.—Cic. *Acad. quæst.* l. 4, p. 44.

gether by the ears, for their worldly pelf, and fleshly interest. Inquire whether the wars of the world be not most for carnal interest, even where religion hath been pretended; and hearken, in Westminster-Hall, and at the assizes, whether most of the contentings there are such as are caused by religion, or by the love of the world and of the flesh. And where religion seemeth to be a part of the cause, it is the atheists and ungodly that are commonly the chief contenders; who think it not enough to hope for no life to come themselves, but they cannot endure other men that do it, because they seem wiser, and better, and happier than they; and by their holiness gall their consciences, and condemn them.

3. The extremity of this objection's impudency appeareth in this above all: that it is most notorious, that there is no effectual cure for all the villanies of the world but true religion; and shall the cure be made the cause of that disease? 1. Read and judge in nature and Scripture, whether the whole matter of religion be not perfectly contrary to the vices of the world. Will it trouble kingdoms, or disquiet souls, to love God above all, and to honour and obey him, and be thankful for his mercies, and to trust his promises, and to rejoice in hope of endless glory; and to love our neighbours as ourselves, and to do no injustice or wrong to any; to forbear wrath and malice, lust, adultery, theft, and lying, and all the rest expressed in this treatise. 2. Is it not for want of religion that all the vices and contentions of the world are? Would not men be better subjects, and better servants, and better neighbours, if they had more religion? Would not they lie, and deceive, and steal, and wrong others less? Do you think he that believes a life to come, or he that believeth it not, is more likely to cut your purse, or rob you by the highway, or bear false witness against you, be perjured, or take that which is not his own, or any such unrighteous thing? Is he more likely to live as a good subject or servant, who looketh for a reward in heaven for it, or he that looketh to die as a beast doth? Is he more likely to do well, and avoid evil, who is moved by the effectual hopes and fears of another life, or he that hath no such hopes and fears, but thinketh that if he can escape the gallows, there is no further danger? Had you rather your servant, that is trusted with your estate, did believe that there is a life to come, or that there is none? Nay, why doth not your objection militate as strongly against the thief's believing that there will be an assize? For if the belief of an assize did not trouble him,

he might quietly take that which he hath a mind to, and do what he list; but this fills his heart with fears and troubles. 3. Compare those parts of the world, (Brazil, and Soldania, &c.), which believe not a life to come, (if any such there be,) with those that do, and see which belief hath the better effects. 4. What is there of any effectual power, to restrain that man from any villany which he hath power to carry out, or policy to cover, who doth not believe a life to come? 5. And if you believe it not, what will you do with reason, or any of your faculties, or your time? How will you live in the world, to any better purpose, than if you had slept out all your life? What talk you of the public good, when the denying of our final, true felicity, denieth all that is truly good, both public and private.

But so sottish and malignant an objection deserveth pity more than confutation. Whatever religious persons did ever offend these men with any real crimes, I can assure them, that the cure had been to have made them more religious, and not less; and that the true belief of a life to come is the end, the motive, the poise of all wise and regular actions, and of love and peace, of right government and obedience, and of justice, mercy, and all that is lovely in the world.

An Objection about the World's Eternity.

Having said thus much about the point which I thought most considerable, I shall answer an objection about the world's eternity, because I perceive that it sticks with some.

Object. We find it the harder to believe the Scripture, and the christian doctrine, because it asserteth a thing which Aristotle hath evinced to be so improbable, as is the creation of the world within less than six thousand years. When no natural reason can be brought to prove that the world is not eternal.

Answ. 1. It is you that are the affirmers, and, therefore, on whom the natural proof is incumbent. Prove, if you can, that the world is eternal. Were it not tedious, I should, by examining your reasons, show that they have no convincing force at all.

2. There is so much written of it, that I am loth to trouble the reader with more. I now only again refer the reader to Raymundus Lullius, desiring him not to reject his arguments if some of them seem not cogent, seeing if any one of all his multitude prove such, it is enough.^r

I now only desire that the controversy between the Christian

^r Vid. Paul. Cortes. in 2 sent. d. 1. pp. 30, 31.

and the infidel may be but rightly stated; and to that end do not charge Christianity with any schoolman's, or other confident person's, private opinions, nor suppose Christ or Scripture to determine any thing which they do not determine. 1. Christianity and Scripture do not at all determine, whether the whole universe was created at the same time when this, our heaven and earth, was; but only, that the system or world which we belong to, the sun, and moon, and stars, and earth, were then created. Nay, a great part of the ancient doctors, and of the most learned late expositors on Gen. i., do expound the heavens which God is said to create, as being only the visible heavens, and not including the angels at all; and others say, that by "in the beginning," is meant *ab initio rerum*, and that the heavens there meant being the angelical habitations, and the earth as without form, were both *ab initio rerum* before the six days' creation, which began with the making of light out of the pre-existent heavens or chaos. I think not this opinion true; but this liberty christian doctors have taken, of differing from one another in this difficult point. But they utterly differ about the time of the creation of angels (on Gen. i. and on Job i.) and, consequently, whether there were not a world existent when this world was created.*

2. Or if any that seeth more than I, can prove the contrary, yet it is certainly a thing undetermined by Scripture and the christian faith, whether there were any worlds that had begun and ended before this was made. That God is the Maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible, is most certain; but whether this heaven and earth, which now is, was the first which he hath made, is a thing that our religion doth not at all meddle with. They that, with Origen, affirm that there were antecedent worlds, are justly blamed on one side, not for speaking things false, but things uncertain and unrevealed, and for corrupting Christianity by a mixture of things alien and doubtful; and those who affirm that there were no antecedent worlds, are as much culpable on the other side, if not more, on

* Some think, because they read much in Plato of the making of the world, that his opinion was not for its eternity: but I doubt they are quite mistaken. Alcinous in li. de doct. Plat. saith too truly, Cum vero mundum Plato genitum inquit, haudquaquam sic eum sensisse credendum est, ut aliquod olim tempus ante mundum præcesserit; verum quia semper in generatione perdurat indicatque substantiæ suæ causam prestantiorem. Animam præterea mundi, quæ semper extitit, haud efficit Deus; sed ornat: cæque ratione eam facere nonnunquam asseritur, quod excitat eam, et ad seipsum ejus mentem velut ex profundo quodam somno convertit, &c.

the same account, and upon further reasons. On the one side, we know that God needeth nothing to his own felicity, but is perfectly sufficient for himself, and that he createth not the world *ex necessitate naturæ*, as an agent which acteth *ad ultimum posse*; and, on the other side, we know, that though he hath a goodness of self-perfection, unspeakably more excellent than his benignity, as related to man (not that one property in God is to be said more excellent than another in itself, but that, *quoad relationem*, there is an infinite difference between his goodness in himself, and his goodness only as related to his creatures, and measured by their interest), yet we confess that his fecundity and benignity are included in his own goodness; and that he delighteth to do good, and is communicative; and that he doth good *ex necessitate voluntaria; ex naturæ perfectione*, without coaction; it being most necessary that he do that which his infinite wisdom saith is best; which made Tho. White “de Mundo” say, that God did necessarily make the world, and necessarily make it in time, and not *ab æterno*, and yet all this most voluntarily, because he doth necessarily do that which is best in the judgment of his wisdom. And we deny not, that if a man will presume to give liberty to his reason, to search into unrevealed things, that it will seem to him very improbable that he who is *actus purus*, of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, and who now taketh pleasure in all his works, and his delights are with the sons of men, should, from all eternity, produce no creature till less than six thousand years ago; when a thousand years with him are but as a day; and that he should resolve to have creatures to all eternity, who, as to future duration, shall be so like to himself, when, from all eternity, he had no creature till, as it were, five or six days ago! Christians are apt to have such thoughts as these as well as you, when they look but to rational probabilities; but they hold that all these matters, whether there were antecedent worlds, and how many, and of what sort, and of what duration, whether this was the first, are matters unrevealed, which they ought not to trouble the world or themselves with prying into, or contending about: and they find that they are unfruitful speculations, which do but overwhelm the mind of him that searcheth after them; when God hath provided for us, in the christian faith, more plain, and sure, and solid, and wholesome food to live upon.

3. And if it be unrevealed in Scripture, whether, before this, there were any other world, we must confess it unrevealed,

whether there were any emanent or created entity which God did produce from all eternity, considered *quoad durationem* only; for the Scripture saith no more of one than of the other. And if there were one moment, dividing eternity only imaginarily, in which there had been nothing but God, we must equally confess an eternity in which there was nothing but God; because eternity hath no beginning.[†]

4. But Christianity assureth us of these two things: 1. That, certainly, there is no being besides God but what was created, produced, or totally caused by him; and that if any creature were eternal as to duration, yet it is after God in order of being, as caused by him, as the shadow is after the substance, and the beams and light are after the sun; or, rather, as the leaves would be after the life of the tree, if they were conceived to be both eternal: one would be an eternal cause, and the other but an eternal effect. 2. It is certain that this present world, containing the sun, and moon, and heavens, and earth, which is mentioned, (Gen. i.,) is not from eternity; and, indeed, reason itself doth make that, at least, very probable, as revelation makes it certain, which will appear when I have opened the philosophers' opinions on the other side.

2. Among yourselves there are all these differences, and so we have several cases to state with you: 1. Some think that this present system of compounded beings is from eternity; 2. Others think, that only the elements and heavens, and all simple beings, are from eternity; 3. Others think that fire or ether only, as the active elements, are from eternity, or the incorruptible matter of the heavens; 4. Others think that matter and motion only were from eternity; 5. Others think that only spiritual, purer beings, intelligences, or minds, were from eternity, and other things produced immediately by them; 6. And there have been those heathen philosophers who held that only God was from eternity.

Among all this variety of opinions, why should any one think the more doubtfully of Christianity, for denying some of them, which all the other deny themselves: is it a likely thing that any individual mixed body should be eternal, when we know that mixed bodies incline to dissolution: and when we see

[†] *Lumine naturæ non constat quod angeli facti sint in tempore, et non fuerint ab æterno: nam imprimis per lumen naturæ cognoscimus, exemplo solis et luminis, effectum posse cœvum esse suæ causæ: unde nulla repugnantia est, ex parte Dei vel ex parte creaturæ, ut hæc sit Deo cœva.*—*Schibler Met. de Angel.* See also Durandus, Ariminensis, Aquinas, Pererius, Suarez, &c.

many of them, *oriri et interire*, daily before our eyes? And if man and beast, as to each individual, have a beginning and end, it must be so as to the beginning of the species; for the species existeth not out of the individuals, and some individual must be first: and as Bishop Ward argueth against Mr. Hobbs, "If the world be eternal, there have infinite days gone before, *e. g.* the birth of Christ: and then the whole is no greater than the parts, or infinity must consist of finite parts." The heavens and the earth, therefore, which are compounded beings, by the same reason, are liable to dissolution, as man is; and therefore had a beginning. So that the truth is, there is no rational probability in any of your own opinions, but those which assert the eternity of some simple beings, as matter, or intelligences, or an *anima universalis*. Now, consider further, that if ever there was a moment when there were no individuals, or mixed beings, but only some universal soul or matter, then there was an eternity when there was nothing else: (for eternity hath no beginning :) and then, will it not be as strange to yourselves, to think that God should, from all eternity, delight himself in matter unformed, (if that be not a contradiction,) or in an *anima simplex et unica*, without any of all the variegated matter and beings which we now find besides in nature, as that he should eternally content himself with himself alone? If all individuals of compound beings were not from eternity, what was? Either the egg or the hen must be first (as the old instance is). If you will come to it, that either *anima unica*, or atoms unformed were eternal, why should not God as well be without these, as be without the formed worlds? ^u

What shall a presumptuous mind now say to all these difficulties? why return to modesty: remember that as the bird hath wit given her to build her nest, and breed her young as well as man could do it, and better, but hath no wit for things which do not concern her; so man hath reason for the ends and uses of reason, and not for things that are not profitable to him; and that such looks into eternity about things unrevealed do but overwhelm us, and tell us that they are unrevealed, and that we have not our reason for such employments.

And what is the end of all that I have said? why, to tell you that our religion doth not only say nothing of former worlds,

^u Read in 'Bib. Pat.' the dispute of Zachary Mitilene with Ammonius and a physician, about the world's eternity. How nearly the Manichees' opinion agreed with the Platonists', see in Nemesius 'De Anim. (pp. 457, 462, &c.)'

but, 2. That it also forbiddeth us to say yea or nay to such questions, and to corrupt our minds with such presumptuous searches of unrevealed things. And, therefore, that you have no reason to be against the Scripture on this account; for it doth not determine any thing against your own opinion, if you assert not the eternity of this present world or system; but it determineth against your presumption, in meddling with things which are beyond your reach.

And withal it giveth us a certainty, that as in one sun there is the *lux, radii, et lumen*; so, in one God, there is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, eternally existent, and self-sufficient; which quieteth the mind more than to think of an eternity of an *anima* or *materia*, which is not God.

All this I have here annexed, because these philosophical self-deceivers are to be pitied, and to have their proper help: and I thought it unmeet to interrupt the discourse with such debates, which are not necessary to more sober readers, but only for them who labour of this disease: and I know that when they read the first leaf of the book, which proveth that man hath a soul or mind, they will rise up against it with all the objections which Gassendus, Mr. Hobbs, &c., assault the like in Cartesius with, and say, 'You prove not this mind is any thing but the more subtle part of matter, and the temperament of the whole:' to whom I now answer, 1. That it is not in that place incumbent on me, nor seasonable to prove any more than I there assert. 2. But I have here done it for their sakes, more seasonably, though my discourse is entire and firm without it.

And I desire the unbelieving reader to observe, that I am so far from an unnecessary encroaching upon his liberty, and making him believe that Christianity condemneth all those conjectures of philosophers which it asserteth not itself, that I have taken the liberty of freely conjecturing in such cases myself, not going beyond the evidence of probability, or the bounds of modesty;^x and that I think them betrayers of the christian

^x Nor do I here press you with the authority of a Hermes, Zoroaster, or Orpheus, as knowing how little proof is given us that the writings are theirs which are fathered on them; and giving some credit to Porphyry himself, who, in the Life of Plotinus, telleth us that there were then, Ex autequa philosophia egressi hæretici, Adelphii Acylinique sectatores, qui Alexandri Lybici Philocomi, Demonstrati, et Ly di plurimos libros circumferebant, et revelationes quasdam Zoroastris, Zostriani, Nichotei, Allogenis, Mesi, aliorumque ejusmodi palam ostendentes, et deceperunt multos, et ipsi decepti jam fuerant:

cause, or very injurious to it, who would interest it in matter with which it meddleth not ; and corrupt it, by pretending that it condemneth all the opinions in philosophy which themselves are against. Nor am I one that believeth that Christianity will allow me that zeal, which too hastily and peremptorily condemneth all, that in such points do hold what I dislike. I do not anathematise as heretics all those who hold those opinions which either Stephanus, or Guilielm. Episc. Parisiensis, condemned in their ‘*Articul. contra varios in fide errores* :’ though I think many of them dangerous, and most of them very audacious. *e. g.* “*Quod intelligentia matrix cœli fluit in animas rationales sicut corpus cœli influit corpus humanum : quod scientia intelligentiæ non differet à substantia ejus. Quod intelligentia sola voluntate movet cœlum : quod omne quod non habet materiam est æternum. Quod intellectus non est forma corporis nisi assistens : quod anima separata non patitur ab igne : quod anima separata manet animal vivum,*” &c. I can no more charitably bear such opinions, than those that so severely then condemned them. Though yet, I think, that in this age, it is one of the devil’s chief designs, to assault Christianity by false philosophy.

Pretend not, then, your by-opinions to prejudice you against Christianity in the main ; much less against those natural verities, which all wise, and sober, and honest philosophers are agreed in. When Xenocrates, *de morte*, (translated by Ficinus,) had, in the name of Socrates, told Axiochus what Gobrius told, of an inferior place, whither souls went at death, and of their judgment, and of the torment, “*Ubi homines impii omniformibus suppliciis cruciati perpetua punitione vexantur,*” he disclaimeth the imposition of the belief of so much, but selects his certainty, “*Ego ratione coactus hoc solum plane firmiterque cognosco, animam omnem immortalem existere, et eam, quæ pura ex iis locis abierit, sine tristitia vivere ; quamobrem sive sursum sive deorsum tendas, Axioche, beatum fore te oportet, si modo pie sancteque vixeris.*” N.B. And he holds to this : “*Non in mortem, sed in ipsam immortalitatem migras : neque bonis privaberis, sed integra bonorum possessione frueris : nec voluptates mortali corpori mixtas percipies amplius, sed omni prorsus tristitia vacuas : illuc inquam proficisceris ex hoc carcere liber,*

———Ego vero Porphyrius argumentationibus multis ostendi, librum Zoroastri ab illis inscriptum adulterinum novumque esse, et ab eis confictum qui struebant hæresin : ut institutiones suæ esse Zoroastri veteris crederentur. And hereupon Plotinus wrote his book against the gnostics.

ubi quieta omnia, et à tristitia seneetuteque semota. Ubi exultatio sancta, vitæque malorum nescia, et tranquilla pace nutrita, naturam rerum specularans, et arcana philosophiæ contemplans; haud sane ad turbæ theatri gratiam, sed ad perspicuæ veritatis objectum."

If you are not wise enough to be Christians, why will you not be as wise and honest as the better sort of heathens: must we have so much ado to reason debauched hypocrites and apostates, to that which nature taught so many, who yet did but in part improve it? Believe this much, which a Xenocrates or Socrates could teach you, and live accordingly, and you will not be blinded and deceived with so many beastly lusts, which hinder your belief, and will drown you in perdition. Or rather come to Christ, who will better cure those lusts than Socrates, or Plato, or any philosopher could do. But, alas! Epicurus had more court and country disciples than the manly sort of philosophers, however the wise men vilified him in the schools: and his apostles, while they condemn the doctrine of incorporeal spirits, do so often animate themselves with those corporeal spirits, which the hearers of Christ's disciples thought they had drunk in, Acts ii. That they are more fool-hardy, and pot-confident, than their wiser adversaries; and get that with audacity, that I say not impudency, which others lose by humble modesty: for, saith Cicero, (de Fin. l. ii. p. 100,) "*Est tanti philosophi tamque nobilis, audacter sua decreta defendere.*" And this doctrine so befriendeth sin, that sin will befriend it; and then it is not likely to want entertainment. For, as Cicero, (*ibid.*) "*Qualis est ista philosophia, quæ non interitum afferat pravitatis, sed sit contenta mediocritate vitiorum?*—in magnis interdum versatur angustiis, ut hominum conscientia remota, nihil tam turpe sit, quod voluptatis causa non videatur esse facturus. Deinde ubi erubuit (vis enim est permagna naturæ) confugit illuc ut neget accedere posse quidquam ad voluptatem nihil dolentis.—Luxuriam non reprehendit, modo sit vacua infinita cupiditate et timore. Hoc loco discipulos quærere videtur, ut qui Asoti esse velint, philosophi fiant."

I have cited more out of Cicero than any other in this treatise, and yet, when I think how far our apostates are below him, seeing they despise the words of Christ, I will once more use the words of Cicero, to convince them, shame them, or condemn them. Tuscul. (Qu. l. i. p. 229) "*Quorsum igitur hæc spectat oratio? Quæ sit illa vis et unde sit intelligendum*

puto. Non est certe nec cordis, nec sanguinis, nec cerebri, nec atomorum. Anima sit animus, ignisve nescio;" (he doubted whether the Platonists or stoics were in the right;) "nec me pudet ut istos fateri me nescire quod nesciam: illud, si ulla alia de re obscura, affirmare possem, sive anima, sive ignis, sit animus, eum jurarum esse divinum." N. B. Cicero dare swear that the soul is divine, though he doubt of the immateriality; and our apostates deny both. And reciting its operations, he saith, (p. 239,) "Prorsus hæc divina mihi videtur vis, quæ tot res efficiat ac tantas. Vigere, sapere, invenire, meminisse; ergo animus, qui, ut ego dico, divinus, ut Euripides audet dicere, Deus est: et quidem si Deus aut anima aut ignis est, idem est animus hominis. Sin autem est quinta quædam natura ab Aristotele inducta primum, hæc et Deorum est et animorum. Animorum nulla in his terris origo inveniri potest: nihil enim est in animis mistum, atque concretum, aut quod ex terra natum atque fictum esse videatur: nihil ne aut humidum quidem, aut stabile, aut igneum: his enim in naturis nihil inest quod vim memoriæ, mentis, cogitationis habeat; quod et præterita teneat, et futura provideat, et complecti possit præsentia; quæ sola divina sunt: nec invenietur unquam unde ad homines venire possit, nisi à Deo. Singularis est igitur natura quædam, atque vis animi sejuncta ab his usitatis notisque naturis: itaque quicquid est aliud quod sentit, quod sapit, quod vult, quod viget, cœleste et divinum est, ob eamque rem æternum sit necesse est: nec vero Deus ipse qui intelligitur a nobis, alio modo intelligi potest, nisi mens soluta quædam, et libera, segregata ab omni concretionem mortali, omnia sentiens, et movens, ipsaque prædita motu sempiturno; hoc è genere atque eadem è natura est humana mens." So that, though he suspected it to have been some pure materiality, it was but such as he thought God had, and consisted with its eternity. "Ubi igitur aut qualis ista mens? (scil. Deus) ubi tua, aut qualis, potesne dicere? An si omnia ad intelligendum non habeo, quæ habere vellem, ne eis quidem quæ habeo, mihi per te uti licebit? Non valet tantum animus, ut sese ipse videat: at ut oculus, animus sese non videns alia cernit."

P. 226, he saith of them that plead for the soul's mortality: "Præclarum nescio quid adepti sunt, qui didicerunt se, cum tempus mortis venisset, totos esse perituros. Quid habet ista res aut lætabile aut gloriosum? sed plurimi contra nituntur, animosque quasi capite damnatos morte mulcant: neque aliud est quid-

quam cur incredibilis his animorum videatur æternitas, nisi quod nequeunt qualis animus sit vacans corpore intelligere, et cogitatione comprehendere : quasi vero intelligant qualis sit in ipso corpore ! quæ conformatio ! quæ magnitudo ! qui locus. Hæc reputent isti qui negant animum sine corpore se intelligere posse : videbunt, quem in ipso corpore intelligant ! Mihi quidem naturam animi intuenti, multo difficilior occurrit cogitatio, multoque obscurior, qualis animus in corpore sit, tanquam alienæ domi, quam qualis cum exierit, et in liberum cœlum, quasi in domum suam venerit. Si enim quod nunquam vidimus, id quale sit intelligere non possumus. Certe et Deum ipsum et divinum animum corpore liberatum, cogitatione complecti non possumus."

P. 225. "Atque ea profecto tum multo puriora, et delucidiora cernentur, cum, quo natura fert, liber animus pervenerit. Cum nihil erit præter animum, nulla res objecta, impedit, quo minus percipiat, quale quidque sit; quamvis copiose hæc diceremus, si res postularet, quam multa, quam varia spectacula, animus in locis cœlestibus esset habiturus."

P. 210, 211. "Ipsi majorum gentium dii qui habentur, hinc à nobis profecti in cœlum reperientur : multi de diis prava sentiunt : id enim vitioso more effici solet : omnes tamen esse vim et naturam divinam arbitrantur : nec vero id collocutio hominum, aut consensus efficit : non institutis opinio est confirmata ; non legibus ; omni autem in re consensus omnium gentium lex naturæ putanda est. Hæc ita sentimus natura duce, nulla ratione, nullaque doctrina : maximum vero argumentum est naturam ipsam de immortalitate animorum tacitam judicare, quod omnibus curæ sunt, et maxime quidem, quæ post mortem futura sint. N. B. Abiit ad deos Hercules ; nunquam abiisset nisi cum inter homines esset, eam sibi viam munivisset. Quid in hac republica tot tantosque viros ad rempublicam interfectos cogitasse arbitramur ? Eisdemne ut finibus nomen suum quibus vita terminaretur ? Nemo unquam sine magna spe immortalitatis se pro patria offerret ad mortem. Nescio quomodo inhæret in mentibus quasi sæculorum quoddam augurium futurorum ; idque maximis ingeniis, altissimisque animis et existit maxime et apparet facillimè : quo quidem dempto quis tam esset amens, qui semper in laboribus et periculis viveret ?"

This maketh me think of Augustin's saying, "Si anima mortalis est, Epicurus in animo meo palmam habet." (Confess. l. vi. c. ult.)

"Quod si omnium consensus (inquit. Cic. ib.) naturæ vox est, omnesque qui ubique sunt consentiunt esse aliquid quod ad

eos pertineat qui è vita cesserunt, nobis quoque idem existimandum. Etsi, quorum aut ingenio aut virtute animus excellit, eos arbitramur quia natura optima sint, cernere naturæ vim maxime; verisimile est cum optimus quisque maxime posteritati serviat, esse aliquid cujus is post mortem sensum sit habiturus. Sed, ut deos esse natura opinamur, qualesque sint ratione cognoscimus: sic permanere animos arbitramur consensu omnium nationum. N.B. Qua in sede, qualesque sint ratione discendum est."

P. 232. "Hæc igitur et alia innumerabilia cum cernimus, possumusne dubitare, quin his præsit aliquis vel Effector, si hæc nata sunt ut Platoni videtur, vel si semper fuerint ut Aristoteli placet, moderator tanti operis et muneris? Sic mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, ut Deum non vides, tamen ut Deum agnoscis ex operibus ejus, sic ex memoria rerum et inventionem et celeritate motus, omnique pulchritudine virtutis vim divinam mentis agnoscito. In quo igitur est loco? Ubi ubi sit animus, certe quidem in te est. Quæ est ei natura? Propria puto et sua. Sed fac igneam, fac spirabilem! Nihil ad id de quo agimus: illud modo videto: ut Deum noris, etsi ejus ignores et locum et faciem: sic animum tibi tuum notum esse oportere, etiamsi ejus ignores et locum et formam: in animi autem cognitione dubitare non possumus, nisi plane in physicis plumbei sumus, quin nihil sit animis admistum, nihil concretum, nihil copulatum, nihil coagmentatum, nihil duplex. Quod cum ita sit, certe nec secerni, nec dividi, nec discerpi, nec distrahi potest; nec interire igitur. Est enim interitus quasi discessus et secretio ac direptus earum partium, quæ ante interitum junctione aliqua tenebantur. His et talibus adductus Socrates, nec patronum quæsit ad iudicium capitis, nec iudicibus supplex fuit, adhibuitque liberam contumaciam, à magnitudine animi ductam, non à superbia: et supremo vitæ die de hoc ipso multa disseruit, et paucis ante diebus, cum facile posset educi è custodia, noluit: et cum pene in manu jam mortiferum illud teneret poculum, locutus ita est, ut non ad mortem trudi, verum in cælum videretur ascendere. Ita enim censebat, itaque disseruit; Duas esse vias, duplicesque cursus animorum è corpore excedentium: nam qui se humanis vitiis contaminassent, et se totos libidinibus dedissent—eis divinum quoddam iter esse, seclusum à concilio deorum. Qui autem se integros castosque servavissent, quibusque fuisset minima cùm corporis contagio, seseque ab his semper sevocassent, essentque in corporibus humanis, vitam imitati deorum, his ad illos à quibus essent profecti reditum facilem

patere. Cato autem sic abiit à vita, ut causam moriendi nactum se esse gauderet. Vetat enim Dominus ille in nobis Deus injussu hinc nos suo demigrare. Cum vero causam justam Deus ipse dederit, ut tunc Socrati, nunc Catoni, sæpe multis; ne ille medius fidius vir sapiens lætus ex his tenebris in lucem illam excesserit: nec tamen illa vincula carceris ruperit; leges enim vetant."

P. 227. "Licet concurrant Plebei omnes philosophi (sic enim ii qui à Platone et Socrate, et ab illa familia dissident, appellandi videntur) non modo nihil unquam tam eleganter explicabunt, sed ne hoc quidem ipsum quam subtiliter conclusum sit, intelligent. Sentit animus se moveri: quod cum sentit, illud una sentit, se via sua, non aliena moveri: nec accidere posse, ut ipse unquam à se deseratur: ex quo efficitur æternitas.

I have been tedious, and will therefore only add his application, pp. 233, 234. "Tota philosophorum vita, commentatio mortis. Nam quid aliud agimus cum à voluptate, id est à corpore, cum à re familiari, quæ est ministra et famula corporis, cum à repub. cum à negotio omni sevocamus animum? Quid inquam tum agimus, nisi animum ad seipsum, advocamus? secum esse cogimus? maximeque a corpore abducimus: secernere autem à corpore animum, nec quidquam aliud est quam emori discere. Quare hoc commentemur, mihi crede; disjungamusque nos à corporibus, id est, consuescamus mori. Hoc et dum erimus in terris erit illi cœlesti vitæ simile. Et cum illuc ex his vinculis emissi feremur, minus tardabitur cursus animorum: quo cum venerimus, tum denique vivemus: nam hæc quidem vita, mors est, quam lamentari possem, si liberet."

And how the somatists were then esteemed, he addeth, "Catervæ veniunt contradicentium, non solum Epicureorum, quos equidem non despicio; sed nescio quomodo, doctissimus quisque contemnit." And among Christians, they will never recover their reputation.

I know that some doubting Christians are ready to say, as Cicero's auditor, who saith, that he had often read Plato; "Sed nescio quomodo dum lego assentior; cum posui librum, et mecum ipse de immortalitate animorum cæpi cogitare, assensio omnis illa elabitur." But this is because the truth is not sufficiently concocted, nor the conjoined frame of evidences entirely and deeply printed on the mind; and so diversions alienate the mind from the just apprehension of some of those evidences which it had formerly had a glimpse of, and leave it open to the contrary suggestions. He that is surprised when his pro-

spective glass, or telescope, is not with him, will not see those things which by their help he saw before. And the remembrance of former convictions in the general, will hardly satisfy a man against his present different apprehension, though he be conscious that he had then more help than now. I have found, myself, a far clearer apprehension of the certainty of the life to come, and of the truth of the Gospel, when I have come newly from the serious view of the entire frame of convincing evidences, than I can have at other times, when many particulars are out of the way, or much worn off my apprehensions.

These passages I have cited out of heathens, to convince or confound those that, under the Gospel, with their hearts, tongues, or lives, deny those truths which the light of nature hath so far made clear. Remembering both those symbols of Pythagoras : "De rebus divinis absque lumine ne loquaris, et Diis rebusque divinis, nihil tam mirabile dicitur, quod non debeas credere;" and his verse (translated by Ficinus) :

" Corpore deposito cum liber ad æthera perges,
Evades hominem, factus deus ætheris almi."

Alcinous, reciting Plato's 'Reasons for the Immortality of the Soul,' (cap 25,) mentioneth seven reasons; 1. "Anima cuicunque adest, vitam affert, utpote illi naturaliter insitam : quod vero vitam præstat, mortem minime suscipit : ergo immortale existit. 2. Anima cum per corporis sensus ad illa quæ sensibilia sunt descendit, angitur et turbatur ; nec similis esse potest illius cujus præsentia turbatur. 3. Anima ipsa natura corpori dominatur. Quod autem natura sua regit, et imperat, divinati cognatum : ergo anima Deo proxima immortalis est," &c. And because it may be objected, that, by the first reason, the souls of brutes would be immortal, he answereth that, but so doubtfully and darkly as is not worth the reciting. But, though Alcinous incline to the negative of the immortality of the *animæ brutorum*, Porphyrius is peremptory for the affirmative, upon the supposition of their rationality.

The stoic philosophers bear, also, as full a testimony against the atheist, and the deniers of humanity, as the rest ; for though Cicero thank them for nothing, and rebuke them for denying the soul's eternity, and giving us but *usuram ut cornicibus*, a longer and not an everlasting life, yet some of them seem to be of another mind, and the rest rather think that the souls of men will participate in the world's periodical revolutions, than be at all annihilated or deprived of felicity. The paucity of their

writings, which have come down to us, and the malice of the Epicureans, with whom they were at the greatest odds, did make them represented as if they had held more unreasonable opinions, and been more sour and inhuman than indeed they were; and some, who, of late times, condemn them for that in which they agree with the doctrine of Christ, do seem to mean Christianity, while they exclaim against the severities of stoicism, and mean the church while they name but the porch. Certainly, if Cicero himself, who is offended with their schism, do represent their opinions aright, and if we may judge of the rest by his speeches of Cato, and by the writings of Seneca, Epictetus, and Antonine, and if Barlaam hath truly collected their ethics, there were no men that spake and lived so like Christians, who were strangers to Christ. He that would see the difference between them and the Epicureans, let him but read the ‘Præloquium,’ before his Antoninus, of Mr. Gataker; that man of admirable learning, humility, and piety, not to be named without love and honour, nor in this age without tears. Of Antoninus himself, he saith, “*Certè quæcunque Dominus ipse Christus in concionibus collationibusque suis historiæ evangelicæ insertis (de mali cogitatione etiam abstinenda, de affectibus vitiosis supprimendis, de sermone otioso non insuper habendo, de animo cum primis excolendo, et ad imaginem divinam effigendo, de beneficentia simplicissime exhibenda, de injuriis æquanimiter ferendis, de admonitione et increpatione cum moderatione cautioneque accurata exercendis, de rebus quibuslibet, adeoque vita ipsa, ubi res ratioque poscit nihili habendis, de aliis denique plerisque pietatis, charitatis, æquitatis, humanitatis, officiis quam exquisitissime obeundis exequendisque) præcepta dedit; apud nostrum hunc eadem, perinde acsi illa lectitasset ipse, in dissertationum commentationumque harum congerie inspersa passim, nec sine vehementia et vivacitate insigni quæ in præcordia ipsa penitus penetret. Lector quivis sedulus advertet, ingenuus agnoscat.*”

The sum of their doctrine, different from the Epicureans, he thus reciteth, and, by citations, copiously proveth: “*Numen cœleste rerum humanarum curam gerere; nec universi tantummodo, sed hominum etiam singulorum, et rerum quoque singularum; rebus humanis præsto esse, generique humano, non ad bona vere sic dicta duntaxat, sed et ad vitæ hujus commoda, et adminicula suppetitias ferre. Deum itaque ante omnia colendum; ad omnia invocandum, per omnia cogitandum, in omnibus agnoscendum et comprobandum, de omnibus laudandum et cele-*

brandum ; huic uni in omni negotio simpliciter obsequendum ; ab ipso quicquid obvenerit animo prompto ac lubenti excipendum atque amplexandum, nihil melius, nihil convenientius, nihil conducibilius, nihil opportunius, aut tempestivius, quam id, quicquid existat, quod ipse voluerit, existimandum : quocunque ducere visum fuerit, citra tergiversationem aut murmurationem, sponte sequendum ; locum stationemque quemcunque is assignaverit, strenue tuendum, enixe tenendum, etiamsi mortem millies oppetere oporteret. Hæc de numine stoici et erga numen affecta."

"De homine et officiis. Hunc et cordatus diligere et curare et sustinere, injuriaque omni (ut quæ impietatis etiam notam inurat) abstinere ; et beneficentia prosequi, nec sibi soli genitum censere se, aut vivere, sed in commune bonum ac beneficium, cunctis pro facultate viribusque semet exhibere, re ipsa, reique bene gestæ conscientia, (nec hac etiam ipsa quadamtenus reputata), citra vestem, aut mercedis spem commodive proprii intuitum, contentum agere ; à beneficio uno præstito ad aliud transire, nec unquam benefaciendo defatisci ; sed vitæ telam, tanquam vivendi fructus hic sit ; benefactis sibi invicem continenter annexis, ita totum pertexere, ut nusquam interveniat hiatus ullus vel minimus ; beneficii loco, quod benefecerit habentem ; sibique profuisse existimantem : si alii cuiquam usui esse poterit ; nec extra se proinde quicquam vel laudis humanæ, vel lucelli, aut aucupantem aut expetentem : ad hæc nihil mentis cultu antiquius, nihil honesti studio potius aut pretiosius habere : ab eo denique quod officii sui esse norit, nulla vel vitæ, nedum alius rei cujuspiam, cupidine abducendum, nulla mortis cruciatuque illius, ne dum damni aut detrimenti formidine abigendum se permittere." Hæc stoicorum præcepta sunt.

When will the whole tribe of the Epicureans ever give the world such a prince as Antonine, who taught the world that a prince should be a philosopher ; and that self-government, and a well-ordered mind and life, is the first point in the government and well-ordering of the commonwealth ; and that monarchy may be so used, as to consist as well with the people's interest and liberty, as the most accurate Venetian democracy : the only hurt that ever he was charged to do being this, that he lived so well, that he seemed somewhat to hinder the succeeding lustre of Christianity, even in Constantine and Theodosius themselves.

And as for the stoics' great doctrine of virtue's self-sufficiency

to felicity, which Plato and Aristotle also own against the Epicurean felicity of pleasure, it is undoubtedly a very great and sacred theological verity ; but it implieth a higher truth, which I have vindicated in this treatise, viz., that man hath an ultimate end above himself, and that God, for all that he is perfect, and can receive no addition of felicity, is both his own and our End, though *intendere finem* is not spoken univocally of God and man ; and that his goodness, as essential in himself, and as his own perfection, is, in the order of our conceptions, much higher than his benignity or goodness, as related to the good of man. I have read some late self-esteeming writers, (who love not to be named by way of opposition,) who have undertaken the defence of the Epicurean heresy, that pleasure is formally both man's felicity, and his ultimate end : but their reasonings for it are not half so handsome and adapted to deceive, as the discourse of Torquatus in Cicero *de Finib.* is, which indeed may seem very plausible, till Cicero's excellent answer is compared with it. It is a fair pretence to say, that a good man is pleased with nothing but that which is good, and that true pleasure is to be found especially in virtue, and that temperance and chastity should be more pleasant than excess and luxury ; and yet that the best men, when they do any great and excellent work, do therefore do it because it pleaseth them. But the truth is, that *bonum qua bonum est objectum voluntatis*, good and appetible are the same ; it is not first good because it pleaseth us, but it pleaseth us, because it is esteemed by us to be good. And the greatest good should most greatly please us, because it is first the greatest good ; and as God in himself is infinitely better than any delight or felicity of ours, so is he, therefore, to be more the object of our delight. And as the good of the world, or of kingdoms, or of thousands, is better than the pleasure of one individual person, so should it be better loved, and more delighted in. For if good, as good, be appetible and delectable, then the greatest good must have the greatest love and pleasure. And nature itself telleth us, that he that would not rather be annihilated than the world should be annihilated, or would not lose his life and honour, to save the life, and honour, and felicity of king and kingdom, is no good member of civil society, but a person blinded by selfishness and sensuality. Therefore, man hath something above himself, and his own pleasure, to seek and to take pleasure in. How far you can congruously say, that you

take pleasure in your pleasure, and so make your own pleasure the object, yea, the only ultimate object of itself, I shall not now stay to inquire.⁷ But certain I am, that though our love, which is our complacency in the beloved object, is our *actus finalis*, yet it is not the *objectum finale* to itself; but God himself, the infinite Good, is that final Object; and the public good is a more noble and excellent object than our own. And though it be truly our felicity to love God, yet we love him not chiefly because it is our felicity to love him, but because he is chiefly good and lovely; and then, in the second instant, we love our own love, and delight even in our own delights. Indeed, the sensitive life, as such, can seek nothing higher than its own delight; but the rational life is made to intend and prosecute that end, which reason telleth us is best, and to prefer that before ourselves, which is better than ourselves. And therefore the Epicurean opinion, which maketh pleasure our highest end, doth show that the sect is sensual and brutish, and have brought their reason into servitude to their appetites and lusts. And nature itself doth abhor the notion, when it is brought into the light; and will hear him with some horror, who shall speak out and say, 'God is not to be chiefly loved for himself, nor as he is best in himself, nor as my ultimate objective End, but only to be loved next myself, as a means to my felicity or pleasure, as meat, drink, ease, and sport, and lust are; and virtue or holiness is not to be loved chiefly for itself, that is, as it is the image of God, and pleasing to him, but as it conduceth to my pleasure.' As Cicero excel-

⁷ Even in friendship with men, it is commonly said that we must have more respect to our friend than to ourselves: and therefore Cicero pleadeth that Epicurus's opinion is inconsistent with true friendship. However that stand, I am sure, in our love to God, we must love him more for himself than for our own ends and benefit. Therefore it is that I distinguished love before, from obedience as such, as being somewhat more excellent, and the final grace. And Proclus 'De Anim. et Dæmone,' discerned this distinction, when he saith, "*Belli finis est justitia: pacis autem aliud quiddam excellentius bonum, amicitia, scil. atque unio finis enim universæ virtutis est ut tradunt Pythagorici. Aristotelesque confirmat; ut omnibus jam factis amicis, justitia non ulterius egeamus, quando, viz. sublatum fuerit, meum, et non-meum.*" And if this be true of the love of man, much more of the love of God; which they also may do well to consider of who most fear the cessation of that individuation of souls, which consisteth in the distance that now we are at: for though doubtless there will continue an individuation, yet union is so much of the felicity, perfection, and delight of souls; union, I say, with God, as we are capable, and with one another; that we should rather be afraid, lest we shall not be near enough, than lest too much nearness should confound us.

lently noteth, there is a great deal of difference between these two, "To love virtue as virtue, and so to take pleasure in it because it is virtue," and "To love virtue for pleasure's sake, more than for its own;" for he that doth so, must say as Cicero chargeth Epicurus plainly to say, "That luxury is not to be discommended, if it be not unpleasant; for the end is the measure and rule to judge of all the means." If pleasure, as pleasure, be best, then to him that so contrives it, to live more pleasedly in whoredom, and drunkenness, and theft, and murder, than in godliness and honesty, it will be better so to do; and virtue, and lust, or wickedness, will stand in competition only in the point of pleasure: and then, which think you will have the greater party, and what a case would mankind be in? I am persuaded, that the well studying the excellent discourse of Cicero on this point, and the reasons which the stoics, and the rest of the philosophers, give against the plebeian philosophers, as Cicero calleth them, may much conduce to help many divines themselves to a better understanding of the same controversy; as in theology they have otherwise worded it, "Whether God, or our own felicity, be most to be loved?" and yet without running into the fanatic extreme, of separating the love of God and ourselves, and calling men to try whether for his glory they can be willing to be damned. Only when you read the philosopher saying that virtue in and for itself is to be loved as our felicity, elucidate it by remembering, that this is because that virtue in itself is the image of God, and by our felicity they mean the perfection of our natures, in respect of the end for which we were made. And that, as the excellency of my knife, or pen, yea, or my horse, is not to be measured by their own pleasure, but their usefulness to me, because I am their end; so is it as to man's perfection, as he is made for God, and related to him, for all that he hath no need of us, seeing he can be pleased in us. Thus this philosophical controversy is coincident with one of the greatest in theology.

Though I have displeased many readers, by making this treatise swell so big, by answering so many objections as I have done, yet I know that many will expect that I should have made it much greater, by answering, 1. Abundance of particular objections from Scripture difficulties; 2. And many discourses of several sorts of persons, who contradict some things which I have said. But I supersede any further labour of that kind, for these following reasons:

1. It would fill many volumes to do it, as the number and quality of the objections do require. 2. Those that require it are yet so lazy, that they will not read this much which I have already written, as esteeming it too long. 3. They may find it done already by commentators, if they will but have the patience to peruse them. 4. I have laid down that evidence for the main cause of godliness and Christianity, by which he that well digesteth it, will be enabled himself to defend it against abundance of cavils, which I cannot have time to enumerate and answer. 5. The scribbles of self-conceited men are so tedious, and every one so confident that his reasons are considerable, and yet every one so impatient to be contradicted and confuted, that it is endless to write against them, and it is unprofitable to sober readers, as well as tedious to me, and ungrateful to themselves. To instance but in the last that came to my hands, an 'Inquisitio in Fidem Christianorum hujus seculi:' (the name prefixed I so much honour, that I will not mention it :) p. 3, he calleth confidence in error by the name of certainty, as if every man were certain that hath but ignorance enough to overlook all cause of doubting. P. 13, he will not contend if you say, that it is by divine faith, that we believe the words to be true which are God's; and by human faith, by which we believe them to be the words of God. He saith, that faith hath no degrees; but is always equal to itself: to believe is to assent, and to doubt is to suspend assent; *ergo*, where there is the least doubt, there is no faith; and where there is no doubt, there is the highest faith; *ergo*, faith is always in the highest, and is never more or less: and yet it may be called small when it is *quasi nulla*, (that *quasi*, is to make up a gap,) in respect of the subject, or at least hardly yielded; and in regard of the object, when few things are believed. P. 26, he maketh the Calvinists to be enthusiasts, that is, fanatics, because they say, that they know the Scripture by the Spirit: as if, subjectively, we had no need of the Spirit to teach us the things of God; and, objectively, the Spirit of miracles and sanctification, were not the notifying evidence or testimony of the truth of Christ. The same name he vouchsafeth them that hold that the Scripture is known by universal tradition to be God's word, and every man's own reason must tell him (or discern) the meaning of it. And he concludeth, that if every one may expound the Scripture, even in fundamentals, then every man may plead against all magistrates, in defence of

murder, or any other crime, as a rational plea ; and say, why should you punish me for that which God hath bid me do ? As if God would have no reasonable creature, but brutes only to be his subjects. As if a man could knowingly obey a law, which he neither knoweth, nor must know the meaning of, and is bound to do he knoweth not what. And as if the king's subjects must not understand the meaning of the fifth commandment, nor of Rom. xiii. 1, "Honour thy father and mother ;" and, "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, and not resist." Or, as if kings must govern only dogs and swine ; or might make murder, adultery, idolatry, and perjury, the duty of all their subjects when they pleased, because none must judge of the meaning of God's law by which they are forbidden : or, as if it were the only way to make men obedient to kings and parents, to have no understanding that God commandeth any man to obey them, nor to know any law of God that doth require it. Or, as if all our pastors and teachers were not to be so useful to us as a sign-post ; nor we were not to learn of them or of our parents any thing that God, either by nature or Scripture, ever taught us : or, as if a child or subject, who is required to learn the meaning of his ruler's laws, to judge of them *judicio privatae discretionis*, were thereby allowed to misunderstand them, and to say that they command us that which they forbid us ; and because the king forbiddeth us to murder, he alloweth us to say, you proposed it to my understanding, and I understand it that you bid me murder, and therefore you may not punish me. As if he that is bound to judge by a bare discerning what is commanded him, and what forbidden, were allowed to judge, *in partem utramlibet*, that it is or it is not, as please himself. As if when the king hath printed his statutes, he had forfeited all his authority by so doing, and his subjects might say, why do you punish us for disobeying your laws, when you promulgated them to us, as rational creatures, to discern their sense ? Will it profit the world to write confutations of such stuff as this ; or must a man that is not condemned to stage-playing or ballad-making, thus waste his time ? Do the people need to be saved from such stuff as this ? If so, what remedy, but to pity them, and say, 'Quos perdere vult Jupiter hos dementat, et si populus vult decipi, decipiatur.'

And yet to do no more wrong to the Scriptures, than to councils, and bulls, and statutes, and testaments, and deeds, and bonds, he concludeth, "Of all writings whatsoever, that by the

mere words of the writer you cannot be certain of his sense, though they be common words, and you take them in the common sense." So that if any doubt arise about my words, if I resolve it by writing, I cannot be understood; but if I spake the same syllables by word of mouth, it would serve the turn. As if no man could be sure of the sense of any law, or testament, or bond, or covenant, which is committed to writing, nor of any exposition of them, if once it fall under pen or press. As if God's writing the Ten Commandments had left them unintelligible, in comparison of his speaking them: then farewell all historical certainty. Hath every single priest himself any assurance of the sense of the council, the canons, the pope's decretals and bulls, but by the way of writing? And so the poor people must, instead of the church, believe only that priest that orally speaketh to them, though he have no certainty of the matter himself. If this doctrine be made good once, it will spoil the printers' trade, and the clerks', and the courts of record, and the post-office, too.

But, p. 51, he maketh the consent of the universal church to be the only sure communication of christian doctrine in the articles of faith; yea, the consent of the present age concerning the former. But how the consent of the whole church shall be certainly known to every man and woman, when no writing can certainly make known any man's mind, is hard to tell a man that expecteth reason. And that you may see how much the subject of this treatise is concerned in such discourses, he addeth, "That if the church had at any time been small, its testimony had been doubtful; but (saith he) it testifieth of itself that Christians were never few;" and therefore it is to be believed. But we will have no such prevaricating defence of Christianity. The major is the infidel's erroneous cavil; the minor is a false defence of the faith. The church never said that Christians were never few: it hath ever confessed the contrary, that once they were few; and yet it hath proved against the infidel, that its testimony was not doubtful, having better evidence of their veracity than numbers.

You may perceive by these strictures upon this one discourse, what an endless task it would be to write confutations of every man that hath leisure to publish to the world his opinions, which are injurious to the christian verity. And, therefore, no sober reader will expect that I or he must be so tired, before he can be satisfied and settled in the truth.